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CVE-2026-27181

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Missing Authorization in MajorDoMo Market Module

CVE-2026-27181

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authorization

CWE:

CWE-862

Impact:

Unauthorized Module Deletion and System Denial of Service

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

MajorDoMo's market module exposes an unauthenticated endpoint that allows arbitrary module uninstallation simply by toggling an HTTP request parameter.

Because mode-gated admin actions are reachable without any access control, an attacker can iterate through module names and wipe most of the installation using only crafted GET requests.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in the MajorDoMo market module's administrative logic, which is exposed through the /objects/?module=market endpoint.

The admin() method reads a mode value from the request (gr('mode') / $_REQUEST) and assigns it directly to $this->mode at the very beginning of execution, before any authentication or authorization checks are enforced.

As a result, code paths intended only for privileged administrators, including module uninstall operations, become reachable to any unauthenticated user who can send HTTP requests to the MajorDoMo web interface.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Publicly exposed web interface at /objects/?module=market.
  • Required access: Network-level ability to reach the MajorDoMo HTTP endpoint (no login or credentials required).
  • Trigger point: Supplying a crafted mode parameter value (e.g., via query string or POST data) that selects privileged admin flows, including the uninstall handler.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The market module's admin() method trusts the user-controlled mode parameter and updates $this->mode before performing any authentication/authorization checks, effectively bypassing intended admin-only restrictions on sensitive module management operations.

Why this happens

The underlying issue maps to CWE-862: Missing Authorization.

The market module's administrative controller exposes a multi-mode handler where sensitive operations (such as plugin uninstallation) are guarded only by a logical mode switch.

However, this mode is taken directly from $_REQUEST via gr('mode') and applied to $this->mode without validating the caller's identity or privileges.

Because no subsequent access control check revalidates whether the current user is authorized for that mode, any unauthenticated request can select privileged paths, including the uninstall code that calls uninstallPlugin(), executes module-specific uninstall logic, and removes files and database entries.

Potential impact

  • An attacker can uninstall arbitrary modules without authentication.
  • The entire MajorDoMo installation's modules may be removed through repeated requests, causing a broad denial of service.
  • Application functionality can be degraded or completely disabled by selectively removing key components.
  • Associated scripts, templates, and configuration tied to affected modules can be deleted, leading to data and configuration loss.
  • System recovery may require manual reinstallation of modules and restoration from backups.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation typically centers on enforcing strict authorization for all administrative actions and eliminating trust in client-controlled mode selectors.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Performing explicit authentication and role/permission checks at the start of admin handlers, before any mode- or action-based routing occurs.
  • Using an internal, server-side routing mechanism for privileged operations instead of relying on user-controlled parameters (or validating that only allowed values are accepted for authorized users).
  • Applying a centralized access-control layer for module management endpoints (install/uninstall/update) and failing closed by default if no valid session is present.
  • Segregating administrative interfaces onto protected paths or dedicated admin panels that require authenticated sessions and, where appropriate, multi-factor authentication.
  • Logging and monitoring all module management operations to detect unexpected or bulk uninstall activity.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can focus on both code-level patterns and runtime behavior:

  • Static analysis and code review:
  • Flag controller or admin methods that:
  • Read action/mode variables directly from $_REQUEST, $_GET, or $_POST.
  • Invoke sensitive operations (install/uninstall, file deletion, database modification) without preceding authentication/authorization checks.
  • Look for multi-mode admin handlers where mode or similar parameters determine control flow into privileged branches.
  • Enforce policies that any method performing module or plugin management must call a centralized authorization routine.
  • Runtime and log analysis:
  • Monitor web server and application logs for:
  • Frequent requests to /objects/?module=market including suspicious or unexpected mode values.
  • Uninstall or plugin-removal activity coming from unauthenticated or anonymous sessions.
  • Implement anomaly detection for bursts of uninstall actions or a rapid sequence of requests touching many different module names.
  • Automated tooling:
  • Use SAST tools configured with custom rules for missing auth checks on "admin", "market", or "plugin" controllers.
  • Integrate security-focused linters into CI to block changes that introduce new admin paths without access control.

Sources

SourceLink
chocapikk.comchocapikk.com/posts/2026/majordomo-revisited/
github.comgithub.com/sergejey/majordomo/pull/1177
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/majordomo-unauthenticated-module-uninstall-via-market-endpoint

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if the MajorDoMo interface is reachable over the network (for example, exposed to the internet or a wider internal network), an unauthenticated attacker can exploit the issue by sending crafted requests to the market module endpoint.

No. The vulnerability exists because administrative actions are tied to a request parameter rather than to the caller's authenticated privileges.

As a result, no login or valid session is required to trigger module uninstallation.

The safest pattern is to enforce strict authentication and authorization checks at the start of any admin or module-management code, and to treat all mode/action parameters as untrusted.

Sensitive operations like install, uninstall, and update should only execute after verifying that the caller holds an appropriate admin role and is operating from a legitimate session.

Future prevention relies on adopting a consistent access control model:

  • Centralize permission checks for admin and module-management features.
  • Prohibit direct binding of user-controlled parameters to internal mode or action selectors without validation.
  • Require security-focused code review for any new administrative endpoint.
  • Use automated checks (SAST, linters, and CI policies) to flag missing authorization patterns early in development.
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