Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

SQL Injection in itsourcecode Document Management System

CVE-2026-3069

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-74, CWE-89

Impact:

Data Exposure and Integrity Compromise via SQL Injection

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A SQL injection vulnerability in the itsourcecode Document Management System 1.0 allows attackers to manipulate database queries via the field1 parameter in /edtlbls.php.

When user-supplied data is concatenated directly into SQL statements without proper sanitization or parameterization, a remote attacker can tamper with queries, potentially accessing or modifying sensitive data.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in the web interface of the itsourcecode Document Management System 1.0, specifically in requests that hit /edtlbls.php and process the field1 parameter.

It is relevant in deployments where user-controlled or indirectly influenced input is passed into backend SQL queries without robust validation or prepared statements.

Typical at-risk contexts include public or semi-public web deployments where attackers can interact with the application over HTTP/S.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP/S endpoint exposing /edtlbls.php
  • Required access: Network access to the web application; no prior authentication may be required depending on how the endpoint is protected
  • Input vector: The field1 request parameter (e.g., query string, form field, or AJAX payload) is incorporated into SQL statements
  • Trigger point: Execution of dynamically constructed SQL queries on the database using unsanitized field1 input
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application constructs SQL commands by directly embedding user-supplied data, violating the principle of separating code from data as described in CWE-89 (SQL Injection) and CWE-74 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component)

Why this happens

The underlying issue is the direct concatenation of user input from the field1 parameter into SQL queries without using parameterized statements or proper escaping.

This pattern allows special SQL control characters (quotes, operators, comment markers) to alter the intended structure of the query, transforming data fields into executable control logic.

Conceptually, this maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'), and is a specific instance of CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component where the downstream component is the database engine.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may extract sensitive information from database tables, including document metadata and potentially user records.
  • Stored data can be modified, corrupted, or deleted, affecting the integrity and availability of documents managed by the system.
  • The database account used by the application could be abused to create or alter tables, views, or other database objects, depending on its privileges.
  • In some environments, SQL injection can be leveraged to execute server-side functions, potentially leading to broader system compromise.
  • Application behavior may be altered, enabling privilege escalation within the document management system.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating direct injection opportunities and constraining database privileges.

Recommended defensive patterns include:

  • Using parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database interactions involving user-controlled values, ensuring query structure is fixed and data is bound separately.
  • Implementing centralized input validation for parameters like field1, rejecting or strictly constraining values that do not conform to expected formats (e.g., numeric IDs, limited-length text, whitelists).
  • Applying output encoding and proper escaping when dynamic values must be incorporated into SQL-like contexts that cannot easily be parameterized.
  • Designing the database access layer to use least-privilege accounts, so that the application's database user only has the minimal rights required for its operations.
  • Adopting a secure-by-default data access abstraction (ORM or query builder) that encourages safe query construction patterns across the codebase.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can combine code-level analysis, configuration review, and runtime monitoring:

  • Static analysis rules that flag string concatenation or interpolation used to build SQL queries, especially when they incorporate request parameters like field1 in /edtlbls.php.
  • Manual code review focused on database access layers, looking for non-parameterized queries and repeated patterns of constructing SQL with raw user input.
  • Security testing and fuzzing with automated SQL injection scanners against endpoints that accept parameters used in query construction.
  • Centralized logging of database errors and suspicious query patterns (e.g., presence of tautologies, UNION, or comment markers originating from user input) with alerting on anomalies.
  • Integration of secure coding checks into CI/CD pipelines to enforce policies that disallow unsafe query-building practices before deployment.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/ltranquility/cve_submit/issues/5
itsourcecode.comitsourcecode.com/
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?ctiid.347424
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?id.347424
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?submit.757746

Frequently asked

questions

It is remotely exploitable by anyone who can send requests to the affected /edtlbls.php endpoint and control the field1 parameter, assuming no additional access controls are in place for that path.

Not necessarily. If the vulnerable functionality is exposed before authentication or on a publicly accessible page, exploitation can occur without logging in. If the endpoint is behind authentication, an attacker would need at least the lowest privilege level that can reach the vulnerable request.

Refactor the affected code so that all SQL statements use parameterized queries or prepared statements, ensuring field1 values are passed as bound parameters instead of being concatenated into the SQL string. Combine this with strict validation of acceptable input formats.

Establish a standard data access layer that enforces parameterization by design, adopt coding guidelines that prohibit dynamic SQL string building with user input, integrate static analysis to detect violations, and conduct regular security code reviews focused on query construction and input handling.

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