Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

SQL Injection in Fujian Smart Integrated Management

CVE-2026-2821

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-74, CWE-89

Impact:

Data exposure, data tampering, and possible authentication bypass via SQL injection

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Fujian Smart Integrated Management Platform System up to version 7.5 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the XCamera.ashx controller, where the ChannelName parameter is used unsafely in database queries.

A remote attacker can send crafted requests that manipulate backend SQL statements, potentially accessing or modifying sensitive data and affecting the integrity and availability of the system.

Affected context

The vulnerability arises in web deployments of the Fujian Smart Integrated Management Platform System (≤ 7.5) that expose the /Module/CRXT/Controller/XCamera.ashx endpoint over a network.

The issue occurs where the ChannelName argument from HTTP requests is incorporated into SQL statements without sufficient neutralization or structured parameter binding.

Any environment where this endpoint is reachable by untrusted clients and is backed by a relational database is potentially affected, especially when default or permissive database privileges are in use.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public or internal web interface exposing /Module/CRXT/Controller/XCamera.ashx
  • Required access: Ability to send HTTP requests to the vulnerable endpoint (no specific prior authentication details are documented)
  • Input vector: The ChannelName parameter, supplied via query string or request body, is processed by server-side code and incorporated into SQL queries
  • Trigger point: Application code that builds and executes SQL statements using the untrusted ChannelName value
  • Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled input is concatenated or interpolated into SQL queries without proper parameterization or escaping, matching the patterns described in CWE-89 and CWE-74

Why this happens

At its core, this issue is a classic SQL injection problem: server-side logic constructs SQL queries dynamically, embedding the ChannelName input directly into the query text.

Instead of using parameterized queries or stored procedures with well-defined parameters, the code likely concatenates raw request values into the SQL string.

This design breaks the intended separation between data and code, allowing specially crafted input to alter the structure of the executed SQL.

The weakness maps to:

  • CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'), due to untrusted data affecting SQL control flow.
  • CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component, since the application passes untrusted data as part of a command to the database.

Potential impact

  • May allow retrieval of sensitive information from the database, including system configuration or user-related records
  • Can enable modification or deletion of database records, affecting data integrity
  • Could be used to bypass authentication or authorization checks implemented at the SQL layer
  • May allow the creation of new accounts or privilege escalation if database permissions are overly broad
  • Can be leveraged to disrupt service availability by forcing expensive or destructive queries

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating the use of untrusted data in raw SQL and tightening privilege boundaries:

  • Prefer parameterized queries (prepared statements) or ORM query builders that treat input strictly as data, not SQL code.
  • Apply rigorous input validation for fields like ChannelName, restricting to expected character sets, length, and formats.
  • Centralize database access patterns so that dynamic query construction is minimized and easier to review.
  • Enforce principle of least privilege at the database layer, ensuring application accounts have only the minimal rights needed.
  • Consider using stored procedures with strict parameterization where appropriate, avoiding dynamic SQL within them.
  • Implement generic error handling so SQL error messages do not reveal schema or query structure to clients.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically involves both code-focused and behavior-focused approaches:

  • Static analysis: Use SAST rules to flag SQL command construction that concatenates variables, especially values derived from HTTP parameters like ChannelName.
  • Code review: Look for ad-hoc query building in the XCamera-related modules, including string formatting, concatenation, or templating of SQL using request data.
  • Security testing: Run automated and manual SQL injection tests (e.g., fuzzing parameters with SQL meta-characters) against the /Module/CRXT/Controller/XCamera.ashx endpoint.
  • Runtime monitoring: Enable database and application logs that record anomalous queries, syntax errors, or patterns consistent with injection attempts, and integrate these into SIEM workflows.
  • Policy enforcement: Adopt internal coding standards mandating parameterized queries and validate adherence during CI/CD with linters or custom checks.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/luoye197-prog/cve-yinda-sql2/blob/main/introduce
github.comgithub.com/luoye197-prog/cve-yinda-sql2/blob/main/poc.py
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?ctiid.346946
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?id.346946
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?submit.753405

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. The vulnerability can be exploited remotely by sending crafted HTTP requests to the exposed XCamera.ashx endpoint, as long as it is reachable over the network.

The advisory does not specify authentication requirements. Organizations should assume that if the endpoint is accessible without strict access control, unauthenticated exploitation may be possible and validate this in their own environments.

Refactor all database access code involving ChannelName to use parameterized queries or ORM methods that separate query structure from data, combined with strict input validation and least-privilege database accounts.

Establish secure coding standards that forbid building SQL with string concatenation, enforce these via code review and automated scanning, and provide developers with vetted database access utilities or frameworks that are secure by default.

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