Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

SQL Injection in Event Management System manage_booking.php

CVE-2026-2689

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-74, CWE-89

Impact:

Data Exposure and Manipulation via SQL Injection

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

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Summary

The Event Management System 1.0 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the /admin/manage_booking.php endpoint, where the ID parameter is inserted into database queries without proper sanitization.

A remote attacker can manipulate this parameter to interfere with SQL queries, potentially accessing, modifying, or deleting booking-related data in the backend database.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in the administrative booking management functionality of the Event Management System 1.0.

It is exposed through the /admin/manage_booking.php script, which processes an ID argument as part of booking operations.

The issue is present when user-controlled input from HTTP requests is incorporated into SQL queries without robust validation, parameterization, or output encoding, allowing crafted values to alter the intended query structure.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) interface exposed by the Event Management System, specifically the /admin/manage_booking.php endpoint.
  • Required access: Network reachability to the application; depending on deployment, access to the admin interface may or may not be gated by authentication.
  • Input vector: The ID parameter supplied in a request to /admin/manage_booking.php (e.g., query string or form data).
  • Trigger point: Execution of database queries that directly interpolate the ID value into SQL statements.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application builds SQL queries using string concatenation or interpolation, treating the ID parameter as trusted data, without using parameterized statements or adequate input validation, leading to SQL injection as described by CWE-89 and improper neutralization of special elements in output used by a downstream component (CWE-74).

Why this happens

The root cause lies in unsafe construction of SQL queries using untrusted input.

Instead of using prepared statements with bound parameters, the code in /admin/manage_booking.php likely concatenates the ID parameter directly into the SQL string.

This pattern, classified under CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'), allows an attacker to inject control characters such as quotes, comments, or operators to change the query logic.

Additionally, the lack of proper neutralization of special elements passed to the database engine aligns with CWE-74, where data flowing into a downstream interpreter (SQL) is not appropriately constrained or encoded.

As a result, the database interprets parts of the user-provided input as executable SQL rather than inert data.

Potential impact

  • Retrieval of sensitive booking or user information that the attacker would not normally be able to access.
  • Modification of booking records, including unauthorized changes, cancellations, or status manipulation.
  • Deletion of records, potentially causing loss of operational or audit data.
  • Bypassing of logical access controls implemented in the application layer by directly manipulating queries.
  • In certain configurations, potential execution of stacked queries leading to broader database compromise.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation generally focuses on treating all external input as untrusted and ensuring it cannot alter the structure of SQL queries.

Recommended defensive patterns include:

  • Using parameterized queries (prepared statements) for all database access, binding values instead of concatenating strings.
  • Applying strict server-side validation on the ID parameter, enforcing expected formats (e.g., numeric-only) and rejecting non-conforming input.
  • Centralizing data-access logic in a data access layer that enforces safe query construction by default.
  • Limiting database privileges of the application account to only the operations strictly required (least privilege) to reduce impact if injection occurs.
  • Implementing a consistent input handling policy that separates data from control and avoids dynamically building SQL from raw request values.

These patterns reduce the attack surface and make injection vulnerabilities less likely to arise in new or modified code.

How teams detect issues like this

Detecting this class of vulnerability typically combines code-centric and behavior-centric approaches:

  • Static analysis: Configure security-focused linters or SAST tools to flag direct concatenation of request parameters (including ID) into SQL strings, especially in PHP files like manage_booking.php.
  • Code review: During manual review, look for:
  • Raw access to superglobals (e.g., $_GET, $_POST) used directly in SQL.
  • SQL strings built via string concatenation, interpolation, or sprintf without parameter binding.
  • Inconsistent or missing input validation on parameters used in queries.
  • Dynamic testing: Use automated scanners or security tests that submit crafted ID values to observe anomalies such as SQL errors, inconsistent responses, or time-based differences.
  • Runtime monitoring: Enable and review database logs for suspicious patterns like malformed queries, attempts with SQL control characters, or unexpected query structures.

Automated tools can assist in flagging both known vulnerable patterns and regressions when new functionality is added.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/ltranquility/CVE/issues/38
itsourcecode.comitsourcecode.com/
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?ctiid.346489
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?id.346489
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?submit.754238

Frequently asked

questions

It is remotely exploitable by anyone who can reach the /admin/manage_booking.php endpoint and supply the ID parameter.

Actual impact depends on whether the admin interface is exposed publicly and what data or operations the underlying queries control.

Not necessarily. If the vulnerable endpoint is accessible without strong authentication or if authentication is weak or bypassable, an unauthenticated attacker may exploit it.

In locked-down deployments, an attacker would first need to gain access to the administrative interface or a position where they can send crafted requests.

Refactor database access so that all queries use parameterized statements, eliminating string concatenation with user input.

Combine this with strict validation for the ID parameter, ensuring only expected formats and ranges are accepted.

Adopt a defensive coding standard that mandates:

  • Parameterized queries for all database interactions.
  • Centralized input validation routines for request parameters.
  • Regular security-focused code reviews and automated checks for unsafe SQL construction.

Embedding these practices into the development lifecycle reduces the chance of new SQL injection vulnerabilities being introduced.

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