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CVE-2026-27203

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.3)

Environment Variable Injection / Configuration Injection

CVE-2026-27203

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Environment Variable Injection / Configuration Injection

CWE:

CWE-15, CWE-74

Impact:

Configuration Manipulation leading to Denial of Service and Potential Remote Code Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

eBay API MCP Server contains an environment variable injection flaw in its updateEnvFile function, which updates the .env configuration file without validating user-supplied values for dangerous characters like newlines or quotes.

When an attacker can influence values written via the ebay_set_user_tokens tool, they may inject arbitrary environment variables, override existing configuration, and in some deployments steer the application into Denial of Service or remote code execution scenarios.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in deployments of the eBay API MCP Server that:

  • Use the provided ebay_set_user_tokens tool to manage credentials
  • Store sensitive runtime configuration in a .env file that is parsed at application startup
  • Accept values for environment variables that may originate from user-controlled or indirectly controlled sources

The issue is specifically tied to the updateEnvFile function in src/auth/oauth.ts, which appends or replaces key/value pairs in .env without sanitization or structural validation.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The interface or workflow through which ebay_set_user_tokens is invoked (CLI, automation scripts, or integrated assistant flows).
  • Required access: Ability to supply or influence values that are passed to updateEnvFile, such as token strings or associated metadata that end up in the .env file.
  • Trigger point: Execution of the ebay_set_user_tokens tool or any code path that calls updateEnvFile to write new entries into .env.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The .env writing logic treats input as trusted and embeds it directly into the configuration file without escaping newlines, quotes, or delimiter characters, allowing the attacker-controlled value to break the intended line format and introduce additional environment assignments.

Why this happens

The core issue is unsafe handling of configuration data when constructing the .env file content.

The updateEnvFile function assumes that provided values are simple, single-line entries and writes them directly into the file without normalizing or escaping line breaks, quotes, or separator characters.

This pattern maps to:

  • CWE-15: External Control of System or Configuration Setting, because an attacker can control configuration settings that affect application behavior.
  • CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component (Injection), since the .env file is a downstream configuration consumer and its syntax is broken by untrusted special characters.

Abstractly, the bug class is "configuration injection via unsanitized interpolation," where untrusted data is embedded inside a structured configuration format without respecting its grammar.

Potential impact

  • Configuration overwrites that may disable security checks or alter API endpoints.
  • Application startup or runtime failures leading to Denial of Service.
  • Alteration of logging, debugging, or proxy settings that could leak sensitive data.
  • Manipulation of command paths or script hooks that, in some setups, could result in remote code execution.
  • Injection of misleading credentials or tokens, potentially impacting authorization and audit trails.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on hardening configuration handling and reducing trust in values written to .env:

  • Normalize and escape untrusted input before writing to configuration files, removing or encoding line breaks, quotes, and delimiter characters incompatible with .env syntax.
  • Use a structured configuration management approach (e.g., typed config objects or key/value stores) rather than directly concatenating user-supplied strings into flat files.
  • Enforce strict validation rules for all inputs that end up in environment variables, including maximum length, allowed character sets, and expected formats.
  • Apply least-privilege principles so the process that updates .env has only the minimal file permissions required, and avoid running high-privilege logic based solely on environment configuration.
  • Separate security-sensitive settings (such as execution hooks or shell commands) from values that are influenced by external users to reduce the blast radius of configuration injection.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can be approached from both code and operational perspectives:

  • Static analysis and code review:
  • Flag direct string interpolation into configuration files without escaping or validation.
  • Identify functions that write .env or other config files and ensure they enforce character whitelists and line-structure guarantees.
  • Look for trust assumptions where user-facing tools pass values directly into configuration update paths.
  • Policy and CI enforcement:
  • Introduce coding guidelines for safe configuration management and enforce them via linters or pre-commit hooks.
  • Use automated review tools to detect patterns of configuration injection, such as appending raw user input to files consumed by parsers.
  • Runtime and operational monitoring:
  • Monitor configuration files for unexpected structural changes (e.g., sudden growth, malformed entries, or unexpected variables).
  • Log and review invocations of tools that modify .env, correlating unusual values with subsequent application errors or behavior changes.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/YosefHayim/ebay-mcp/commit/aab0bda75ea9dd27aa37d0d8524d7cf41b3c4a9a
github.comgithub.com/YosefHayim/ebay-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-97rm-xj73-33jh

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, depending on how the ebay_set_user_tokens tool is integrated. If remote users or upstream systems can influence the values passed into this tool, an attacker may exploit the bug without direct filesystem access. In purely local, tightly controlled workflows, the exposure surface is smaller.

The attacker must be able to supply or manipulate data that flows into updateEnvFile—for example, being able to set or modify token values that are written to .env. Direct write access to .env is not required if they can control the values used by the update logic.

The most robust fix is to treat configuration content as structured data: strictly validate and sanitize all values before writing, escape or reject dangerous characters, and ensure that a single value cannot alter the .env file structure. Where possible, migrate away from free-form text concatenation into typed, schema-enforced configuration mechanisms.

Preventing similar problems requires a combination of secure design and automation: define clear rules for how configuration files are generated, disallow direct interpolation of untrusted input into configuration formats, use static analysis and code review to spot unsafe patterns, and adopt secure-by-default libraries or helpers for environment and configuration management.

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