Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

OS Command Injection in UTT HiPER 520 Web Management

CVE-2026-2846

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-77, CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution on Network Appliance

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

An OS command injection vulnerability in the UTT HiPER 520 Web Management Interface allows crafted input in the policyNames parameter to be executed as system commands.

A remote attacker who can reach the management interface may run arbitrary commands on the device, potentially gaining full control over the router.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in the web-based management interface of the UTT HiPER 520 (firmware 1.7.7-160105), specifically in the /goform/formPdbUpConfig handler and its sub_44D264 function.

It becomes relevant when the device exposes its administrative web interface over a network (LAN or WAN) and accepts user-supplied policyNames data without robust input handling.

In typical deployments, this interface is meant for authenticated administrators, but misconfiguration, weak credentials, or exposure to untrusted networks can widen the attack surface.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP/HTTPS access to the router's Web Management Interface endpoint /goform/formPdbUpConfig.
  • Required access: Ability to send HTTP requests to the management port; in many setups this is restricted to internal networks, but can be accidentally exposed externally.
  • Trigger point: Submission of a request with a specially crafted policyNames parameter when invoking configuration-related actions.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application appears to concatenate or interpolate policyNames directly into an OS command or shell context without adequate sanitization, escaping, or use of safer APIs, allowing attacker-controlled content to break out of expected command structure.

Why this happens

The underlying issue aligns with CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection'), and more broadly with CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection').

The vulnerable code path likely constructs shell commands by embedding the policyNames parameter directly in a command string or passing it to a shell interpreter without strict validation or neutralization of metacharacters (such as ;, &&, |, or backticks).

This pattern treats user-controlled data as trusted and executable, allowing attackers to alter the command structure and execute arbitrary commands under the privileges of the web management process.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary OS commands on the router.
  • Full compromise of device configuration and network policies.
  • Creation of persistent backdoors or modification of firewall and routing rules.
  • Pivoting into internal networks behind the device.
  • Participation of the router in botnets or other large-scale attacks.
  • Loss of integrity and confidentiality of traffic that depends on the router's security policies.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on breaking the direct path from user input to OS commands and limiting the blast radius of any compromise:

  • Use command parameterization or APIs that avoid shell parsing altogether (e.g., direct system calls with argument arrays instead of shell-constructed strings).
  • Apply strict input validation and whitelisting for fields like policyNames, ensuring only expected characters and formats are accepted (e.g., alphanumeric plus a small safe set).
  • Normalize and reject input containing shell metacharacters or control characters rather than attempting ad-hoc blacklists.
  • Run the web management process and any helper components with least privilege, restricting access to only required system resources.
  • Segregate management interfaces onto trusted networks only, and protect them with strong authentication and network access controls.
  • Adopt secure coding guidelines that prohibit direct shell invocation with user-influenced arguments unless guarded by robust validation layers.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically combines code-level analysis with runtime monitoring:

  • Static analysis rules targeting uses of shell-executing functions (e.g., system, popen, backtick operators, or equivalent router OS APIs) where arguments incorporate HTTP parameters such as policyNames.
  • Code review checklists emphasizing:
  • No direct concatenation of user input into shell commands.
  • Use of safe wrappers and parameterized execution patterns.
  • Centralized validation routines for web parameters.
  • Configuration and policy enforcement, such as secure coding standards that ban unmediated shell calls from web handlers.
  • Runtime monitoring for anomalous command execution on the router, unusual child processes, or unexpected outbound connections from the device.
  • Automated security testing (e.g., web scanners or custom fuzzers) configured to probe management endpoints with payloads designed to detect command injection patterns.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/cha0yang1/UTT520CVE/blob/main/UTTRCE1.md
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?ctiid.347082
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?id.347082
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?submit.753964

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, but only if the web management interface is reachable from the internet or from an untrusted network segment. In many deployments, the interface is limited to internal networks, which still allows attacks from insiders or compromised internal hosts.

The description does not mandate authentication, but in practice, many routers protect /goform endpoints with admin logins. Whether authentication is required depends on the specific configuration; misconfigurations or default/weak credentials significantly lower the barrier to exploitation.

Refactor the affected code so that it never constructs shell commands with user-influenced data. Prefer APIs that accept argument lists or configuration structures, enforce strict whitelisting on fields like policyNames, and centralize command execution behind a minimal, well-reviewed interface.

Adopt secure coding practices that:

  • Treat all external input as untrusted and validate it against strict schemas.
  • Ban direct shell invocation from web handlers, or wrap it behind vetted helper functions.
  • Integrate static analysis and security-focused code reviews into the development lifecycle.
  • Restrict management interfaces to trusted networks with strong authentication and hardening by default.
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