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CVE-2026-27028

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.4)

Missing Authentication in EV Charging Backend

CVE-2026-27028

Modified

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authentication

CWE:

CWE-306

Impact:

Unauthorized Control and Privilege Escalation over EV Charging Infrastructure

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.4)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

The OCPP WebSocket endpoints for charging stations lack proper authentication, allowing any unauthenticated client to connect using a known or guessed charger identifier.

An attacker can impersonate charging stations, issue or receive OCPP commands, and manipulate operational and billing-related data sent to the backend, leading to unauthorized control and data corruption.

Affected context

This vulnerability arises in EV charging backends implementing OCPP over WebSocket where:

  • Charging stations are identified primarily by an ID passed during WebSocket connection or handshake.
  • The server does not enforce strong authentication (e.g., certificates, tokens, or credentials) for stations.
  • The backend trusts any WebSocket client presenting a valid-looking station identifier.

In such deployments, the OCPP server assumes that possession of a station ID is sufficient to treat the connection as a legitimate charger.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public or network-accessible OCPP WebSocket endpoints exposed to the internet or shared networks.
  • Required access: Network-level ability to reach the WebSocket endpoint; no prior authentication or credentials required.
  • Knowledge prerequisites: Knowledge or ability to guess/derive valid charging station identifiers (e.g., through enumeration, observation, documentation, or predictable ID schemes).
  • Trigger point: Initiating a WebSocket connection to the OCPP endpoint and supplying a charger ID during the handshake or protocol initialization.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The backend binds authorization solely to the station identifier and does not verify the authenticity of the connecting client, treating any connection with a valid ID as trusted.

Why this happens

The core issue maps to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function. The system exposes critical operational functionality—controlling and reporting the state of EV charging stations—over WebSocket without robust authentication.

Instead of requiring the charging station to prove its identity (via client certificates, cryptographically signed tokens, or similar), the backend implicitly trusts any client that:

  • Can reach the WebSocket endpoint, and
  • Presents a syntactically valid station ID.

This design treats identifiers as secrets and conflates identification with authentication. As a result, anyone capable of guessing or intercepting an ID can impersonate that station, invoke privileged commands, and interact with backend workflows as if they were the physical device.

Potential impact

  • An attacker could impersonate one or more charging stations and issue OCPP commands as those devices.
  • An attacker may remotely start, stop, or alter charging sessions, potentially disrupting service to legitimate users.
  • Charging session data, metering records, and status updates can be falsified, leading to corrupted billing and reporting.
  • Attackers could trigger misconfiguration or denial-of-service scenarios by repeatedly connecting or sending maliciously crafted sequences of OCPP messages.
  • The attacker could escalate their impact by manipulating authorization flows, reservations, or firmware-related commands at scale across a charging network.
  • Operators' trust in telemetry and operational data from the charging infrastructure can be undermined, impacting monitoring, analytics, and incident response.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally centers on enforcing strong, device-level authentication and reducing implicit trust in station identifiers:

  • Introduce mutual authentication for OCPP WebSocket connections, such as TLS client certificates or cryptographically signed tokens bound to each charger.
  • Treat station identifiers as public identifiers, not secrets, and ensure that authorization decisions rely on verified credentials.
  • Implement per-device credentials (e.g., unique keys or certificates) with secure provisioning and rotation processes.
  • Enforce least privilege at the protocol level, restricting what a single station can influence and validating that messages align with the expected state and capabilities of that specific charger.
  • Apply defense-in-depth controls such as rate limiting, anomaly detection on station behavior, and strict validation of OCPP message sequences and payloads.
  • Segregate network access to the OCPP endpoints so that only expected charger networks or VPNs can reach them, reducing exposure to arbitrary internet clients.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection commonly focuses on identifying unauthenticated access paths and suspicious device impersonation:

  • Perform static and architectural analysis of the OCPP backend to identify WebSocket entry points that do not enforce authentication middleware or certificate checks.
  • Review authentication and connection-handling logic for patterns where a station ID alone is used to associate a connection with a trusted device.
  • Instrument logging and monitoring for anomalies such as:
  • Multiple simultaneous connections claiming the same station ID from different IPs or networks.
  • Rapid station identifier enumeration attempts.
  • Unusual command patterns or message rates from specific station IDs.
  • Use automated security testing tools or protocol fuzzers to simulate unauthorized clients and verify whether the backend accepts and processes commands without credentials.
  • Integrate security checks into CI/CD, including rules that flag new WebSocket endpoints that bypass standard authentication mechanisms or policy filters.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-057-08.json
cisa.govcisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-057-08
mobility46.semobility46.se/en/contact-us

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if the OCPP WebSocket endpoint is exposed to the internet or reachable from untrusted networks, an attacker can exploit this remotely without prior access, relying only on reachability and knowledge of station identifiers.

No. The weakness lies in device authentication: the backend does not verify that a connecting client is the genuine charging station. As a result, no user or operator credentials are required to impersonate a charger and send OCPP commands.

The most robust fix is to require strong, device-bound authentication for all charging stations—typically mutual TLS with per-device client certificates or signed tokens—ensuring that the backend verifies cryptographic proof of identity before accepting any OCPP messages.

Treat every network-facing endpoint controlling physical or financial operations as a critical asset that must enforce explicit authentication and authorization. During design and code review, mandate that identification (IDs) is never used as a proxy for authentication, standardize on shared authentication middleware, and validate that all protocol entry points consistently apply the chosen scheme.

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