Summary
Tata Consultancy Services Cognix Recon Client v3.0 contains a broken access control flaw in its password reset functionality that allows authenticated users to reset passwords for arbitrary accounts.
By crafting specific reset requests, a logged-in user can bypass authorization checks and take over other users' accounts, including potentially higher-privileged ones.
Affected context
The vulnerability appears in the password reset workflow of Cognix Recon Client v3.0, specifically in how the application authorizes which account's password can be changed.
It typically manifests when the backend API accepts user identifiers from the client without enforcing strict ownership or privilege checks, and when authenticated users can interact directly with password reset endpoints beyond their own account.
Environments exposing this functionality over internal or external web interfaces, particularly where different roles (standard users, admins, operators) share the same reset mechanism, are more likely to be exposed.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Web application interface or API endpoints handling password reset requests.
- Required access: Valid authenticated user account on the system (no need for elevated privileges).
- Trigger point: Submission of a crafted password reset request that targets another user's identifier (e.g., username, user ID, or email) in the reset payload or URL.
- Why exploitation is possible: The server-side logic fails to enforce that a given authenticated session may only reset the password for the account they own, and instead trusts client-supplied identifiers without robust authorization checks.
Why this happens
The core issue is a lack of proper authorization enforcement in a security-sensitive operation: password reset.
Rather than deriving the target account from the authenticated session context (or a strongly verified reset token), the implementation appears to accept arbitrary user identifiers from client-controlled input and proceeds with the reset.
This aligns with CWE-284: Improper Access Control, where security-critical operations are not constrained by adequate permission checks, allowing users to act outside their intended privileges.
Conceptually, the bug stems from mixing identity selection (which account is affected) with untrusted client parameters, and not validating that the requester is allowed to perform that action on the selected account.
Potential impact
- Unauthorized reset of passwords for other user accounts.
- Full account takeover of targeted users, including potentially administrative or high-privilege accounts.
- Loss of confidentiality and integrity of data accessible through compromised accounts.
- Potential pivoting to other internal systems or data stores via compromised high-privilege accounts.
- Disruption of business processes due to widespread unauthorized password changes.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on enforcing strong, server-side access control around password reset operations and decoupling them from untrusted parameters.
Recommended design patterns include:
- Derive the account being modified from the authenticated session or a cryptographically strong, single-use reset token, not from arbitrary client input.
- Ensure that self-service password changes (while logged in) are restricted strictly to the currently authenticated user.
- For out-of-band resets (e.g., "forgot password"), use secure, time-limited, unguessable tokens bound to a specific user and action, validated on the server.
- Apply role-based access control for administrative password resets, with explicit checks verifying that the acting user has the necessary privileges and is using a dedicated admin interface.
- Implement least-privilege principles in all account management functionality and avoid multi-purpose endpoints that can affect arbitrary accounts.
- Add consistent authorization middleware or policy layers, so that sensitive actions like password reset cannot bypass standardized permission checks.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection typically combines code-level review, automated analysis, and behavior monitoring:
- Static analysis and code review:
- Search for password reset or account management endpoints that accept user identifiers from request parameters (e.g., userId, username, email) and modify credentials.
- Verify that every such endpoint checks that the target account is either the current user or that the caller has explicit administrative rights.
- Review controller/service methods where authentication is present but no follow-up authorization decisions are made for sensitive actions.
- Look for direct database updates to user credential fields using client-supplied identifiers without cross-checking ownership.
- Automated security testing:
- Use API security scanners or DAST tools configured to attempt ID/parameter tampering on password reset and profile modification endpoints.
- Implement unit and integration tests that simulate one user attempting to reset another user's password and assert that the operation fails.
- Runtime monitoring:
- Log password reset events with acting user, target account, source IP, and correlation IDs.
- Alert on unusual patterns such as one account triggering many password resets for different users.
- Policy enforcement:
- Define secure coding guidelines that forbid direct use of client-provided user identifiers in credential modification operations without explicit authorization checks.
- Integrate these policies into CI/CD using linters or security-focused code scanning tools.

