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CVE-2026-29093

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

Insecure Service Exposure / Misconfigured Session Storage

CVE-2026-29093

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Insecure Service Exposure / Misconfigured Session Storage

CWE:

CWE-287, CWE-668

Impact:

Session Hijacking and Account Compromise

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

WWBN AVideo's pre-24.0 Docker deployment exposes a memcached instance on all network interfaces without authentication, while PHP is configured to store all user sessions in that memcached service.

An attacker who can reach port 11211 can read, modify, or delete session data, which can lead to session hijacking, administrator impersonation, and mass logouts without needing to authenticate to the application itself.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects AVideo deployments that:

  • Use the official docker-compose.yml prior to version 24.0
  • Run the bundled memcached container with port 11211 published on 0.0.0.0
  • Configure PHP to store user sessions in that memcached instance

The risk materializes when the host or container network is reachable by untrusted users (e.g., public cloud instances, shared hosting, or flat internal networks) and network filtering does not restrict access to port 11211.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible memcached service listening on 0.0.0.0:11211
  • Required access: Ability to connect to TCP/UDP port 11211 from any network path (internet or internal network)
  • Trigger point: Direct interaction with the memcached protocol used as the PHP session backend
  • Why exploitation is possible:
  • Memcached runs without authentication or encryption by default
  • The official docker-compose file publishes the memcached port to all interfaces
  • PHP stores session data (including identifiers and potentially sensitive state) directly in this memcached instance
  • No application-layer controls protect session records stored in memcached

Why this happens

The core issue is an insecure exposure of a sensitive backend service (CWE-668: Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere). AVideo's Docker configuration places the memcached container on a public-facing port and binds it to 0.0.0.0 without any access control, while simultaneously using it as the primary session store for all users.

This means that a component intended to be an internal, trusted resource becomes accessible to attackers, who can interact with it using the native memcached protocol. Because memcached is unauthenticated and stores raw session state, this exposure directly undermines the authentication boundary (related to CWE-287: Improper Authentication) by allowing attackers to read or alter session data without going through the web application's login process.

Potential impact

  • An attacker can hijack existing user sessions, including administrative accounts
  • An attacker can impersonate arbitrary users by crafting or modifying session records
  • Mass invalidation or destruction of all active sessions via memcached flush operations
  • Leakage of session-associated data that may include user identifiers and authorization state
  • Reduction of trust in application logs and actions due to unauthorized session abuse

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on preventing direct exposure of session storage backends and hardening how session data is handled:

  • Network isolation of backend services:
  • Bind memcached to localhost or a private, container-only network rather than 0.0.0.0
  • Avoid publishing memcached ports to the public internet or untrusted networks
  • Use firewall rules, security groups, or Kubernetes network policies to restrict port 11211 to only the application containers
  • Service-level protection:
  • Prefer memcached or alternative session stores that support authentication, authorization, and encryption where feasible
  • Use TLS or secure tunnels when session stores must cross network boundaries
  • Session storage design:
  • Treat session backends as high-sensitivity infrastructure components and apply least privilege
  • Minimize sensitive data stored directly in sessions, favoring opaque identifiers where possible
  • Secure-by-default deployment patterns:
  • Provide container orchestration templates that do not expose internal services by default
  • Document the expectation that cache and session services run in a private network zone

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify and monitor similar misconfigurations through several approaches:

  • Configuration and infrastructure review:
  • Inspect docker-compose.yml, Kubernetes manifests, or infrastructure-as-code for services bound to 0.0.0.0 or public load balancers
  • Flag backend services (memcached, Redis, databases, message queues) that have exposed ports without authentication
  • Network scanning and asset discovery:
  • Run internal and external scans to detect open memcached ports (11211) and other internal services
  • Use continuous attack surface management tools to detect new exposures over time
  • Static and policy-based checks:
  • Implement CI/CD checks that analyze container manifests for patterns like ports: "11211:11211" on internal-only services
  • Apply organizational policies requiring justification or exemptions for exposing infrastructure ports
  • Runtime monitoring:
  • Monitor memcached access logs or surrounding network telemetry for unexpected client IPs or anomalous query patterns

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/WWBN/AVideo/releases/tag/24.0
github.comgithub.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-xxpw-32hf-q8v9

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, if the host or container environment is reachable from the internet and port 11211 is not filtered. If the service is only reachable on an internal network, exploitation is limited to actors with internal access.

No. The attacker interacts directly with the memcached service and does not need to authenticate to the AVideo web application. They only need network access to the exposed memcached port.

The most robust fix is to ensure that session and cache backends are only accessible on private networks and not bound to public interfaces, combined with authentication and encryption for any backend service that must be network-accessible.

Standardize on secure-by-default deployment templates, enforce network segmentation for internal services, integrate infrastructure-as-code checks into CI/CD, and treat any stateful backend (sessions, caches, databases) as sensitive resources that should never be directly exposed to untrusted networks.

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