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CVE-2026-25951

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

Path Traversal in FUXA SCADA/HMI File Handling

CVE-2026-25951

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Path Traversal / Directory Traversal

CWE:

CWE-22, CWE-23, CWE-184

Impact:

Remote Code Execution via Arbitrary File Write

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A flaw in FUXA's path sanitization logic allows an authenticated administrator to bypass directory traversal protections using nested traversal sequences (such as ....//).

When exploited, this can enable arbitrary file writes into sensitive server directories like runtime/scripts, potentially leading to remote code execution when the application reloads and executes the planted scripts.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in FUXA deployments where authenticated administrative users can upload, save, or manage files through the web interface.

It is relevant when:

  • The server exposes file management or script management functionality to admin users.
  • File paths are constructed from user-supplied input and normalized using custom logic.
  • The application attempts to restrict writes to specific directories but relies on flawed path sanitization instead of strict whitelisting or OS-level controls.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: FUXA web interface / HTTP API for file or script management.
  • Required access: Valid authenticated account with administrative permissions (or equivalent role that can write files).
  • Trigger point: Any feature that accepts a path or filename and writes content to the filesystem (e.g., script deployment, configuration export/import, project file handling).
  • Why exploitation is possible: The path sanitization and validation logic attempts to prevent ../ directory traversal but can be bypassed with crafted nested sequences like ....//, causing the resulting path resolution to escape the intended directory constraints and target arbitrary locations.

Why this happens

The core issue is an incomplete and bypassable implementation of path validation and sanitization.

Instead of relying on canonicalized filesystem paths and strict directory whitelisting, the code likely performs string-based filtering that does not account for all traversal variants, encodings, or nested sequences (CWE-22 and CWE-23).

This interacts with CWE-184 (Incomplete Blacklist) because the logic attempts to block certain patterns (such as ../) but fails to anticipate obfuscated forms that the underlying filesystem ultimately interprets as traversal.

As a result, user-controlled data is incorporated into filesystem paths that the server treats as trusted, allowing writes outside the intended directory scope.

Potential impact

  • Arbitrary file creation or overwrite in directories writable by the application process.
  • Remote Code Execution when malicious files are written into script-execution locations like runtime/scripts and later loaded by the server.
  • Persistence of malicious logic that survives normal application restarts if stored in configuration or startup directories.
  • Tampering with application behavior, alarms, or process logic by modifying legitimate scripts or configuration assets.
  • Potential lateral movement or broader system compromise if the application account has access to shared or system directories.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on robust path handling, least privilege, and isolation of executable content:

  • Use canonicalization: Resolve user-supplied paths to absolute, canonical paths and verify that they remain under an allowed base directory before any file operation.
  • Prefer whitelisting: Define explicit, fixed directories for uploads and script storage, and reject any path that attempts to go outside those directories, regardless of input form.
  • Avoid string-only filters: Do not rely solely on blacklisting patterns like ../; instead, compare canonical paths or use APIs that enforce directory boundaries.
  • Separate code and data: Store user-modifiable files in directories that are never executed as code or scripts by the application runtime.
  • Apply least privilege: Run the FUXA service under an account with minimal filesystem permissions so that even if traversal occurs, high-impact locations cannot be written.
  • Introduce defense-in-depth checks: Combine application-level validation with server or container policies (e.g., read-only mounts for critical directories).

How teams detect issues like this

To detect similar vulnerabilities and potential exploitation:

  • Static analysis:
  • Search for file write operations where paths incorporate user input with only ad-hoc string sanitization.
  • Flag code that manually strips ../ or similar sequences instead of validating canonical paths.
  • Identify file APIs used with concatenated strings rather than path-joining utilities followed by canonical checks.
  • Code review cues:
  • Look for custom path normalization routines that implement blacklists instead of whitelists and canonical comparison.
  • Review all admin-only features that allow uploads, exports/imports, or script editing for proper path constraints.
  • Runtime/operational monitoring:
  • Log and alert on file writes outside expected project or data directories, especially to directories that contain executable scripts.
  • Monitor for unexpected new or modified files under script or plugin directories (e.g., runtime/scripts).
  • Tooling:
  • Use SAST tools configured to flag path traversal patterns and incomplete path validation.
  • Incorporate security-focused code scanning into CI pipelines to catch new instances of unsafe path handling before release.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/frangoteam/FUXA/commit/f7a9f04b2ab97ab5421e4ec4e711c51e9f4b65c8
github.comgithub.com/frangoteam/FUXA/releases/tag/v1.2.11
github.comgithub.com/frangoteam/FUXA/security/advisories/GHSA-68m5-5w2h-h837

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, but only through the authenticated web interface or API. Exploitation occurs via HTTP requests to functions that accept file paths, so it is remotely reachable within the network perimeter where FUXA is exposed.

Yes. The described scenario requires an authenticated attacker with administrative-level permissions or any role that has the ability to write or manage files on the server via FUXA.

The safest pattern is to canonicalize all filesystem paths, ensure they remain within a predefined allowed root directory, and strictly reject any request that attempts to escape that root. Combine this with separation of executable code from user-writable locations and least-privilege filesystem permissions.

Adopt secure path-handling patterns as a standard: avoid ad-hoc string filtering, rely on canonical path comparison under a whitelisted root, treat all user-supplied paths as untrusted, and incorporate automated checks (code review guidelines, static analysis rules, and security tests) specifically aimed at detecting path traversal and arbitrary file write risks.

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