/

CVE-2026-29109

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

Unsafe Deserialization in SuiteCRM SavedSearch Filter

CVE-2026-29109

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Unsafe Deserialization

CWE:

CWE-502

Impact:

Remote Code Execution by Authenticated Admin

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

SuiteCRM up to and including version 8.9.2 contains an unsafe PHP deserialization issue in the SavedSearch filter processing component.

An authenticated administrator can store crafted data in the saved_search.contents column, which is later passed to unserialize() without class restrictions, potentially leading to arbitrary command execution on the server.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in SuiteCRM deployments where SavedSearch functionality is enabled and persisted in the database.

The issue surfaces when the FilterDefinitionProvider loads saved filters from the saved_search.contents column and deserializes them at runtime with PHP's unserialize() without constraining what classes may be instantiated.

It primarily affects scenarios where administrator-level users can create or modify SavedSearch entries and those values are later processed during normal application usage.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Web application interface handling SavedSearch filters.
  • Required access: Valid SuiteCRM administrator account (or equivalent role with permission to create/modify SavedSearch entries).
  • Trigger point: Invocation of the SavedSearch filter processing logic that calls unserialize() on data from the saved_search.contents column.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The code uses PHP's unserialize() directly on user-controlled data without limiting allowed classes, enabling gadget chains in existing application or library code to be invoked during deserialization.

Why this happens

The core defect is reliance on PHP's unserialize() to process data that, while stored in the database, ultimately originates from user-controllable input.

In FilterDefinitionProvider.php, the code deserializes the saved_search.contents value without applying any class whitelist, type validation, or alternative safe encoding.

This pattern maps to CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data, where serialized structures are treated as benign state rather than potentially hostile objects, allowing attackers with write access to that state to trigger object instantiation and method execution through available gadget chains.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary system commands under the web server or PHP process account.
  • Full compromise of the SuiteCRM application instance, including its data.
  • Lateral movement within the hosting environment, depending on server configuration and network accessibility.
  • Installation of backdoors or web shells for persistent access.
  • Abuse of the CRM platform for data exfiltration or staging further attacks against integrated systems.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation centers on removing unsafe deserialization and tightening trust boundaries around stored configuration and filter data.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Avoiding PHP serialize()/unserialize() for user-influenced data and using safer formats such as JSON or well-defined arrays with explicit validation.
  • If deserialization is unavoidable, enforcing strict class whitelists and disabling object instantiation, limiting deserialized content to simple scalar or array types.
  • Treating database-resident user content as untrusted, even when created by privileged roles, and validating or normalizing it before use.
  • Reducing the privileges of the web server and PHP processes so that, if code execution is achieved, the operating system-level impact is constrained.
  • Applying defense-in-depth around administrative features (e.g., multi-factor authentication, network segmentation) to reduce the likelihood of admin account compromise.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically involves a combination of code-focused and runtime monitoring approaches:

  • Static analysis: Configure SAST rules to flag usages of unserialize() and similar APIs, especially when applied to data that can be influenced by users or database-backed state, and require explicit justification or refactoring.
  • Code review: During manual reviews, scrutinize components that deserialize data from the database, sessions, cookies, or request bodies, and ensure that only safe structures are used and validated.
  • Security testing: Perform targeted tests around SavedSearch and other serialized features to confirm that untrusted data cannot reach dangerous deserialization paths; automated DAST tools can help identify such patterns.
  • Runtime monitoring: Monitor application logs and system telemetry for unusual command execution patterns, suspicious PHP error logs, or anomalous activity tied to SavedSearch interactions.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/SuiteCRM/SuiteCRM-Core/security/advisories/GHSA-mhq2-277m-6w24

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, but only via authenticated access to the SuiteCRM web interface. The attacker must interact with the application (e.g., SavedSearch features) to store and later trigger the malicious serialized data.

Based on the described behavior, an authenticated administrator (or a role with equivalent SavedSearch manipulation capabilities) is required to reliably exploit this vulnerability.

Replace PHP object deserialization (unserialize()) for user-influenced or database-backed content with safer serialization formats such as JSON and enforce strict schema validation on the resulting data structures.

Establish coding standards that forbid unsafe deserialization of data that might be influenced by users, integrate static analysis rules to detect risky deserialization calls, and ensure that new features use structured, validated data formats rather than serialized objects for persistence or communication.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.