Summary
Sciyon Koyuan Thermoelectricity Heat Network Management System 3.0 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the /SISReport/WebReport20/Proxy/AsyncTreeProxy.aspx endpoint, where the PGUID argument is concatenated into database queries without proper sanitization.
A remote attacker can manipulate this parameter to interfere with SQL query logic, potentially accessing, modifying, or deleting backend data under certain deployment conditions.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in web deployments of Sciyon Koyuan Thermoelectricity Heat Network Management System 3.0 that expose the /SISReport/WebReport20/Proxy/AsyncTreeProxy.aspx resource over a network.
It appears when user-controlled input from the PGUID parameter is used in SQL queries without adequate input validation, encoding, or parameterization.
The actual impact depends on database permissions, network segmentation, and how the reporting subsystem interacts with other components in the heat network management environment.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: HTTP(S) interface on /SISReport/WebReport20/Proxy/AsyncTreeProxy.aspx
- Required access: Network access to the web application; no strong indication of authentication requirements for the vulnerable endpoint
- Trigger point: Supplying crafted values in the PGUID query parameter that are subsequently used in SQL statements
- Why exploitation is possible: The application appears to build SQL dynamically with PGUID content, without using parameterized queries or sufficient validation/escaping, enabling attacker-controlled modification of the SQL query structure
Why this happens
The core issue stems from constructing SQL statements by directly embedding untrusted input from the PGUID parameter into query strings.
This aligns with CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'), as metacharacters in user input can alter the intended query logic.
The presence of CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component reflects a broader pattern where output destined for the database layer is not sanitized for that specific interpreter, causing control characters to be interpreted as SQL syntax rather than data.
Potential impact
- Unauthorized reading of database records that may include operational data, configuration, or user-related information
- Modification or deletion of data, potentially impacting heat network management accuracy and historical reporting
- Bypassing of application-level access controls if SQL queries enforce authorization in the database layer
- In some configurations, execution of database-specific functions that could aid further lateral movement or environment reconnaissance
- Corruption of reporting outputs and business logic dependent on the affected data
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating direct concatenation of user input into SQL statements and reinforcing trust boundaries between the web layer and the database:
- Prefer parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database interactions involving user-supplied values such as PGUID
- Introduce strict server-side validation for PGUID, enforcing expected formats (e.g., GUID-like patterns, length limits, allowed character sets)
- Apply context-aware escaping or encoding only as a secondary defense, ensuring it is tailored to the SQL dialect in use
- Implement least-privilege database accounts so that the web application's credentials are restricted to only necessary operations
- Centralize data access logic (e.g., using a data access layer or ORM with safe-by-default query APIs) to reduce ad hoc query construction
- Limit exposure of reporting endpoints through authentication, authorization, and network segmentation where feasible
How teams detect issues like this
Detection efforts can combine code-centric and runtime-focused approaches:
- Static analysis and code review
- Search for dynamic SQL construction patterns that concatenate values from HTTP parameters (e.g., PGUID) into query strings
- Flag use of raw string concatenation or formatting functions when building SQL, especially within AsyncTreeProxy.aspx and related modules
- Enforce coding standards that require parameterized queries and input validation for all data reaching the database
- Automated tooling
- Apply SAST rules targeting CWE-89/CWE-74 patterns in .NET/ASP.NET codebases, focusing on ADO.NET, ORM APIs, and custom data access helpers
- Runtime and operational monitoring
- Enable database logging and monitor for anomalous or malformed SQL patterns indicative of injection attempts
- Use web application firewalls (WAFs) or API gateways with rules tuned for SQL injection signatures on parameters like PGUID
- Security testing
- Integrate dynamic application security testing (DAST) and periodic penetration testing focused on report and proxy endpoints

