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CVE-2026-30795

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information

CVE-2026-30795

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information

CWE:

CWE-319

Impact:

Exposure of authentication-related secrets and session configuration data to network eavesdroppers

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

RustDesk Client transmits sensitive preset address-book passwords in cleartext within heartbeat JSON payloads across Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS, and Android.

An attacker capable of sniffing network traffic on the path between client and server may capture these secrets and later impersonate users or compromise stored remote-access presets.

Affected context

The vulnerability appears in RustDesk Client's heartbeat sync loop logic, implemented in src/hbbs_http/sync.rs, where JSON heartbeat payloads include a preset address-book password field.

In affected versions (through 1.4.5), this field may be sent without adequate cryptographic protection over the network channel.

Environments where traffic can be monitored—such as shared Wi‑Fi, enterprise networks with inspection points, or compromised routers—are more exposed, especially if additional transport protections (e.g., TLS with strict verification) are not consistently enforced.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network path between RustDesk Client and its corresponding RustDesk backend or relay infrastructure.
  • Required access: Ability to passively observe or capture network traffic (e.g., on the same LAN, Wi‑Fi hotspot, proxy, or upstream network device).
  • Trigger point: Periodic heartbeat sync HTTP/HTTPS requests initiated by the client that include JSON payloads containing the preset address-book password or related secrets.
  • Why exploitation is possible: Sensitive information is embedded directly in the heartbeat JSON in a recoverable form (cleartext or trivially decodable), allowing an eavesdropper to read it without needing to break a robust cryptographic scheme or possess application-level secrets.

Why this happens

This issue stems from including sensitive credential-like data (the preset address-book password) as a plain field in routine heartbeat synchronization messages without ensuring it is protected at the transport or application layer.

Conceptually, this aligns with CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information, where confidential or authentication-related data is sent over a channel that does not guarantee confidentiality against network observers.

The underlying pattern is treating operational telemetry/heartbeat channels as non-sensitive while still embedding secrets needed for user-initiated operations, rather than separating secrets from routine sync traffic or applying strong encryption tied to well-authenticated peers.

Potential impact

  • An attacker monitoring network traffic may capture preset address-book passwords used to protect remote-access entries.
  • Compromised address-book credentials could allow unauthorized access to remote endpoints configured within RustDesk.
  • Captured secrets can be reused to impersonate a user's configuration, potentially enabling social engineering or lateral movement.
  • Leaked configuration details may expose internal hostnames or connection metadata that can aid further reconnaissance.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on ensuring secrets are never exposed in cleartext during routine synchronization:

  • Avoid sending passwords or password-equivalent tokens in periodic heartbeat or telemetry messages; instead, design protocols so that such data is only exchanged when strictly necessary and over strongly authenticated channels.
  • Where sensitive fields must traverse the network, protect them with transport-layer encryption configured securely (including certificate validation and resistance to downgrade or interception) and/or with an additional application-layer encryption scheme.
  • Replace password-based fields in sync payloads with opaque, revocable identifiers or capability tokens that do not directly reveal user credentials.
  • Minimize the amount of sensitive data stored or propagated in client-side configuration; prefer derived or scoped tokens with limited privileges.
  • Apply least-privilege principles to any secrets used for remote access, ensuring that compromise of one preset has minimal blast radius.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect and monitor for similar risks through a combination of code-centric and network-centric approaches:

  • Static analysis / code review: Search for occurrences where password, secret, token, or credential fields are serialized into JSON or other payloads and passed into HTTP/HTTPS clients without explicit encryption or redaction.
  • Configuration and protocol review: Examine heartbeat, sync, and telemetry protocols to ensure they do not carry authentication secrets or password-like values; validate that cryptographic protections are consistently enforced.
  • Network inspection (in controlled test environments): Capture RustDesk Client traffic in a lab and inspect application-layer messages for readable credential-like values, ensuring they are absent from routine sync flows.
  • Policy enforcement: Introduce development guidelines that prohibit embedding plaintext passwords in background or periodic network messages, and adopt automated checks in CI that flag serialization of sensitive fields into network-bound structures.

Sources

SourceLink
docs.google.comdocs.google.com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vSds6jjpd38oO_yIAyd1HYtKNUuea-I-ozAPpGhYI7QgAU-QGJ7D8a4rOZVj1vmiUXV1EcdRHf9aZAW/pub
github.comgithub.com/rustdesk/rustdesk
vulsec.orgvulsec.org/

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, but only by attackers who can observe the network path between the RustDesk Client and its server (for example, on shared networks, compromised routers, or inspection points). They do not need to interact with the client directly; passive sniffing of traffic can be enough.

No valid RustDesk credentials on the client are required. The main requirement is network-level access to capture traffic. Local access is not necessary if the attacker can monitor the relevant network segment or intermediary devices.

Redesign the protocol so that passwords or password-equivalent values are never sent in periodic heartbeat or sync messages, and ensure any necessary sensitive exchanges occur only over robustly authenticated, encrypted channels. Where possible, replace direct passwords with scoped, revocable tokens that carry minimal privilege.

Classify all data fields by sensitivity during design, prohibit transmission of secrets in telemetry or heartbeat channels, enforce strong encryption with certificate validation for all control traffic, and use code review and automated tooling to flag any serialization of sensitive fields into network payloads before release.

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