Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

OS Command Injection in Wavlink WL-NU516U1 Firewall CGI

CVE-2026-2615

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-74, CWE-77

Impact:

Remote Code Execution on Network Device

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Wavlink WL-NU516U1 devices up to firmware 20251208 contain an OS command injection flaw in the singlePortForwardDelete function of /cgi-bin/firewall.cgi, where the del_flag parameter is unsafely handled.

A remote attacker can manipulate this parameter to execute arbitrary commands on the device under typical web-access conditions, potentially taking control of the router and its network traffic.

Affected context

The vulnerability exists in the web-based management interface of Wavlink WL-NU516U1 network devices, specifically within the firewall management functionality that handles single port forwarding deletions.

It is exposed when the device's HTTP/HTTPS management interface is reachable (e.g., from the local network or, in some configurations, from the internet) and the backend CGI script processes user-supplied del_flag values without adequate validation or sanitization.

Exploitation risk increases when administration interfaces are left with default credentials, weak passwords, or exposed directly to untrusted networks.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP/HTTPS requests to /cgi-bin/firewall.cgi on WL-NU516U1 devices.
  • Required access: Ability to send crafted requests to the management interface; in many deployments this means local network access, but some devices may expose the interface to the internet through remote management.
  • Trigger point: Invocation of the singlePortForwardDelete functionality with a maliciously crafted del_flag parameter.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The del_flag parameter is incorporated into OS-level command execution (e.g., shell or system utilities) without strict input validation, escaping, or the use of safe command-building APIs, enabling attacker-controlled shell metacharacters to alter the command's structure.

Why this happens

This issue stems from treating user-controlled input as trusted when constructing system commands inside the CGI-based firewall management logic.

The singlePortForwardDelete function appears to concatenate or interpolate the del_flag parameter directly into a shell command or command-line argument without proper sanitization, escaping, or parameterization.

This behavior corresponds to CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection'), and is also closely related to CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output, since attacker input is being emitted into a command context without neutralizing special characters like ;, &, |, or backticks.

Conceptually, the code path fails to distinguish between data and control instructions, allowing attacker-supplied data to be interpreted by the shell as additional commands.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary system commands on the router's underlying operating system.
  • Complete compromise of the device, including persistent backdoor installation.
  • Interception, modification, or redirection of network traffic passing through the device.
  • Use of the router as a pivot point for attacks against internal network hosts.
  • Inclusion of the device in botnets or distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) campaigns.
  • Disclosure of configuration details, Wi-Fi credentials, and other sensitive information stored on the device.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation focuses on eliminating the ability for user-controlled input to influence shell command structure and reducing the trust placed in web-management traffic:

  • Refactor command execution paths to use parameterized APIs (e.g., exec-family calls with argument arrays) instead of passing through the shell, ensuring user input cannot be interpreted as shell syntax.
  • Apply strict allowlist-based validation on parameters like del_flag, restricting them to well-defined formats (e.g., specific numeric IDs or fixed tokens) and rejecting any unexpected characters.
  • Centralize input normalization and encoding for CGI parameters so that any text reaching command construction is already sanitized and cannot introduce control characters.
  • Reduce the privileges of the web management process so that, even if a flaw exists, the executed commands have limited access to the underlying system and configuration.
  • Limit exposure of the web management interface by disabling remote administration from untrusted networks, requiring strong authentication, and segmenting management traffic onto dedicated networks.

These measures make command injection far less likely and significantly reduce the impact of similar bugs.

How teams detect issues like this

Detecting this type of vulnerability typically involves a combination of code-centric and behavior-centric approaches:

  • Static analysis: Configure static analysis rules to flag uses of system(), popen(), backticks, or shell invocation interfaces where arguments are built from HTTP parameters or other external input. Patterns involving string concatenation or sprintf-like formatting with request data should be reviewed closely.
  • Manual code review: During review of CGI handlers or router management interfaces, look for functions that:
  • Call operating system utilities based on web parameters.
  • Build command strings instead of using structured argument arrays.
  • Lack explicit validation and normalization of fields like del_flag.
  • Dynamic testing: Use web application security testing tools and fuzzers to send crafted payloads containing shell metacharacters through firewall and port-forwarding management endpoints to observe unexpected behavior or command execution.
  • Runtime monitoring: On deployed devices, monitor for atypical command execution patterns or processes spawned by the web server or CGI processes, which may indicate exploitation attempts.

Automated SAST/DAST tools and CI-integrated security checks can help surface similar command injection patterns early in the development lifecycle.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Wlz1112/Wavlink-NU516U1-V251208-/blob/main/singlePortForwardDelete.md
github.comgithub.com/Wlz1112/Wavlink-NU516U1-V251208-/blob/main/singlePortForwardDelete.md#exp
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?ctiid.346265
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?id.346265
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?submit.751047

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, depending on how the device is deployed. If the management interface is exposed to the internet—e.g., via remote administration, UPnP misconfiguration, or port forwarding—attackers on the internet may be able to exploit it. If management is restricted to the local network, exploitation would typically require local or adjacent network access.

That depends on how the firewall.cgi script is integrated with authentication. In many embedded products, some management CGI scripts are protected by HTTP authentication, while others may be misconfigured or partially exposed. An attacker's effort is significantly reduced if default or weak credentials are used, but the core requirement is the ability to reach and invoke the vulnerable endpoint.

The most robust fix is to remove shell parsing from the equation: avoid assembling shell commands from user input and instead call system utilities via APIs that accept pre-separated arguments. Combine this with strict allowlist validation for all CGI parameters and ensure that any user-controlled values cannot introduce shell metacharacters or alter the structure of the executed command.

Embed secure design principles into the development lifecycle: treat all web parameters as untrusted, use strong input validation and canonicalization, avoid shell-based command composition, and run management interfaces with minimal privileges. Augment this with regular security-focused code reviews, automated static analysis for dangerous API usage, and targeted penetration testing of router and firewall management features before release.

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