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CVE-2026-26713

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

SQL Injection in Simple Food Order System cancel-order.php

CVE-2026-26713

Modified

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-89

Impact:

Database Compromise

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A SQL injection vulnerability in the Simple Food Order System v1.0 affects the cancel-order endpoint, allowing untrusted user input to be embedded directly into SQL queries.

Under typical web deployment conditions, an attacker can manipulate crafted parameters to modify or exfiltrate data from the application's backend database, and potentially impact authentication or authorization logic.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in the Simple Food Order System v1.0 within the /food/routers/cancel-order.php route, which is responsible for cancelling customer orders.

The issue is present when user-supplied data (such as order identifiers or user IDs) is interpolated into SQL statements without proper parameterization or robust validation.

It is most relevant in deployments where the application server has network access to a relational database and incoming HTTP requests can reach the vulnerable route through the web front end.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public or internal web endpoint at /food/routers/cancel-order.php.
  • Required access: Ability to send HTTP requests to the application; in many cases, this may be available to unauthenticated or minimally authenticated users depending on how the route is protected.
  • Trigger point: Submission of crafted request parameters (e.g., query string, form data, or AJAX payload) that are embedded into SQL statements used for cancelling orders.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application constructs SQL dynamically using user-controlled values without using prepared statements or proper escaping, allowing attackers to alter the structure of the query.

Why this happens

The root cause aligns with CWE-89: SQL Injection, where software builds SQL commands using string concatenation or similar mechanisms that directly incorporate untrusted input.

In this pattern, request parameters associated with order cancellation are treated as trusted text and appended into WHERE or other SQL clauses, enabling attackers to inject operators, literals, or additional statements.

Because the database engine interprets the combined string as executable SQL, the boundary between data and code is lost, and the attacker gains the ability to influence query logic rather than just supply values.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized viewing of order records and associated customer data.
  • Modification or deletion of orders beyond the attacker's own account.
  • Circumvention of business rules, such as cancelling other users' active or completed orders.
  • Extraction of sensitive information stored in other tables accessible to the application's database user.
  • Potential creation of new administrative or backdoor accounts if the schema supports such operations.
  • In some database configurations, execution of server-side functions that may further expand the attack surface.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on treating all user input as untrusted and strictly separating query structure from data.

Recommended defensive patterns include:

  • Using parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database interactions, especially in router/controller scripts.
  • Applying centralized input validation and normalization for identifiers used in order operations, ensuring they conform to expected formats (e.g., numeric IDs).
  • Adopting an abstraction layer or ORM that enforces query parameterization by default and discourages dynamic SQL string building.
  • Restricting the database account used by the application to the minimal set of privileges required for food ordering and cancellation workflows.
  • Implementing consistent error handling that avoids leaking raw SQL errors back to the client, reducing feedback for attackers.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically combines code-level inspection with runtime testing and policy enforcement.

Possible strategies:

  • Static analysis to flag direct concatenation of $_GET, $_POST, or other request variables into SQL strings within cancel-order.php and related modules.
  • Security-focused code reviews that look for ad-hoc mysqli_query, PDO, or similar calls where query parameters are interpolated instead of bound.
  • Application-level security testing (e.g., automated DAST tools) sending injection patterns to /food/routers/cancel-order.php and monitoring for anomalous responses or database error signatures.
  • CI/CD checks that enforce coding standards requiring prepared statements, and fail builds when forbidden patterns are detected in router/controller code.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Thirtypenny77/bug_report/blob/main/code-projects/simple-food-order-system/SQL-4.md

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. As long as the vulnerable endpoint is reachable over the network (e.g., via the public website or an internal portal), an attacker can exploit it remotely by sending crafted HTTP requests.

It depends on how /food/routers/cancel-order.php is integrated. If order cancellation is available to unauthenticated users or weakly protected sessions, exploitation may be possible without valid credentials. Even when authentication is required, low-privilege access is often sufficient.

Refactor the affected code to use parameterized queries or prepared statements everywhere user input reaches the database, and avoid constructing SQL by concatenating request parameters. Centralize database access patterns so unsafe constructs are easy to spot and eliminate.

Establish secure coding standards that mandate parameterized queries, use frameworks or ORMs that make unsafe patterns hard to implement, apply rigorous input validation, and integrate static analysis and security testing into the development pipeline to catch injection risks early.

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