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CVE-2026-27841

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

CSRF in SenseLive X3050 Web Management Interface

CVE-2026-27841

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

CWE:

CWE-352

Impact:

Unauthorized Configuration Changes via Cross-Site Requests

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

SenseLive X3050's web management interface is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF), allowing a malicious website to trigger state-changing actions through a victim's authenticated browser session.

Without server-side CSRF tokens or origin validation, attackers can silently submit unauthorized configuration requests to the device when an admin visits a crafted page.

Affected context

This vulnerability arises in the web-based management interface of SenseLive X3050 when administrators manage the device using a browser.

The issue is present where:

  • Users authenticate to the interface and maintain active sessions (e.g., via cookies).
  • The application accepts POST or other state-changing requests without validating their origin.
  • No anti-CSRF tokens or equivalent server-side protections are enforced on sensitive operations.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Browser-based management sessions to the SenseLive X3050 web interface.
  • Required access: Ability to lure an authenticated administrator or privileged user to visit a malicious or compromised webpage (e.g., link in email, chat, injected content).
  • User state: The victim must be logged into the device management interface in the same browser (or have a valid session cookie) when visiting the attacker-controlled page.
  • Trigger point: The malicious page auto-submits or entices the user to submit crafted HTTP requests (e.g., form POSTs, image tags, scripts) targeting the device's management endpoints.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The server does not verify that state-changing requests originate from the legitimate UI (no CSRF tokens, referer/origin checks, or same-site enforcement), so the browser's stored credentials are automatically attached to attacker-crafted requests.

Why this happens

The core issue is the absence of CSRF defenses on endpoints that modify device configuration or other sensitive state.

The web management interface relies solely on session cookies or similar credentials without binding requests to a trusted origin or including unpredictable, user-specific CSRF tokens.

As described by CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery, the application treats any properly formatted request as valid, regardless of where it was initiated, allowing an attacker to exploit the browser's authenticated context to perform actions the victim is authorized to do.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized changes to device configuration settings (e.g., network parameters, logging, monitoring thresholds).
  • Enabling or disabling security-related features without the administrator's knowledge.
  • Changing administrative credentials or access policies, potentially leading to lockout or persistent compromise.
  • Redirecting device data or traffic to attacker-controlled endpoints.
  • Using the compromised device as an entry point for further attacks in the surrounding network environment.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on enforcing strong server-side request integrity for all state-changing operations:

  • Implement per-session, unpredictable CSRF tokens for all forms and APIs that modify configuration, and verify them on the server for each request.
  • Bind state-changing requests to a trusted origin by validating the Origin and/or Referer headers, rejecting requests that do not originate from the legitimate management interface.
  • Prefer POST (or other non-idempotent methods) for sensitive actions and avoid side effects on GET requests.
  • Combine CSRF defenses with stricter session controls (e.g., short session lifetimes, re-authentication for critical actions) to reduce the window of exploitation.
  • Configure cookies with SameSite attributes where applicable to reduce cross-site request contexts, recognizing this as a defense-in-depth measure rather than a sole control.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically involves reviewing both code and behavior of the management interface:

  • Code review: Verify that every endpoint performing configuration changes or privileged actions enforces CSRF tokens and validates them server-side.
  • Static analysis: Use rules to flag state-changing routes that lack CSRF middleware or annotations, and any form/API with credentials but without a corresponding CSRF mechanism.
  • Security testing: Perform manual or automated CSRF tests by constructing cross-origin requests (forms, XHR/fetch, image tags) to see if state changes succeed without browser warnings or token checks.
  • Policy enforcement: Integrate security checks into the development lifecycle to require CSRF protections on all privileged endpoints, with automated checks in CI/CD pipelines.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-111-12.json
senselive.iosenselive.io/contact
cisa.govcisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-111-12

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if the SenseLive X3050 management interface is reachable from the victim's browser, an attacker can exploit CSRF from any external website the victim visits, as long as the victim is authenticated to the device in that browser.

The attacker does not need direct access to the device or valid credentials; they only need to get a logged-in administrator or privileged user to visit a malicious or compromised webpage that issues crafted requests.

Introduce robust server-side CSRF protections on all state-changing endpoints: use cryptographically strong CSRF tokens bound to the user session, verify them on each request, and complement this with origin/referer validation for sensitive operations.

Adopt a standard CSRF protection framework or middleware as part of the default application architecture, require CSRF coverage for all privileged routes during design and code review, enforce secure cookie attributes, and include CSRF-focused tests in automated security testing and CI pipelines.

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