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CVE-2026-28427

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Path Traversal in OpenDeck Plugin Static File Server

CVE-2026-28427

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Path Traversal / Directory Traversal

CWE:

CWE-22, CWE-24

Impact:

Unauthorized File Read / Information Disclosure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

OpenDeck's HTTP service for serving plugin static files fails to properly sanitize path components, allowing directory traversal via ../ sequences.

An attacker who can reach the OpenDeck service port can read arbitrary files accessible to the OpenDeck process, potentially exposing sensitive system or user data.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in OpenDeck installations where the HTTP service on port 57118 is reachable (locally or over the network) and used to serve static assets for installed plugins.

The issue arises in the file-serving logic that maps URL paths to filesystem paths without robust normalization or restriction to a fixed base directory.

Environments where OpenDeck runs with access to sensitive user or system files are more exposed, as the process' file permissions directly influence what an attacker could read.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The HTTP endpoint exposed by OpenDeck on port 57118.
  • Required access: Network or local access to the listening port (e.g., same machine, local network, or any exposed interface).
  • Trigger point: Issuing HTTP requests with crafted paths containing ../ sequences targeting the plugin static file-serving endpoint.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The server constructs filesystem paths from user-controlled URL components without adequately normalizing and restricting them to a dedicated content root, enabling traversal outside the intended directory.

Why this happens

The bug stems from insufficient validation and canonicalization of user-supplied path components before they are used to resolve filesystem locations.

When the server directly concatenates or naively joins request paths with a base directory, ../ segments allow navigation to parent directories, violating the intended isolation of plugin files.

This aligns with CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory and relates to CWE-24: Path Traversal, where the application fails to enforce that resolved paths stay within a safe, pre-defined directory tree.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may read arbitrary files that the OpenDeck process can access, including user configuration or credential-like data.
  • Sensitive application logs or plugin configuration files could be exposed, aiding further attacks or reconnaissance.
  • System files readable by the OpenDeck user account may be disclosed, potentially leaking environment details, tokens, or other secrets.
  • Information gathered through file disclosure can be used to chain into privilege escalation or lateral movement in the host environment.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on restricting filesystem access and hardening path handling:

  • Normalize and canonicalize all request paths before use, resolving . and .. segments, and reject any path that escapes the intended content root.
  • Enforce a strict, fixed base directory for static content and verify that the final resolved path remains within that directory.
  • Avoid direct string concatenation of URLs and filesystem paths; use safe path-joining APIs that operate on canonicalized paths and support explicit boundary checks.
  • Run the OpenDeck service under a dedicated, least-privilege account with minimal filesystem permissions, limiting the blast radius if traversal occurs.
  • Consider reducing or disabling external exposure of the static file-serving port where it is not strictly required.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection generally involves both code-centric and behavior-centric approaches:

  • Use static analysis rules to flag code that derives filesystem paths directly from HTTP request parameters without normalization or boundary checks.
  • During code review, look for handlers that serve files from disk and verify they enforce a well-defined document root and canonical path validation.
  • Implement application-level logging for file-serving endpoints, and monitor for suspicious patterns such as repeated requests containing ../ sequences or attempts to access known sensitive filenames.
  • Incorporate dynamic security testing (DAST) or fuzzing of HTTP endpoints with path traversal payloads as part of CI pipelines to identify similar weaknesses early.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/nekename/OpenDeck/commit/488a52050017e95a72ba448226ac5e19a20dd9ed
github.comgithub.com/nekename/OpenDeck/security/advisories/GHSA-4974-g27q-h5m8

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, if the OpenDeck service on port 57118 is accessible over a network. If the port is only bound to localhost, exploitation would typically require local access on the machine running OpenDeck.

The attacker must be able to connect to the OpenDeck HTTP service on port 57118. No additional application-level authentication is implied by the vulnerability description, so network reachability is the primary requirement.

The robust fix is to strictly constrain all file-serving logic to a predefined directory, canonicalize incoming paths, reject any request that resolves outside that directory, and avoid raw concatenation of user input into filesystem paths. Running the service with least-privilege filesystem permissions further limits potential damage.

Adopt a standard file-serving abstraction that always enforces a document root and canonical path checks, include path traversal checks in secure coding guidelines and code review checklists, and integrate static/dynamic security testing focused on filesystem access endpoints into your development pipeline.

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