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CVE-2026-30311

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

OS Command Injection in Ridvay Code Auto-Approval Module

CVE-2026-30311

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Ridvay Code's command auto-approval module contains an OS command injection flaw where shell command substitution inside arguments bypasses a regex-based whitelist.

By embedding malicious commands in seemingly safe git commands, an attacker can trigger automatic approval and achieve remote code execution without any user interaction.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in environments where Ridvay Code's command auto-approval module:

  • Automatically approves commands based on a regex-based whitelist
  • Executes approved commands via a system shell (e.g., /bin/sh, bash)
  • Treats commands like git log as inherently safe without neutralizing shell metacharacters

The risk is highest in CI/CD pipelines, automation hooks, or backend services where commands are executed non-interactively based on user input, configuration, or API requests.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Command submission interface used by the auto-approval module (e.g., CI jobs, webhooks, bot commands, or API calls).
  • Required access: Ability to influence or submit commands that the module evaluates and potentially auto-approves.
  • Trigger point: The auto-approval module's regex-based filter misclassifies a crafted command (e.g., git log --grep="$(malicious_command)") as safe and passes it to the shell.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The filter validates only the apparent base command (like git log) and does not neutralize or correctly handle shell command substitution operators $(...) and backticks, allowing the shell to execute injected content before the intended command.

Why this happens

The root cause is reliance on regex-based whitelisting to judge command safety while still invoking a general-purpose shell to execute the resulting command string.

This pattern maps directly to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, where user-influenced data is embedded into a shell-processed command without robust quoting or escaping.

Because the validation logic focuses on the high-level command shape (e.g., starting with git log) rather than on the semantics of shell metacharacters, it fails to treat command substitution syntax $(...) and backticks as dangerous.

When the command is finally handed to the shell, the shell honors its own parsing rules, executing the injected sub-command before or alongside the intended operation, completely bypassing the superficial whitelist.

Potential impact

  • Remote execution of arbitrary OS commands under the privileges of the Ridvay Code service or CI worker.
  • Exfiltration of sensitive data such as environment variables, credentials, tokens, and configuration files.
  • Modification of source code, build artifacts, or configuration, enabling supply-chain compromise and backdooring.
  • Lateral movement within the infrastructure by abusing accessible network services or credentials.
  • Service disruption or denial of service by deleting files, exhausting resources, or terminating critical processes.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on removing shell interpretation from the execution path and enforcing strict command construction:

  • Prefer API-level or library-level integrations (e.g., native Git libraries) instead of invoking shell commands wherever possible.
  • When external commands are necessary, use non-shell execution APIs that accept argument arrays (e.g., execve, subprocess with shell=False, or equivalent) so the shell never parses metacharacters.
  • Replace regex-based whitelists with structured command models: explicitly enumerate allowed binaries and permissible arguments and values, rejecting everything else.
  • Apply strict validation and normalization to all user-controlled input used in command arguments, rejecting any occurrence of shell metacharacters such as $, backticks, ;, &&, |, and redirection operators in contexts that should be plain data.
  • Run the command execution environment with least privilege, isolating it in containers, sandboxes, or separate accounts to limit blast radius if a flaw remains.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically combines code-focused and behavior-focused approaches:

  • Static analysis and code review:
  • Flag any use of shell-invoking APIs that build commands via string concatenation or interpolation.
  • Look for regex-based "sanitization" or whitelists that attempt to recognize "safe" commands rather than enforcing structured arguments.
  • Identify locations where user-controllable data flows into command strings that are executed with shell=True or equivalent.
  • Policy and configuration checks:
  • Enforce development policies forbidding shell execution in automation components when safer APIs exist.
  • Require security review for any new feature that triggers OS command execution.
  • Runtime monitoring:
  • Monitor process execution logs for unusual command lines, especially safe-looking commands with embedded $(...), backticks, or other shell metacharacters in arguments.
  • Use anomaly detection on CI or automation hosts to catch unexpected child processes or outbound connections from build steps.
  • Automated tools such as SAST scanners and CI-integrated security linters can be configured with custom rules to flag these patterns early in the pipeline.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Secsys-FDU/LLM-Tool-Calling-CVEs/issues/8
ridvay.comridvay.com/

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if the command auto-approval module is driven by remote inputs (such as webhooks, API calls, or user-submitted jobs), remote actors can craft malicious commands that the system misclassifies as safe and executes.

The attacker must be able to submit or influence commands processed by the auto-approval module—this could be as a developer in a repository, a user with access to project automation, or any role allowed to trigger the underlying job or workflow.

The most robust fix is to eliminate shell-based command execution for approved operations, instead using library APIs or argument-array execution with strict, explicit whitelisting of allowed commands and parameters, and no reliance on regex heuristics.

Treat any shell as an untrusted interpreter: avoid passing concatenated strings to it, model commands as structured data with strongly typed parameters, validate all external input against a strict schema, and enforce security reviews for any functionality that executes OS-level commands.

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