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CVE-2026-30287

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.4)

Arbitrary File Write / File Overwrite in ACE Scanner PDF

CVE-2026-30287

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Arbitrary File Write / File Overwrite

CWE:

CWE-73

Impact:

Arbitrary Code Execution and Information Exposure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.4)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

An arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability in Deep Thought Industries ACE Scanner PDF Scanner v1.4.5 allows crafted imports to overwrite internal application files.

When an attacker can influence the file import process, they may overwrite configuration or executable components, enabling arbitrary code execution or unintended information exposure.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in the PDF import functionality of ACE Scanner PDF Scanner v1.4.5, where imported content is written to the local filesystem.

It is relevant in deployments where:

  • The scanner processes files originating from untrusted or semi-trusted sources
  • The application runs with privileges that allow it to write into its own installation or configuration directories
  • File paths or names derived from import metadata are not strictly controlled or sanitized

In such conditions, the import pipeline can be abused to target sensitive internal files instead of benign storage locations.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The PDF import mechanism exposed via the scanner's user interface, API, or integrated workflow.
  • Required access: Ability to submit or control the files that ACE Scanner imports (e.g., user account, automated feed, or integrated system with upload rights).
  • Trigger point: Processing of a crafted import that causes the application to write file data to a path that maps to an internal or sensitive file.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application trusts import-derived file paths or names and does not sufficiently constrain or validate where on disk imported data can be written, allowing overwrites of files outside the intended storage directory.

Why this happens

The underlying issue aligns with CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path.

The import logic allows external input (such as file names, embedded metadata, or paths) to influence where on the filesystem data is written, without enforcing a strict, application-controlled mapping.

Instead of resolving all writes to a confined and validated directory, the application permits paths that can traverse or target internal resources (configuration files, scripts, or libraries).

This insecure pattern allows adversaries to replace or corrupt files that the application later executes, parses, or trusts, turning a file handling feature into an arbitrary file overwrite primitive.

Potential impact

  • Overwriting executable scripts or modules that are later loaded, which can lead to arbitrary code execution under the scanner's privileges
  • Corrupting configuration files to change security settings, logging behavior, or external endpoints
  • Overwriting files that contain credentials, API keys, or tokens, potentially exposing or invalidating sensitive secrets
  • Disrupting normal operation by corrupting core application resources, causing denial of service or unreliable scanning results
  • Altering log or audit files to hide traces of malicious activity

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on strictly controlling where imports can write and decoupling external input from filesystem paths:

  • Constrain all imported content to a single, application-owned directory tree, and enforce this constraint at the path resolution layer.
  • Use path canonicalization and validation to ensure that computed file paths remain within the intended sandbox directory, rejecting inputs that attempt directory traversal or absolute paths.
  • Derive on-disk file names from server-side identifiers (e.g., random IDs or hashes) rather than using user-supplied names or metadata directly.
  • Apply least-privilege to the scanner's runtime account so it can only write to its designated data directories and not to system or application binaries.
  • Treat all imported data as untrusted, and avoid designing flows where imported files are later executed, interpreted, or loaded as code.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically combines code-level review with runtime monitoring:

  • Static analysis: Search for file write operations where file paths are constructed from user-controllable input (file names, metadata, request parameters) without canonicalization and directory whitelisting.
  • Code review signals: Identify import and storage components that:
  • Accept arbitrary relative or absolute paths
  • Concatenate user data directly into filesystem paths
  • Lack checks to keep writes within an approved directory
  • Policy enforcement: Introduce secure coding guidelines mandating path normalization and directory confinement for all file write operations.
  • Runtime monitoring: Use file integrity monitoring or OS-level auditing to detect unexpected writes by the scanner process to configuration, executable, or system directories.
  • Automated security scanners and SAST tools can be configured with rules targeting CWE-73 patterns to surface such issues during CI.

Sources

SourceLink
deepthought.industriesdeepthought.industries/
github.comgithub.com/Secsys-FDU/AF_CVEs/issues/16
play.google.complay.google.com/store/apps/details?id=pdfscanner.scan.pdf.scanner.free
secsys.fudan.edu.cnsecsys.fudan.edu.cn/

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, if the PDF import functionality is exposed over a network interface or integrated into a service that accepts files from remote users or systems. When file submission is remote, the arbitrary file overwrite capability effectively becomes remotely triggerable.

The attacker needs the ability to influence or provide files to the scanner's import process. This may be via a user account, an integration endpoint, or any workflow that feeds documents into the scanner, but does not typically require direct filesystem or OS-level access.

The safest pattern is to fully decouple user-controlled input from filesystem paths: restrict all writes to a pre-defined storage directory, generate server-side file names, normalize and validate paths, and ensure the scanner process lacks permissions to write to application binaries, libraries, or system directories.

Adopt a defensive design that treats the filesystem as a constrained resource:

  • Always canonicalize and validate paths against an allowlisted directory.
  • Avoid using user input directly in path construction.
  • Implement least-privilege execution for services handling file imports.
  • Include checks for CWE-73 and related file handling issues in your secure coding standards, code reviews, and automated analysis pipelines.
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