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CVE-2026-30402

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Code Injection in wgcloud Test Connection Function

CVE-2026-30402

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Code Injection

CWE:

CWE-94

Impact:

Remote Code Execution

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

wgcloud versions 2.3.7 and earlier contain a code injection vulnerability in the "test connection" functionality that can allow execution of attacker-controlled code.

When exposed to remote input without proper validation and sanitization, this feature can be abused by a remote attacker to run arbitrary commands on the server.

Affected context

The vulnerability exists in wgcloud deployments that expose the "test connection" feature over a network interface reachable by an attacker.

It is typically triggered when the application takes connection parameters (such as host, port, credentials, or scripts) from a remote user and uses them to build or evaluate code or system commands without sufficient constraints.

Environments where wgcloud is reachable from untrusted networks, or where multi-tenant users can access the connection testing feature, are at elevated risk.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible wgcloud interface that exposes the test connection function (e.g., web UI or API).
  • Required access: Ability to invoke the test connection functionality with controlled input (may be unauthenticated or low-privileged, depending on deployment configuration).
  • Trigger point: Submission of crafted connection test parameters that are processed and executed by the server.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The implementation dynamically constructs or evaluates code or command strings from user-controlled data without adequate input restriction, escaping, or use of safer execution APIs, enabling injection of arbitrary instructions.

Why this happens

This issue is an instance of CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection').

The test connection logic appears to directly embed user-supplied fields (such as host or connection strings) into executable code or command templates.

Instead of treating incoming parameters as inert data, the implementation allows them to influence the structure of code or command lines that are run by the backend.

When parsing, concatenating, or evaluating these values, no strict separation is maintained between static logic and dynamic input, leading to an injection channel where attacker-controlled content is interpreted as executable instructions.

Potential impact

  • Remote attackers may execute arbitrary code or system commands under the wgcloud server's privileges.
  • An attacker could read, modify, or delete application data managed by wgcloud.
  • Compromise of the underlying host, potentially enabling installation of backdoors or pivoting further into the environment.
  • Disruption of monitoring or management workflows, including service downtime or resource exhaustion.
  • Possible access to sensitive configuration data and credentials stored or managed by wgcloud.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating dynamic code construction and enforcing strict data/command separation:

  • Replace any dynamic code evaluation or command templating with parameterized, API-based operations that treat user input strictly as data.
  • Introduce strong input validation on all test connection parameters, restricting them to expected formats, whitelists, and length limits.
  • Avoid building shell commands or interpreter code via string concatenation; use high-level client libraries (e.g., database or network drivers) instead of shelling out.
  • Run the wgcloud service with the least privileges necessary and isolate it (e.g., via containers, restricted OS user, and network segmentation) to limit blast radius if injected code runs.
  • Disable or tightly scope the test connection functionality in environments where it is not operationally required or where tenants are untrusted.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection commonly involves both code-centric and runtime-focused approaches:

  • Static analysis: Configure rules to flag dynamic evaluation functions, command-building patterns, and string concatenation used in execution contexts (e.g., shell calls, script interpreters) within the test connection code path.
  • Code review: During manual reviews, look for logic that constructs commands or code snippets using remote inputs; highlight any use of generic "exec"-style functions or shell invocation wrappers.
  • Security testing: Incorporate focused fuzzing and penetration tests on the test connection feature, using benign payloads designed to detect injection behavior without causing damage.
  • Runtime monitoring: Deploy application and host-level monitoring to spot anomalous child processes, unusual command executions, or connections initiated in response to test connection requests.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/TTTlw1024/qwe/issues/1
github.comgithub.com/tianshiyeben/wgcloud/issues/96

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, it is remotely exploitable if the wgcloud interface exposing the test connection function is reachable from an attacker's network path, such as the internet or an untrusted internal segment.

The attacker generally needs the ability to invoke the test connection function with crafted inputs.

Depending on configuration, this might require only basic user access or, in weaker setups, no authentication at all.

The most robust fix is to remove any dynamic code or command generation that incorporates user input and replace it with parameterized library calls that treat inputs strictly as data, backed by strong validation and whitelisting.

Adopt a secure development practice that prohibits dynamic evaluation of user-controlled input, enforces strict input validation, and mandates security-focused code review around any feature that executes commands, scripts, or queries derived from external data.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.