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CVE-2026-27190

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

Command Injection in Deno node:child_process Implementation

CVE-2026-27190

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-78

Impact:

Arbitrary Command Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

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Summary

A command injection vulnerability in Deno's node:child_process compatibility layer allows crafted input to influence how system commands are constructed and executed.

When untrusted data is passed into child process invocation APIs relying on this implementation, an attacker may execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the Deno process.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects applications running on Deno that:

  • Use the Node.js compatibility layer, specifically node:child_process
  • Construct command lines or arguments that incorporate user-controlled or otherwise untrusted data
  • Rely on the affected implementation in Deno versions prior to 2.6.8

The issue is most relevant in server-side or automation scripts where external input drives process execution.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Application interfaces that trigger node:child_process calls (e.g., HTTP APIs, CLIs, background jobs)
  • Required access: Ability to supply or influence input used to build command strings or arguments (e.g., request parameters, configuration values, environment variables)
  • Trigger point: Invocation of child process APIs in the Deno Node-compat layer with insufficiently sanitized or validated input
  • Why exploitation is possible: The underlying implementation does not robustly separate data from shell metacharacters, enabling crafted input to break out of intended command context and inject additional commands or flags.

Why this happens

The root cause aligns with CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection').

In the vulnerable node:child_process implementation, user-influenced data is incorporated into command execution in a way that treats it as part of the command line rather than as opaque data.

This pattern typically arises when:

  • Shell command strings are assembled via string concatenation or templating, or
  • Argument handling does not correctly escape or quote values before passing them to the OS or shell.

As a result, attacker-controlled characters (such as shell metacharacters, separators, or redirection operators) can alter the structure and behavior of the executed command.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary system commands with the privileges of the Deno process
  • Reading, modifying, or deleting application data or configuration files accessible to the process
  • Lateral movement within the host environment via spawned tools and utilities
  • Abuse of the runtime environment to exfiltrate secrets (API keys, tokens, credentials) available to the process
  • Use of the compromised process as a pivot for further attacks within the infrastructure

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation centers on treating OS command execution as a high-risk operation and minimizing where and how it is used.

General defensive patterns include:

  • Prefer high-level library APIs or platform-native functions over custom shell commands for tasks like file operations, networking, or compression.
  • Avoid building shell command strings by concatenating or interpolating user input; instead, use APIs that take argument arrays and do not invoke a shell by default.
  • Strictly validate and constrain any input that influences command names, options, or arguments (e.g., allowlists of permitted commands or flags).
  • Normalize and encode data that must be passed to external programs, ensuring it is treated as data, not executable syntax.
  • Run Deno applications and any spawned processes with least-privilege OS accounts and minimal filesystem and network permissions.
  • Isolate workloads that must spawn processes (e.g., in containers, sandboxes, or restricted runtime profiles) to limit blast radius.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect and control similar risks through a combination of static and process-level monitoring:

  • Static analysis: Configure rules that flag:
  • Use of node:child_process (e.g., exec, execFile, spawn, fork) where arguments derive from untrusted sources.
  • String concatenation or template literals used to construct command strings.
  • Code review signals:
  • Custom wrappers around command execution functions.
  • Business logic paths where user input influences which commands or flags are used.
  • Lack of input validation or allowlists around command-related parameters.
  • Runtime and policy enforcement:
  • Application-level logging of command invocations and arguments for anomaly detection.
  • OS-level auditing of spawned processes from Deno runtimes.
  • CI/CD policies that require security review for any new use of child process APIs or shell-based integrations.

Automated code scanning tools and policy-as-code frameworks can help enforce these patterns consistently across repositories.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/denoland/deno/commit/9132ad958c83a0d0b199de12b69b877f63edab4c
github.comgithub.com/denoland/deno/releases/tag/v2.6.8
github.comgithub.com/denoland/deno/security/advisories/GHSA-hmh4-3xvx-q5hr

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, depending on how the application is built. If remote users can influence any input that flows into node:child_process calls without strong validation or constraints, the issue may be exploitable over network-facing interfaces such as HTTP APIs or webhooks.

An attacker must be able to control or significantly influence input that is used to construct commands or arguments in the affected node:child_process implementation. This can range from untrusted HTTP parameters, message payloads, and CLI arguments to configuration or environment values that an attacker can modify.

Reduce or eliminate shell-based command execution where possible, and where it is strictly necessary, use APIs that separate the command and its arguments without invoking a shell by default. Apply strict validation and allowlists on all inputs that can affect command names, flags, or paths, and treat any deviation from expected values as an error.

Establish coding guidelines that treat process spawning as a privileged operation, require design review for any new external command integrations, and mandate input validation and allowlists for command-related parameters. Combine these with automated static analysis rules and CI checks that highlight new uses of node:child_process or shell command construction, enabling teams to address injection risks early in the development lifecycle.

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