/

CVE-2026-29796

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.4)

Missing Authentication in EV Charging Backend

CVE-2026-29796

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authentication

CWE:

CWE-306

Impact:

Unauthorized Control and Data Manipulation

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.4)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A missing authentication check on OCPP WebSocket endpoints allows attackers to connect as arbitrary charging stations using only a known or guessable station identifier.

By impersonating chargers over WebSocket, an unauthenticated attacker can issue or receive OCPP commands, gaining unauthorized control over charging infrastructure and corrupting backend operational data.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in EV charging backends that expose Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) WebSocket endpoints without enforcing authentication or strong identity verification for charging stations.

It is most relevant where:

  • Charging stations are identified solely by an ID provided during the WebSocket handshake or initial OCPP messages
  • No cryptographic credentials, tokens, or mutual TLS are required
  • Network access to the OCPP WebSocket endpoint is possible from untrusted networks (e.g., public internet, partner networks)

Under these conditions, any party that can reach the endpoint and knows or can guess valid station identifiers may be able to connect as if they were genuine devices.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public or semi-public OCPP WebSocket endpoint exposed by the charging backend.
  • Required access: Network-level ability to initiate WebSocket connections to the OCPP server (no prior authentication required).
  • Attacker knowledge: Knowledge or discovery of one or more valid charging station identifiers (via enumeration, observation, leaked configuration, or guessable ID schemes).
  • Trigger point: Opening a WebSocket connection and presenting a target station ID (or equivalent identifier) during the OCPP session setup.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The backend implicitly trusts the station identifier presented over WebSocket and lacks an authentication mechanism (e.g., certificates, shared secrets, signed tokens) to verify the identity and authorization of the connecting peer.

Why this happens

The core issue aligns with CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function, where a critical service endpoint is exposed without verifying the identity of its callers.

In this case, the OCPP WebSocket interface treats any connecting client as a legitimate charging station based solely on a supplied identifier, without enforcing:

  • Cryptographic station authentication (such as mutual TLS or signed tokens)
  • Per-device credentials or secrets
  • Any robust proof-of-possession mechanism bound to the physical charger

This design effectively turns a sensitive control and telemetry channel into an unauthenticated interface, permitting arbitrary parties to interact with backend logic intended only for trusted charging stations.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized issuance of OCPP commands to start, stop, or alter charging sessions.
  • Station impersonation, allowing attackers to pose as legitimate chargers in the network.
  • Manipulation or falsification of metering and session data reported to the backend.
  • Disruption of charging services, including denial of service to legitimate customers.
  • Privilege escalation by leveraging charger-level access to influence backend decisions or other infrastructure.
  • Corruption of billing, audit, and operational datasets derived from charging station telemetry.
  • Potential safety and reliability risks where backend commands affect physical equipment behavior.

General mitigation guidance

Addressing this vulnerability centers on enforcing strong, device-level authentication and authorization at the OCPP WebSocket boundary and tightening trust assumptions about station identifiers.

Common mitigation patterns include:

  • Requiring mutual TLS between charging stations and the backend, with unique certificates per device and strict verification of certificate chains.
  • Introducing per-station credentials (keys, tokens, or client certificates) that are verified at WebSocket connection time, independent of user-level authentication.
  • Binding station identifiers to cryptographic identities, so that presenting a station ID without the corresponding credential fails authentication.
  • Implementing explicit authorization checks that confirm the connecting entity is allowed to operate on the referenced station ID.
  • Avoiding guessable or sequential station identifier schemes; treat identifiers as public labels, not as security secrets.
  • Segmenting network access so that OCPP endpoints are only reachable from expected charger networks or secure VPNs, reducing exposure to arbitrary internet clients.
  • Applying least privilege to backend components that consume OCPP messages, minimizing the impact of any compromised or misbehaving station identity.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection approaches can focus on both code-level signals and runtime behavior:

Static and design-level detection:

  • Review WebSocket/OCPP connection handlers for the absence of authentication checks before accepting station connections.
  • Use static analysis or architectural review to flag endpoints that:
  • Accept critical control messages over WebSocket without verifying device credentials.
  • Rely solely on station identifiers, IP addresses, or network location as proof of identity.
  • Define security architecture requirements stating that all device-to-backend control channels must perform mutual authentication, and use tooling or checklists to enforce these requirements.

Runtime and operational detection:

  • Monitor logs for:
  • Multiple concurrent connections using the same station ID from different network locations.
  • Unusual patterns of control commands or configuration changes originating from a single station.
  • Sudden increases in failed or unexpected OCPP messages that might indicate probing or enumeration.
  • Employ anomaly detection on OCPP traffic (e.g., frequency, command types, geographic inconsistency of station IPs) to surface suspicious impersonation attempts.
  • Periodically test the OCPP endpoint from external vantage points to verify that unauthenticated connections are rejected as expected.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-078-08.json
cisa.govcisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-078-08

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if the OCPP WebSocket endpoint is exposed to the internet or any untrusted network without additional network-level protections, an attacker can attempt to connect remotely and impersonate charging stations.

No. The described weakness allows unauthenticated attackers with mere network access and knowledge (or guesses) of station identifiers to interact with the backend as if they were legitimate chargers.

The most robust fix is to require strong, device-level authentication for every WebSocket/OCPP connection, typically via mutual TLS or equivalent cryptographic mechanisms, and to verify that each presented station ID is bound to the authenticated device identity.

Treat all device-facing control endpoints as critical security boundaries: design them with mandatory authentication, explicit authorization per device, and clear separation between identifiers (labels) and secrets (credentials). Incorporate security architecture reviews, threat modeling, and automated checks to ensure that new or modified endpoints cannot accept control or telemetry traffic without verifying the caller's identity.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.