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CVE-2026-26682

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

Code Injection in fastCMS PluginController

CVE-2026-26682

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Code Injection

CWE:

CWE-94

Impact:

Arbitrary Code Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A code injection vulnerability in fastCMS before version 0.1.6 allows arbitrary code execution through the PluginController.java component.

If a local attacker can interact with the plugin management functionality or influence plugin-related inputs, they may execute attacker-controlled code in the fastCMS runtime environment.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in the plugin management logic of fastCMS, specifically within PluginController.java, in versions prior to 0.1.6.

It is relevant in deployments where the CMS is running on a host that can be accessed locally by an attacker (e.g., shell users, shared hosting environments, or other local tenants) and where plugin operations are exposed through local interfaces, configuration files, or IPC mechanisms.

The issue manifests when plugin-related input (names, paths, configuration, or code fragments) can be influenced by a local party and is subsequently used in a way that can introduce new executable code into the JVM without robust validation or isolation.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Local host where fastCMS is deployed (e.g., local OS user, local container user, or process with filesystem access).
  • Required access: Ability to interact with or modify data consumed by PluginController (such as plugin files, plugin metadata, or configuration), typically via local file access or local IPC endpoints.
  • Trigger point: Execution of plugin-management functionality (such as plugin installation, loading, updating, or execution) that processes attacker-influenced data.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The plugin controller logic enables dynamic loading or evaluation of code or code-like data derived from attacker-controllable input without adequate validation, sandboxing, or restriction on what can be executed, enabling direct code injection into the fastCMS process.

Why this happens

This vulnerability stems from unsafe handling of dynamic code within the plugin controller, mapping to CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection').

In abstract terms, the component responsible for managing plugins accepts input that can influence what code gets loaded, generated, or executed and fails to constrain that input to a safe subset (for example, trusted plugin locations, signed artifacts, or a closed set of operations).

Instead of strictly treating plugin metadata as data and enforcing strong validation, the controller effectively allows untrusted or weakly validated input to participate in code paths that the JVM executes.

Such patterns commonly involve reflective loading of classes from attacker-controllable locations, use of dynamically compiled code, script engines, or evaluation of configuration that can contain executable constructs without proper filtering or policy enforcement.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary attacker-supplied code with the privileges of the fastCMS process
  • Full compromise of the CMS instance, including modification of content and configuration
  • Access to sensitive data stored or processed by fastCMS (such as user data, credentials, or API keys)
  • Use of the compromised instance as a pivot point for lateral movement within the host or network
  • Installation of persistent backdoors or malicious plugins within the CMS environment

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on strictly separating data from executable code in plugin handling and reducing the trust placed in local inputs:

  • Constrain plugin loading to a controlled set of trusted, signed, or otherwise verified artifacts and directories.
  • Avoid dynamic code generation or evaluation from plugin metadata, configuration, or paths; treat these values as data only.
  • Enforce strong validation and whitelisting on plugin identifiers, locations, and configuration fields, rejecting inputs that deviate from expected patterns.
  • Apply least-privilege principles to the fastCMS runtime so that, even if plugin logic misbehaves, its ability to affect the underlying system is limited.
  • Prefer sandboxing or restrictive class loaders for plugin execution, limiting access to sensitive internal APIs and system resources.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this class of issue using a combination of code-focused and environment-focused techniques:

  • Static analysis: Rules that flag dynamic code evaluation, reflection-based class loading from uncontrolled paths, use of scripting or compilation APIs, and any execution of values derived from plugin metadata or local files.
  • Code review: Manual review of PluginController and related plugin-management code for any patterns that mix untrusted input with executable constructs, dynamic classpath manipulation, or unmanaged script engines.
  • Runtime monitoring: Logging and analysis of plugin installation and loading events, highlighting unexpected plugin sources, unusual filesystem paths, or anomalous plugin behavior.
  • Policy enforcement: CI/CD checks requiring plugin-related changes to undergo security review and disallowing new uses of dynamic evaluation APIs without explicit justification.

Sources

SourceLink
gist.github.comgist.github.com/sorzs/e3913b814e2e5548aa66de6c25b0510a
github.comgithub.com/sorzs/test/tree/main/fastcms-rce

Frequently asked

questions

The description indicates a local attacker requirement, so exploitation generally requires local access to the host or environment where fastCMS runs. Remote exploitation would only be possible if local-only interfaces or plugin inputs are indirectly exposed over the network by other weaknesses.

An attacker typically needs local access sufficient to influence data consumed by PluginController—for example, the ability to create or modify plugin files, metadata, or configuration on the host or inside the container where fastCMS is deployed.

The safest pattern is to eliminate or strictly limit dynamic code execution based on plugin-supplied data: confine plugin loading to trusted, validated artifacts, enforce strict input validation, and use controlled class loading or sandbox mechanisms that cannot execute arbitrary attacker-controlled code.

Future code should follow secure design principles for extensibility: treat all plugin-related input as untrusted, avoid code generation or evaluation from externally influenced values, use strong verification for plugin origin and integrity, and incorporate automated security checks and code review focusing on dynamic loading and execution paths.

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