/

CVE-2026-30276

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Arbitrary File Overwrite / External File Name or Path

CVE-2026-30276

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Arbitrary File Overwrite / External File Name or Path Control

CWE:

CWE-73

Impact:

Arbitrary Code Execution and Information Exposure

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

DeftPDF Document Translator v54.0 contains an arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability in its file import process that allows attacker-controlled content to be written over internal application files.

Under certain conditions, this can enable arbitrary code execution or expose sensitive information if critical configuration, executable, or data files are replaced.

Affected context

The vulnerability manifests when DeftPDF Document Translator v54.0 processes imported documents and derives file storage locations from attacker-influenced data.

It is most relevant where:

  • User-supplied files are accepted for translation or processing
  • The server-side component writes these files to shared or predictable locations
  • Path validation or file placement logic does not robustly constrain which internal files may be overwritten

The issue does not require a specific deployment platform but becomes more severe when the application runs with elevated file system privileges.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The document/file import interface exposed by DeftPDF Document Translator (e.g., web upload or API).
  • Required access: Ability to submit files to the translator service; network access to the deployment.
  • Trigger point: Submission of a crafted file or set of file metadata that causes the application to write attacker-controlled content to an internal path.
  • Why exploitation is possible: File write destinations are derived from untrusted input with insufficient normalization, validation, or restriction, allowing overwrite of internal application or configuration files.

Why this happens

This issue stems from improper control over the names or locations of files that are created or overwritten during the import process.

The application appears to:

  • Accept user-controlled file content and/or file paths
  • Use this data directly, or with incomplete sanitization, to determine where on the server's filesystem to store the file
  • Fail to enforce strict mapping between user uploads and safe, segregated storage locations

This aligns with CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path, where external input influences file system operations such as creation, overwrite, or modification of files beyond the intended directory or file set.

Potential impact

  • Overwrite of configuration or environment files, which may:
  • Alter application behavior
  • Enable loading of malicious code
  • Replacement of scripts, libraries, or executable components, potentially leading to:
  • Arbitrary code execution in the context of the application
  • Overwrite of access control or logging files, which could:
  • Disable or weaken security controls
  • Erase or falsify audit trails
  • Exposure or corruption of sensitive data if index, manifest, or key material files are overwritten
  • Facilitation of further attacks by establishing a persistent malicious payload on the server

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on strict control of where and how user-supplied files are stored, and what they are allowed to affect.

Recommended defensive patterns include:

  • Directory isolation: Store all uploaded or processed files in a dedicated, non-executable directory that is not shared with application code, configuration, or secrets.
  • Path canonicalization and validation: Normalize and canonicalize file paths before use, and enforce that final resolved paths remain within an expected upload directory.
  • Server-side file naming: Ignore client-supplied file paths or names for storage decisions; instead, generate server-side identifiers (e.g., UUIDs) and fixed directory structures.
  • Write restrictions: Avoid allowing writes to directories that contain application binaries, libraries, or configuration; use OS-level permissions to prevent the application user from modifying critical system files.
  • Least privilege execution: Run the application under an account with minimal filesystem rights so that even if file writes are misused, critical system areas remain protected.
  • Content-type and usage separation: Clearly separate storage and runtime usage of uploaded files; never treat uploaded files as configurations, templates, or executable code.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection efforts should concentrate on identifying unsafe file write patterns and anomalous filesystem activity.

Common strategies include:

  • Static analysis and code scanning:
  • Flag instances where file paths or filenames are derived from request parameters, form fields, or document metadata without strict validation.
  • Identify uses of APIs that write files (e.g., open/write, upload handlers) where input is not constrained to a safe base directory.
  • Secure code review:
  • Review upload and import handlers for assumptions about client-provided names, extensions, or paths.
  • Verify that path normalization and containment checks are implemented and correctly handle edge cases and path traversal attempts.
  • Runtime monitoring:
  • Monitor the application's process for writes to directories that should remain static (e.g., application code, configuration, or system directories).
  • Use file integrity monitoring (FIM) tools to detect unexpected changes to critical files and generate alerts.
  • Policy and CI/CD enforcement:
  • Enforce coding guidelines that prohibit using untrusted input for file path construction.
  • Integrate automated scanners into CI pipelines to detect known anti-patterns around path handling.

Sources

SourceLink
deftpdf.comdeftpdf.com/
github.comgithub.com/Secsys-FDU/AF_CVEs/issues/22
secsys.fudan.edu.cnsecsys.fudan.edu.cn/

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. If the file import or upload interface is reachable over the network, an attacker can exploit the issue remotely by submitting crafted files or metadata.

The attacker typically only needs the ability to use the DeftPDF Document Translator's file import functionality. No local shell access is required, though any authentication or access controls on the import endpoint will affect who can exploit it.

The most robust pattern is to completely decouple user input from filesystem locations: generate server-side filenames, constrain all writes to a dedicated upload directory, validate and canonicalize paths, and ensure the application cannot modify its own code or configuration directories.

Establish secure file-handling guidelines: never trust client-supplied paths or filenames for storage decisions, enforce strict directory whitelisting, run with least-privilege filesystem permissions, and incorporate static analysis and code review checklists focused on file I/O and path usage.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.