Summary
A SQL injection vulnerability in SchemaHero 0.23.0 allows crafted input in the column parameter to flow into dynamically constructed SQL within the columnAsInsert function for Postgres.
If an attacker can influence column names or related metadata passed into this function, they may be able to inject arbitrary SQL statements during migration or data manipulation workflows.
Affected context
This vulnerability affects environments using SchemaHero 0.23.0 with the Postgres plugin where:
- Application or operator-controlled input can affect the
columnparameter used in migrations or insert generation, and - Column identifiers or metadata are not fully controlled at build time or by trusted operators, and
- The
columnAsInserthelper is invoked to construct SQL statements against a PostgreSQL database.
The risk is higher in multi-tenant or self-service database provisioning scenarios where less-trusted parties can influence schema definitions or migration specifications.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Database migration or schema management pathways that use SchemaHero with the Postgres plugin.
- Required access: Ability to influence or submit values that become the
columnparameter (e.g., schema/migration definitions, column configuration, or other metadata consumed by SchemaHero). - Trigger point: Execution of code paths that call
columnAsInsertto build and execute SQL statements against the database. - Why exploitation is possible: The
columnparameter is incorporated into SQL without proper sanitization, escaping, or use of safe identifier-quoting APIs, enabling crafted values to alter the intended SQL structure.
Why this happens
The underlying issue is improper handling of untrusted data when constructing SQL statements for PostgreSQL.
Within plugins/postgres/lib/column.go, the columnAsInsert function appears to interpolate the column parameter directly into SQL text.
This maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'), where attacker-controlled input is treated as part of the SQL syntax rather than as a data or identifier value.
Instead of strictly validating and quoting the column identifier or using safe construction primitives, the code path allows SQL metacharacters to modify the query structure.
Potential impact
- Injection and execution of arbitrary SQL statements under the privileges of the SchemaHero-managed database connection.
- Unauthorized reading of sensitive tables and rows that should not be exposed.
- Modification or deletion of application data, including corruption of schema or migration metadata.
- Creation, alteration, or dropping of tables and other database objects.
- Escalation of impact to other tenants or applications sharing the same database instance.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation generally focuses on ensuring untrusted values cannot influence SQL structure:
- Treat the
columnvalue strictly as an identifier and apply robust identifier validation (e.g., allowlist of expected patterns, rejecting unexpected characters and SQL metacharacters). - Use database driver or library APIs specifically designed for safely quoting identifiers, not just string concatenation or parameter substitution intended for data values.
- Clearly separate schema-definition responsibilities from untrusted users; only trusted operators or CI/CD pipelines should be able to define or modify column metadata used by SchemaHero.
- Apply least-privilege principles to the database account used by SchemaHero so that even if an injection occurs, the account cannot perform high-impact actions outside its intended scope.
- Incorporate secure-by-default abstractions for query construction in migration tooling, avoiding raw SQL assembly where feasible.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can detect this pattern and similar SQL injection risks through several approaches:
- Static analysis: Configure linters or static analysis tools to flag dynamic SQL construction where identifiers or keywords are directly concatenated from variable input, especially in migration or schema management modules.
- Code review: During review of database-related code, look for functions that join fragments into SQL strings and verify that all identifiers come from trusted sources or pass through strict validation and quoting utilities.
- Policy enforcement: Establish internal guidelines that prohibit raw string concatenation for SQL query and schema generation in infrastructure-as-code and migration tools; enforce these rules via pre-commit hooks or CI checks.
- Runtime monitoring: Monitor database logs for anomalous or malformed SQL statements, including unexpected comments, stacked queries, or control keywords appearing in places where only identifiers should appear.

