Summary
The FreePBX CDR (Call Data Record) module contained a SQL injection vulnerability that allowed crafted input to alter database queries.
When attacker-controlled data is incorporated into SQL statements without proper sanitization or parameterization, it can lead to unauthorized data access, modification, or system compromise within the PBX environment.
Affected context
This vulnerability occurs in FreePBX deployments using the CDR module to query or display call detail records where user-supplied data is incorporated into SQL queries.
It typically becomes relevant when request parameters or filter values originating from web interfaces, APIs, or integrated systems are passed to the database without strict validation or parameter binding.
Environments that expose CDR-related functionality to administrative users, integrated applications, or potentially untrusted interfaces are more likely to be at risk.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: FreePBX web interface or any endpoint/functionality that triggers CDR-related SQL queries.
- Required access: Ability to submit crafted input to CDR-related parameters (e.g., filters, search criteria, report inputs); this may require authenticated access depending on deployment.
- Trigger point: Execution of database queries in the CDR module that directly embed user-supplied values into SQL statements.
- Why exploitation is possible: Input values are concatenated or interpolated into raw SQL without consistent use of parameterized queries, allowing an attacker to inject additional SQL tokens or clauses.
Why this happens
The underlying bug aligns with CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection').
In the vulnerable code paths, the CDR module constructs SQL statements by directly embedding input values (such as filters, search strings, or identifiers) into query strings.
Without robust input neutralization and parameter binding, the database interprets parts of the input as SQL syntax instead of data, enabling injection of arbitrary conditions or statements.
This reflects the broader insecure pattern of dynamic query construction using string concatenation instead of prepared statements.
Potential impact
- Unauthorized reading of call detail records, including call metadata and potentially sensitive information.
- Modification or deletion of CDR entries, impacting billing, auditing, or compliance records.
- Enumeration or manipulation of other tables within the FreePBX database, depending on schema exposure and permissions.
- Escalation to full application compromise if the database account has extensive privileges (e.g., writing configuration, altering credentials).
- Indirect impact on call routing, logging integrity, and incident response accuracy due to tampered records.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on removing dynamic, concatenated SQL and tightening data handling boundaries:
- Adopt parameterized queries (prepared statements) for all CDR-related database operations, ensuring user-controlled values are always bound as data, not SQL syntax.
- Introduce strict validation and normalization of CDR filter and search parameters, constraining them to expected types, formats, and whitelisted values.
- Centralize query-building logic for CDR operations to enforce consistent safe patterns rather than ad-hoc string construction.
- Apply least-privilege to the database account used by FreePBX, limiting its ability to modify schema or unrelated tables.
- Consider additional application-layer controls, such as role-based access to CDR features, to reduce exposure of query-driving inputs.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection typically involves a mix of static review, targeted testing, and runtime monitoring:
- Static analysis: Scan FreePBX module code for string-built SQL where variables are interpolated directly, especially in CDR reporting and search functions; flag any use of concatenation around WHERE, ORDER BY, or LIMIT clauses.
- Code review: Examine CDR query-building routines to verify consistent use of prepared statements and input validation; look for bypass paths such as "advanced" filters or export utilities.
- Security testing: Use focused penetration testing or security QA to probe CDR-related endpoints with benign injection patterns and observe whether database errors or anomalous responses occur.
- Runtime monitoring: Enable database logging of slow or anomalous queries and review for unexpected patterns that include user-supplied strings in SQL syntax positions.
- Automated code review tools or CI-integrated linters can help enforce policies that forbid raw SQL concatenation in high-risk modules like CDR.

