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CVE-2026-30404

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

SSRF in wgcloud Backend Database Connection Test

CVE-2026-30404

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

CWE:

CWE-918

Impact:

Network Pivoting and Remote Resource Access via SSRF

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

The backend database management connection test feature in wgcloud v3.6.3 contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability.

By abusing the connection test endpoint, an attacker can coerce the wgcloud server into issuing arbitrary outbound requests, which can be used to probe internal networks, fetch malicious files, and potentially chain into further compromise.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in the backend database management functionality, specifically in the feature that tests connectivity to database instances.

When user-controlled parameters (such as host, port, or URL-like connection strings) are used directly by the server to initiate outbound connections, the application effectively exposes its network position as a proxy.

In environments where wgcloud can reach internal services or has unrestricted outbound internet access, this SSRF behavior becomes particularly risky.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) endpoint used to test database connectivity in the wgcloud backend.
  • Required access: Ability to invoke the database connection test feature; typically authenticated access to the wgcloud management UI or API, depending on deployment configuration.
  • Trigger point: Submission of crafted connection parameters (e.g., host/URL) that the server uses to perform the connection test.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The server trusts user-supplied network addresses and uses them directly for outbound requests without sufficient validation, egress controls, or target restrictions.

Why this happens

This issue stems from the backend implementing a "connection test" feature by directly using untrusted, user-supplied network endpoints as destinations for server-initiated requests.

Instead of constraining these requests to a safe, predefined set of database hosts or protocols, the implementation allows arbitrary addresses or URLs to be used.

This aligns with CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), where an attacker can abuse a server's network privileges to interact with internal or external resources that would otherwise be inaccessible.

Potential impact

  • The server may be used to scan and probe internal network services and ports.
  • The application can be coerced into downloading malicious files from attacker-controlled servers.
  • Internal-only APIs, metadata services, or admin interfaces could be accessed, potentially exposing sensitive data or credentials.
  • SSRF may be chained with other vulnerabilities (e.g., deserialization bugs, misconfigured HTTP interfaces) to achieve remote code execution or lateral movement.
  • Outbound traffic could be abused to mask the origin of malicious requests or participate in further attacks.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation typically focuses on constraining how and where server-initiated requests can be made:

  • Restrict database connection tests to a controlled allowlist of hosts, IP ranges, and ports that are known to be safe.
  • Parse and validate all connection parameters rigorously, limiting allowed schemes, protocols, and address types (e.g., disallow HTTP/HTTPS if not needed, block loopback and link-local addresses).
  • Apply egress network controls at the infrastructure level to prevent the application server from reaching sensitive internal services or unrestricted internet destinations.
  • Use separate, least-privilege network segments for monitoring/management components so they cannot freely reach critical backend systems.
  • Design diagnostic features (like connection tests) to operate through backend service abstractions rather than arbitrary user-specified endpoints.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can leverage both code-centric and infrastructure-centric approaches:

  • Static analysis & code review: Flag locations where user-controlled hostnames, URLs, or connection strings are passed directly into networking libraries (HTTP clients, socket connectors, database drivers) without normalization and restriction.
  • Configuration and policy checks: Enforce policies that prevent dynamic construction of outbound destinations from raw request parameters, particularly in diagnostic or "test connection" features.
  • Runtime monitoring: Inspect server logs and outbound traffic patterns for unusual destinations (e.g., internal IP ranges, metadata endpoints, unexpected ports) originating from the wgcloud server.
  • Automated security testing: Use DAST or SSRF-focused scanners against management interfaces to identify endpoints that reflect or proxy arbitrary network requests.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/TTTlw1024/qwe/issues/3
github.comgithub.com/tianshiyeben/wgcloud/issues/98

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, in typical deployments an attacker who can reach and interact with the wgcloud management interface (often over HTTP(S)) can exploit this issue remotely, subject to any authentication or access controls that guard the connection test feature.

The attacker needs the ability to trigger the backend database connection test with attacker-controlled parameters.

This often requires at least low-privileged access to the management UI or API, though misconfigurations (e.g., exposed or weakly protected admin interfaces) can lower that bar.

The safest pattern is to eliminate arbitrary user-controlled destinations:

  • Only allow connection tests to known, configured database hosts.
  • Enforce strict allowlists and protocol restrictions.
  • Complement application-level checks with network egress controls so the server cannot reach sensitive internal or arbitrary external endpoints.

Treat any feature that sends requests on behalf of a user as potentially SSRF-prone:

  • Avoid using raw user input to construct network targets.
  • Centralize outbound request logic behind vetted helper functions that enforce allowlists and blocking rules.
  • Incorporate SSRF checks into secure design reviews, code review guidelines, and automated tooling for any new diagnostic or integration features.
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