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CVE-2026-27005

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

SQL Injection in Chartbrew Database Connectors

CVE-2026-27005

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-89

Impact:

Arbitrary Data Access and Manipulation in Connected Databases

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Chartbrew versions prior to 4.8.3 contain a SQL injection vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary SQL into queries sent to connected MySQL or PostgreSQL databases.

When exploited, this can enable reading, modifying, or deleting data in those databases, constrained only by the privileges of the database user configured for Chartbrew.

Affected context

This vulnerability arises in Chartbrew deployments that:

  • Expose a network-accessible Chartbrew web interface
  • Use Chartbrew to connect directly to relational databases (MySQL, PostgreSQL)
  • Allow query parameters or chart configuration to influence generated SQL statements

The issue is most serious when Chartbrew connects using highly privileged database accounts (e.g., with broad SELECT/INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE permissions) or when the application is reachable from untrusted networks such as the public internet.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) endpoints exposed by the Chartbrew web application
  • Required access: None; the attack can be performed by unauthenticated users able to reach the Chartbrew instance
  • Trigger point: Endpoints that build or execute SQL queries based on user-supplied parameters or chart configuration values
  • Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled input is incorporated into SQL statements without robust parameterization or escaping, allowing attackers to alter the intended query structure and inject arbitrary SQL commands executed by the connected database.

Why this happens

The root cause maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection').

At a design and implementation level, Chartbrew constructs SQL queries for connected databases using input that originates from unauthenticated HTTP requests (for example, chart filters, query fragments, or dynamic parameters).

Instead of consistently using parameterized queries or safe query-building abstractions, some code paths appear to concatenate or interpolate this input directly into SQL strings.

This insecure pattern allows attacker-supplied tokens—such as quotes, operators, and statement delimiters—to break out of the intended query context and execute additional SQL instructions under the database account configured for Chartbrew.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized reading of sensitive data stored in connected MySQL/PostgreSQL databases
  • Modification of existing records (e.g., tampering with business data or analytics inputs)
  • Deletion of tables or rows, potentially leading to loss of critical data
  • Creation of new database objects (tables, views, users) if the database account is overly privileged
  • Abuse of database features (e.g., functions, stored procedures) that could enable further compromise of the environment
  • Pivoting into other applications that share the same database or rely on the compromised data

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating unsafe query construction and reducing the blast radius of a potential compromise:

  • Prefer parameterized queries / prepared statements for all database interactions; never concatenate or interpolate user input into SQL strings.
  • Use query builder or ORM abstractions that encode parameters safely and minimize direct raw SQL formatting.
  • Apply strict input validation on fields used to shape queries (e.g., allowlists for column names, sort fields, and operators; strongly typed numeric and date parameters).
  • Segregate user-controllable elements from structural SQL (e.g., keep table/column lists static and configurable only by trusted administrators).
  • Configure database accounts according to least privilege, granting only the minimal permissions (SELECT/INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE on specific schemas) required by Chartbrew.
  • Place Chartbrew behind authentication or access controls when feasible, limiting exposure to the public internet and reducing unauthenticated attack surface.
  • Implement defense in depth with database-level safeguards such as row-level security, audit logging, and constraints that can limit damage even if a query is abused.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can combine code-level analysis with runtime monitoring:

  • Static analysis and code review:
  • Search for raw SQL construction using string concatenation or template literals incorporating request parameters or chart configuration values.
  • Flag any dynamic assembly of WHERE, ORDER BY, or LIMIT clauses that rely on unchecked user input.
  • Verify that all database access layers use prepared statements or safe query builders and that no "escape hatch" raw SQL routines bypass these protections.
  • Automated tooling:
  • Use SAST tools configured with rules for CWE-89 to highlight insecure SQL patterns.
  • Integrate pre-commit or CI checks that detect direct concatenation of request-derived data into SQL strings.
  • Runtime and operational monitoring:
  • Enable database query logging and look for anomalous patterns such as unexpected UNIONs, stacked queries, or syntax errors consistent with injection probing.
  • Monitor HTTP access logs for suspicious parameter values containing SQL meta-characters or common injection fingerprints.
  • Security testing:
  • Conduct regular dynamic testing and penetration exercises focused on endpoints that influence chart queries, filters, and custom SQL features.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/chartbrew/chartbrew/releases/tag/v4.8.3
github.comgithub.com/chartbrew/chartbrew/security/advisories/GHSA-w5rh-v333-qq6c

Frequently asked

questions

The vulnerability is highly exploitable wherever a Chartbrew instance is reachable over the network, because it can be triggered by unauthenticated HTTP requests. Any attacker with network access to the application can attempt SQL injection against connected databases.

No prior authentication is required. The attacker only needs the ability to send crafted requests to the Chartbrew web interface. The extent of database compromise then depends on the permissions of the database user configured for Chartbrew.

The safest approach is to enforce parameterized queries or prepared statements consistently across all database interactions and remove any code paths that perform direct string concatenation with user-controlled input. Combine this with strict validation and allowlisting for any dynamic query components such as sortable fields or filterable columns.

Adopt secure database access patterns as a non-negotiable standard: always use parameterized queries, centralize data access through vetted abstraction layers, and enforce code review rules that reject raw SQL construction involving user data. Complement this with automated static analysis for CWE-89, least-privilege database accounts, and regular security testing focused on data access features.

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