Summary
EcoOnline EHS for Android contains an issue involving its AndroidManifest.xml component that may expose sensitive application information and enable arbitrary code execution.
A remote attacker could exploit the affected application behavior when the vulnerable component is reachable or improperly protected.
Affected context
The issue affects EcoOnline EHS (com.airsweb.v10) for Android version 0.2.499 and is associated with the application's AndroidManifest.xml component. Risk depends on whether the relevant component is externally reachable, insufficiently restricted, and able to process attacker-controlled requests or data.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: A remotely reachable Android application component associated with the manifest
- Required access: Ability to interact with the exposed component over its supported interface
- Trigger point: Processing of attacker-controlled input or invocation through the affected component
- Why exploitation is possible: Component exposure and inadequate boundary enforcement may allow sensitive information access or execution of unintended application functionality
Why this happens
The underlying issue is an insecure Android component exposure pattern in which manifest-declared functionality may be reachable beyond its intended trust boundary. When exported or otherwise accessible components lack appropriate authorization and input handling, attackers may use them to obtain information or influence application behavior. This is consistent with CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor, with the reported code-execution impact indicating that the exposed behavior may also cross into execution of attacker-influenced functionality.
Potential impact
- An attacker may obtain sensitive application or environment information
- Unauthorized parties could access functionality intended for trusted callers
- Attackers could execute arbitrary code within the application's available privileges
- The application or associated data could be compromised
- Further attacks may be possible if exposed data or execution privileges enable access to connected services
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on reducing component exposure and enforcing trust boundaries around Android application entry points.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Restricting manifest-declared components to the smallest required audience
- Requiring robust caller authentication and authorization for sensitive operations
- Validating and constraining all data received through externally reachable components
- Avoiding dynamic execution paths driven by untrusted input
- Limiting application permissions and runtime privileges according to least privilege
- Preventing sensitive information from being returned to unauthorized callers
- Applying secure-by-default component and inter-process communication policies
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can assess for similar issues through:
- Static analysis of AndroidManifest.xml for exported activities, services, receivers, and providers
- Review of intent filters and component permission declarations
- Code review for missing caller validation and sensitive data returned through IPC interfaces
- Testing externally reachable components with unauthorized and malformed requests
- Policy enforcement requiring explicit justification for exported components
- Automated mobile application security scanning and code-review tools that identify exposed components or unsafe IPC patterns

