Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

OS Command Injection in Vaelsys HTTP POST Request Handler

CVE-2026-2952

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-77, CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution via OS Command Injection

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Vaelsys 4.1.0 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the HTTP POST request handler of /tree/tree_server.php, where the xajaxargs parameter is processed insecurely.

A remote attacker can craft malicious POST requests that cause arbitrary operating system commands to be executed with the web server's privileges, potentially leading to full server compromise.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs within the Vaelsys 4.1.0 web application component that handles HTTP POST requests to /tree/tree_server.php.

It manifests when user-supplied input from the xajaxargs parameter is incorporated into server-side command execution logic without robust validation, encoding, or separation from the shell.

Systems where this endpoint is exposed over the network—such as internet-facing or intra-organizational deployments—are more susceptible, especially if the application runs under a highly privileged account.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible web endpoint at /tree/tree_server.php.
  • Required access: Remote unauthenticated or low-authenticated access (depending on deployment), with the ability to send crafted HTTP POST requests containing xajaxargs.
  • Trigger point: Server-side processing of the xajaxargs parameter in the HTTP POST Request Handler, where the value reaches code that constructs and executes OS-level commands.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application combines attacker-controlled input with shell commands without proper sanitization, escaping, or use of safe command execution APIs, enabling injection of additional command tokens.

Why this happens

This issue stems from constructing operating system commands using untrusted input from the xajaxargs parameter and passing them to shell-invoking APIs (for example, functions that interpret a command string) without enforcing strict input constraints.

The underlying bug aligns with CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection'), and is closely related to CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection').

At an abstract level, the code treats web request parameters as safe to interpolate into command lines, rather than encapsulating them as data-only arguments or validating them against a narrow, known-good set of values.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary OS commands with the privileges of the web server process.
  • Installation of backdoors, web shells, or additional malicious tooling on the affected host.
  • Unauthorized access to application data, configuration files, and environment secrets.
  • Pivoting to other systems within the same network through lateral movement.
  • Disruption of service availability by modifying system state, deleting files, or exhausting resources.
  • Tampering with logs or security controls to hinder detection and incident response.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on eliminating direct shell interpretation of user-controlled data and reducing the privileges of processes that execute commands.

Recommended defensive patterns include:

  • Refactoring command execution to use high-level APIs or libraries that do not require spawning a shell, passing user input strictly as typed arguments rather than concatenated strings.
  • Applying strict server-side validation to parameters used in command execution, using whitelists (allowlists) of permitted values or patterns, and rejecting any unexpected or complex input.
  • Avoiding the need for dynamic command construction by encapsulating common operations in fixed, parameterized functions or services.
  • Running the web application under a dedicated, least-privilege account and isolating it using sandboxing or containerization to limit blast radius if a command is injected.
  • Segregating duties so that web-facing components cannot directly perform sensitive system-level actions without additional internal checks.

How teams detect issues like this

Effective detection typically combines code-centric and runtime-centric approaches:

  • Static analysis: Configure SAST rules to flag uses of shell-invoking functions (e.g., exec-like APIs) where arguments contain HTTP request parameters or other untrusted data, especially within /tree/tree_server.php and related request handlers.
  • Code review: During manual reviews, look for patterns of string concatenation involving user input used in command-building logic; require justification or refactoring toward safer APIs.
  • Security testing: Employ dynamic application security testing and fuzzing focused on POST parameters like xajaxargs to identify command injection behavior.
  • Runtime monitoring: Monitor logs and telemetry for unusual command execution patterns, anomalous process trees spawned by the web server, or unexpected outbound network connections originating from the application host.
  • Policy enforcement: Integrate secure coding policies into CI/CD pipelines that block deployments when command injection anti-patterns are detected.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/CVE-Hunter-Leo/CVE/issues/10
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?ctiid.347318
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?id.347318
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?submit.755166

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. Because the issue resides in a network-accessible HTTP POST handler, a remote attacker who can reach the /tree/tree_server.php endpoint may exploit it. The impact scope can extend from the compromised application to the underlying host and, in some cases, to adjacent systems if the attacker can pivot.

The attacker typically only needs the ability to send crafted HTTP POST requests to the vulnerable endpoint. If the endpoint is exposed without authentication, no prior credentials are required; if it is behind a login, any account that can access the affected functionality may be sufficient.

The most robust fix is to remove direct shell command construction from request-handling code. Instead, use safe, parameterized APIs that treat user input strictly as data, enforce strict validation on any remaining parameters, and ensure that no user-controlled content is ever interpreted as part of a command line.

Establish secure coding standards that prohibit concatenating untrusted input into system commands, mandate the use of safer execution primitives, and require validation and canonicalization of external input. Complement these standards with automated code scanning, security-focused code reviews, and architectural patterns that separate web-facing components from sensitive system operations.

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