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CVE-2026-30314

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

OS Command Injection in Ridvay Code Command Auto-Approval

CVE-2026-30314

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Ridvay Code's command auto-approval module contains an OS command injection flaw that allows attackers to bypass its whitelist protections using shell command substitution.

By embedding malicious code inside seemingly benign commands (for example, as arguments to git), an attacker can achieve remote code execution without user interaction whenever the auto-approval logic runs.

Affected context

The vulnerability appears in environments where Ridvay Code's command auto-approval module is used to automatically approve and execute shell commands based on a regex-based whitelist.

The issue is most relevant when:

  • Commands are constructed or passed to a shell for execution (e.g., /bin/sh, /bin/bash)
  • Approval decisions rely on pattern-matching of command text rather than structured parsing
  • Shell features like command substitution $(...) or backticks are available and not explicitly disabled

In such contexts, arguments that look like safe subcommands (e.g., git log --grep="...") can harbor injected shell code that the auto-approval logic does not recognize as dangerous.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Any interface (CLI wrapper, web UI, API, automation hook, CI integration) that:
  • Sends commands through Ridvay Code's auto-approval module, and
  • Ultimately executes them in a shell with command substitution enabled.
  • Required access: Ability to submit or influence commands or command fragments that the auto-approval module inspects (e.g., user-supplied filters, arguments, or templates).
  • Trigger point: The moment the auto-approval module analyzes a composed command string, classifies it as "safe" based on regex matching (e.g., treating it as a benign git command), and passes it to the shell for execution.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The filtering logic inspects only surface-level command patterns and assumes that arguments are inert strings.
  • It uses fragile regular expressions that:
  • Match high-level commands (like git log) but
  • Fail to understand shell semantics such as $(...) and backticks.
  • The shell then interprets the arguments, prioritizing command substitution and executing the injected payload before evaluating the rest of the command.

Why this happens

The core bug is an OS command injection vulnerability arising from string-based command filtering and construction, aligned with CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command.

Instead of treating shell commands as structured data with clear boundaries, the auto-approval module:

  • Parses and validates commands using regular expressions against raw command strings.
  • Does not neutralize or disallow shell metacharacters such as $(...) and backticks.
  • Assumes that classifying the top-level command name (e.g., git) as safe is sufficient, without considering how sub-expressions are evaluated by the shell.

This mismatch between the module's simplistic, text-based view of commands and the shell's more complex execution model allows attackers to embed executable code in parameters that are approved as benign. The underlying insecure pattern is "validation by regex plus full shell execution," which fails whenever user-controllable data is incorporated into shell commands without strict encoding, quoting, or an execution model that bypasses the shell entirely.

Potential impact

  • Remote execution of arbitrary OS commands under the privileges of the Ridvay Code runtime or associated service account.
  • Theft or modification of source code repositories managed or accessed by Ridvay Code.
  • Installation of backdoors, cryptominers, or other persistent malware on affected hosts.
  • Lateral movement within the environment by using stolen credentials, SSH keys, or service tokens available to the process.
  • Manipulation of CI/CD pipelines, build artifacts, or deployment configurations that depend on Ridvay Code automations.
  • Exfiltration of sensitive data such as configuration files, API keys, and environment secrets.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation centers on eliminating direct shell interpretation of user-influenced command strings and reducing trust in textual filters:

  • Avoid shell-based execution for structured commands:
  • Use language-native process execution APIs that accept argument arrays (e.g., execve, subprocess.run([...], shell=False) in Python, or equivalent), so the shell is never invoked.
  • Represent commands and their arguments as structured data objects with clear, typed fields rather than free-form concatenated strings.
  • Apply strict command and argument whitelisting based on structure:
  • Define an explicit list of allowed commands, subcommands, and flags.
  • Validate user-provided input against well-defined schemas (e.g., specific patterns allowed in --grep options) instead of arbitrary regular expressions over entire command lines.
  • Reject or sanitize any input containing shell metacharacters such as ;, &, |, ||, &&, $(...), backticks, and redirection operators unless explicitly required and safely handled.
  • Enforce least privilege for execution contexts:
  • Run command-processing components under dedicated, low-privilege service accounts with minimal filesystem and network access.
  • Isolate command execution in restricted environments (e.g., chroot jails, containers with constrained capabilities, or sandboxed runtimes).
  • Secure-by-default configuration:
  • Default to "deny" for unknown commands and unexpected arguments.
  • Require explicit configuration to enable command categories and argument patterns.
  • Log all approved commands and their parameters for monitoring and post-incident analysis.
  • Defense in depth around automation workflows:
  • Treat automation-triggered commands as high-risk, enforcing additional approvals or review when they include user-originated filters or text.
  • Limit what external inputs can influence within automated workflows (e.g., restrict which parameters are user-controlled).

How teams detect issues like this

Detection strategies focus on identifying both the insecure patterns in code and anomalous command executions at runtime:

  • Static analysis and code review:
  • Search for code paths that:
  • Assemble shell commands using string concatenation or templates incorporating user-controlled data.
  • Invoke shells with shell=True, /bin/sh -c, or equivalent constructs.
  • Flag implementations that:
  • Use regular expressions or simple string matching to "validate" entire shell command lines.
  • Rely on a whitelist of command names without validating arguments structurally.
  • Encourage reviewers to look for:
  • Absence of argument-level validation and encoding.
  • Logic that attempts to strip or block "dangerous" substrings instead of using safe APIs.
  • Automated tooling and policies:
  • Configure SAST tools to detect:
  • OS command injection patterns (e.g., shell invocation with user input).
  • Use of shell metacharacters in contexts derived from external data.
  • Integrate security checks into CI pipelines to block merges when risky patterns are detected.
  • Runtime monitoring and logging:
  • Log all commands executed via the auto-approval module, including full argument lists and associated identities.
  • Monitor for signatures indicative of command injection, such as:
  • Presence of $(...), backticks, ;, &&, or | in arguments originating from user input.
  • Unexpected invocations of tools like curl, wget, bash, sh, nc, or language runtimes that are not typical for normal operations.
  • Use anomaly detection on command execution logs to highlight unusual patterns, spikes, or new command combinations.
  • Operational safeguards:
  • Enforce strict configuration management to prevent ad-hoc changes that weaken command validation.
  • Periodically review and test the auto-approval rules with security-focused test cases that include command substitution and complex shell features.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Secsys-FDU/LLM-Tool-Calling-CVEs/issues/8
ridvay.comridvay.com/

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, depending on how Ridvay Code is integrated. If user-controlled data (such as web requests, API payloads, or CI parameters) flows into commands inspected by the auto-approval module, an attacker may trigger code execution remotely by crafting malicious input, without requiring interactive shell access.

The attacker needs the ability to influence the command or its arguments at the point where the auto-approval module runs. This could mean submitting parameters to a web interface, modifying CI job definitions, or controlling repository data that Ridvay Code transforms into shell commands. Direct system-level access is not required if those interfaces are exposed.

The strongest fix is to stop passing user-influenced strings to a shell altogether and instead execute approved commands via structured APIs that take argument arrays (with shell=False behavior). On top of that, define strict, schema-based validation for allowed arguments and reject any input containing shell metacharacters or unexpected patterns rather than trying to sanitize them with regexes.

Avoid relying on regular expressions or substring filters to secure shell commands. Design automation components to treat commands as structured data, enforce a clear command and argument allowlist, and route execution through safe APIs. Complement this with secure defaults (deny by default, least-privilege execution) and automated security checks in development pipelines to catch command-injection patterns early.

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