Summary
A SQL injection vulnerability in sourcecodester Pharmacy Point of Sale System v1.0 allows crafted input to be embedded directly into database queries in /pharmacy/manage_user.php.
When user-controlled data is not properly sanitized or parameterized, an attacker can manipulate SQL statements to access, modify, or destroy sensitive pharmacy and user records.
Affected context
The issue arises in the user management functionality exposed through /pharmacy/manage_user.php in the Pharmacy Point of Sale System v1.0.
The vulnerable context is any HTTP endpoint within this script that takes user-supplied parameters (for example, GET or POST fields) and uses them to build SQL queries without strict validation or binding.
Installations using default configurations, weak access controls, or exposed admin panels are more likely to be impacted, especially when the system is reachable from untrusted networks.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Web application endpoints handled by
/pharmacy/manage_user.php. - Required access: Ability to send HTTP requests to the pharmacy POS web interface (e.g., network access to the application; authentication may or may not be required depending on deployment).
- Trigger point: Submission of crafted input into parameters processed by user management operations (such as creating, updating, listing, or deleting users).
- Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled values are concatenated into SQL statements without proper parameterization or rigorous server-side validation, allowing control over query structure.
Why this happens
The vulnerability stems from constructing SQL queries using string concatenation with untrusted input in the /pharmacy/manage_user.php script.
This pattern maps directly to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'), where control characters and SQL syntax from user input are not neutralized.
Instead of using prepared statements or bound parameters, the application likely interpolates raw input into query strings, enabling attackers to alter query logic, union additional queries, or bypass checks.
Potential impact
- Unauthorized reading of sensitive pharmacy data, including user accounts and transaction records
- Creation, modification, or deletion of user accounts, including privilege escalation to administrative roles
- Bypassing authentication or authorization checks by manipulating login or user lookup queries
- Destruction or corruption of inventory, sales, and customer records through injected SQL commands
- Potential compromise of the underlying database server, including pivoting to other databases managed by the same instance
General mitigation guidance
Risk reduction for this class of issue centers on strong separation between data and code in SQL construction and minimizing trust in user input.
Recommended patterns include:
- Use parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database access, ensuring user input is always treated as data.
- Apply strict server-side validation and canonicalization for all incoming fields, matching expected formats (e.g., integers, fixed enums, bounded strings).
- Implement centralized database access layers or ORM patterns that discourage ad hoc SQL concatenation within page controllers like
manage_user.php. - Enforce least-privilege database accounts so that the application can only perform necessary operations and cannot, for example, drop tables or access unrelated schemas.
- Limit exposure of administrative endpoints (such as user management) via authentication, network segmentation, and access controls to reduce reachable attack surface.
How teams detect issues like this
Effective detection typically combines code-centric and behavior-centric approaches:
- Static analysis: Scan PHP code for dynamic SQL construction patterns, especially string concatenation that includes
$_GET,$_POST,$_REQUEST, or other tainted sources passed to database APIs (e.g.,mysqli_query,pdo->query). - Code review: Flag scripts that handle user management or authentication (
manage_user.php, login handlers) and inspect for missing prepared statements or inconsistent input validation. - Runtime monitoring: Enable database query logging and alert on anomalous patterns such as always-true conditions, stacked queries, or unexpected
UNION SELECTclauses originating from web requests. - Security testing: Use controlled SQL injection test cases as part of CI pipelines and regular application penetration testing to uncover regressions in input handling.

