/

CVE-2026-26048

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Missing Authentication for Critical Functionality

CVE-2026-26048

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authentication for Critical Functionality

CWE:

CWE-306

Impact:

Denial of Service (Wireless Network Disruption)

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A Wi-Fi de-authentication vulnerability in the router stems from a lack of protection on management frames, allowing attackers to forge deauthentication and disassociation packets.

When exploited, this can repeatedly disconnect clients from the wireless network and create a persistent denial-of-service condition for legitimate users.

Affected context

The issue affects Wi-Fi router deployments where management frames (such as deauthentication and disassociation frames) are transmitted and accepted without authentication or cryptographic protection.

In environments where 802.11w/Protected Management Frames (PMF) or equivalent management frame protection is not enforced, any device within radio range can inject forged management frames.

This primarily impacts WLANs relying on continuous connectivity, such as home networks, small offices, and public hotspots that use standard Wi-Fi security but do not protect management traffic.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Wireless management plane (802.11 management frames) within radio range of the access point and clients.
  • Required access: No prior authentication; the attacker only needs a Wi-Fi interface capable of crafting and sending raw 802.11 frames.
  • Trigger point: Transmission of forged deauthentication or disassociation frames that appear to originate from the access point or client.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The router accepts and acts on unprotected management frames, and client devices generally trust these frames, as there is no authentication or integrity check to distinguish legitimate from forged messages.

Why this happens

This vulnerability is rooted in CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Functionality, applied to the Wi-Fi management plane.

Deauthentication and disassociation are critical control functions that affect client connectivity, yet the router allows them to be executed through unauthenticated, unencrypted frames.

Because management frames lack integrity protection and origin authentication, an attacker can impersonate the access point or a client and send control messages that are treated as legitimate, causing disconnections and service disruption.

Potential impact

  • Clients may be repeatedly disconnected from the Wi-Fi network, resulting in sustained denial of service.
  • Critical applications (VoIP, video conferencing, remote work tools) can experience frequent interruptions or become unusable.
  • Users may be forced to switch to less secure fallback networks or hotspots, increasing overall exposure.
  • Attackers could combine deauthentication with other attacks (e.g., evil twin or rogue AP scenarios) to entice users to join a malicious network.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on strengthening authentication and integrity for management traffic and reducing trust in unauthenticated control messages.

Pattern-based defensive strategies include:

  • Enabling Wi-Fi Protected Management Frames (PMF, 802.11w) or equivalent management frame protection modes where supported.
  • Configuring the router to require management frame protection for all associated clients, rather than leaving it optional.
  • Favoring modern Wi-Fi security modes (e.g., WPA3 with mandatory PMF) and deprecating legacy modes that do not support management frame protection.
  • Segmenting critical devices (e.g., infrastructure systems, VoIP phones) onto SSIDs and equipment that enforce stronger protections.
  • Monitoring and limiting automated reactions to management events in client software, where possible, to reduce susceptibility to transient spoofed frames.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically involves monitoring wireless management traffic and configuration for signs of unprotected control flows:

  • Wireless intrusion detection/prevention systems (WIDS/WIPS) can flag abnormal spikes in deauthentication or disassociation frames and identify potential attack sources.
  • Periodic configuration reviews of access points and controllers to verify that PMF or equivalent management frame protection is enabled and enforced.
  • Policy-driven audits to identify SSIDs operating with legacy security settings that do not support or require management frame protection.
  • Use of network and endpoint logs to correlate frequent, unexplained Wi-Fi disconnects with nearby RF activity, which may indicate active exploitation.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-050-03.json
cisa.govcisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-050-03

Frequently asked

questions

No. Exploitation requires the attacker to be within wireless range of the target router and clients, as it relies on crafting and sending over-the-air 802.11 management frames.

Typically no. Because the deauthentication and disassociation frames are not authenticated or encrypted, an attacker usually does not need the Wi-Fi credentials or an existing association to launch the attack.

The most robust fix pattern is to require authenticated and integrity-protected management frames (such as enabling and enforcing PMF/802.11w) and to avoid operating in security modes that cannot support management frame protection.

Future deployments should adopt wireless configurations and equipment that support strong management frame protection by default, enforce modern Wi-Fi security standards (e.g., WPA3 with mandatory PMF), and incorporate regular configuration audits and wireless threat monitoring into security operations.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.