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CVE-2026-30824

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Missing Authentication in Flowise

CVE-2026-30824

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authentication

CWE:

CWE-306

Impact:

Unauthenticated Access to Privileged Operations

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Flowise exposes NVIDIA NIM router endpoints under /api/v1/nvidia-nim/* without enforcing authentication in the global middleware.

This can allow unauthenticated attackers to access privileged container management and token generation functionality, leading to full compromise of connected AI workloads and supporting infrastructure in exposed deployments.

Affected context

The vulnerability affects Flowise deployments where:

  • The NVIDIA NIM router endpoints (/api/v1/nvidia-nim/*) are reachable over a network (e.g., internet-exposed, VPN, or internal LAN).
  • The application relies on the global authentication middleware to protect API routes.
  • NVIDIA NIM-related operations expose container management, model routing, or token generation capabilities.

Instances deployed behind strict network controls or additional reverse-proxy authentication may reduce the practical impact, but the application itself does not enforce authentication on these routes.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP API endpoints under /api/v1/nvidia-nim/*.
  • Required access: Network-level access to the Flowise instance (no valid account or credentials required).
  • Trigger point: Direct invocation of NVIDIA NIM router endpoints that perform container management or token generation actions.
  • Why exploitation is possible: These routes are explicitly whitelisted in the global authentication middleware, so requests bypass the normal authentication checks and are treated as trusted, even when sent by unauthenticated clients.

Why this happens

This issue stems from a misconfiguration in the authentication and authorization layer, where a set of high-privilege endpoints is exempted from the global authentication middleware.

Functionally, this aligns with CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function, where security-sensitive operations are exposed without verifying the user's identity.

The underlying pattern is that route-level or whitelist logic incorrectly assumes that specific paths are safe to expose or will be protected elsewhere, resulting in unauthenticated access to functionality that should require strong authentication and, ideally, fine-grained authorization.

Potential impact

  • Unauthenticated creation, modification, or deletion of NVIDIA NIM-related containers or routes.
  • Unauthorized generation or retrieval of tokens that can be used to access AI models or backend services.
  • Abuse of compute resources, including running arbitrary or excessive workloads on connected infrastructure.
  • Data exposure through access to models, logs, or configuration linked to the Flowise instance.
  • Lateral movement opportunities, if issued tokens or managed containers can reach other internal services or data stores.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on strengthening the authentication boundary and minimizing implicit trust in route whitelists:

  • Require authentication for all NVIDIA NIM router endpoints, especially those involving container management, configuration changes, or token issuance.
  • Avoid broad, path-based authentication bypass lists; prefer an explicit opt-in model where all routes are protected by default and only non-sensitive ones are carefully exempted.
  • Introduce layered authorization checks, ensuring that even authenticated users must have appropriate roles or permissions to perform high-privilege operations.
  • Place Flowise behind a trusted reverse proxy or API gateway that enforces authentication and rate limiting, especially in internet-facing deployments.
  • Apply the principle of least privilege to any tokens generated by these endpoints, limiting their scope, duration, and accessible resources.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection strategies typically target both code-level misconfigurations and runtime misuse:

  • Static analysis / code review:
  • Look for route definitions under /api/v1/nvidia-nim/* (or equivalent) that are not wrapped by shared authentication middleware.
  • Flag any use of "whitelists" or "public route" registries that include endpoints responsible for container management, token generation, or configuration changes.
  • Verify that authentication and authorization concerns are centralized and not selectively bypassed for convenience.
  • Configuration and policy checks:
  • Implement CI/CD checks that fail builds when new high-privilege routes are registered without explicit authentication and authorization declarations.
  • Use policy-as-code tools to enforce that all routes exposing management or token operations require auth.
  • Runtime monitoring:
  • Log all requests to /api/v1/nvidia-nim/* with client IP, path, and result status, and alert on suspicious unauthenticated access patterns.
  • Monitor for unexpected spikes in token creation, container lifecycle events, or unusual workloads triggered via these APIs.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/releases/tag/flowise%403.0.13
github.comgithub.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-5f53-522j-j454

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if the Flowise instance is reachable over the network where an attacker resides (for example, if it is exposed to the internet or accessible from a shared internal network), the attacker can call the affected endpoints without authentication.

No. The core issue is that these endpoints are whitelisted from the global authentication middleware, allowing completely unauthenticated access as long as the attacker can reach the API over the network.

Ensure that all security-sensitive routes—such as those that manage containers, configuration, or tokens—are protected by default authentication and authorization middleware. Avoid global whitelists for privileged endpoints and instead rely on explicit, centralized security controls that are applied uniformly.

Adopt a secure-by-default API design where:

  • Every new route is authenticated by default.
  • Privileged operations require both authentication and fine-grained authorization checks.
  • Any exceptions (truly public endpoints) are narrowly scoped, well documented, and subject to security review.
  • Automated tests and static checks verify that high-privilege functionality cannot be invoked without a valid identity and sufficient permissions.
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