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CVE-2026-25939

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

Missing Authorization in FUXA Scheduler Management

CVE-2026-25939

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authorization

CWE:

CWE-862

Impact:

Unauthorized Control of ICS/SCADA Schedules

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

FUXA, a web-based SCADA/HMI process visualization platform, contains a missing authorization check that allows unauthenticated remote users to create and modify scheduler configurations.

When exposed to untrusted networks, this enables attackers to manipulate automation schedules in connected ICS/SCADA environments, potentially leading to unauthorized process operations or unsafe states.

Affected context

The vulnerability affects FUXA deployments running versions 1.2.8 through 1.2.10 where the scheduler management functionality is network-accessible.

It is most critical in environments where FUXA is connected to live ICS/SCADA assets (PLCs, RTUs, controllers) and its web interface or API is reachable from segments not fully trusted, such as corporate networks, remote access links, or partially exposed DMZs.

Installations that rely on FUXA schedulers to automate critical operations or safety-related tasks are particularly at risk if additional network or authentication controls are weak or misconfigured.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: FUXA web interface or backing HTTP API responsible for scheduler creation and modification.
  • Required access: Network reachability to the FUXA service; no valid account or credentials are required.
  • Trigger point: HTTP requests targeting scheduler creation/update endpoints, sent without prior authentication.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The affected endpoints perform state-changing operations on scheduler resources without enforcing proper authorization checks, allowing unauthenticated clients to issue privileged actions.

Why this happens

This issue stems from missing or incomplete authorization enforcement on sensitive scheduler management endpoints.

While the application likely assumes that only authenticated or privileged users will invoke these operations, the corresponding routes accept and process unauthenticated requests, violating the principle of least privilege.

Conceptually, this maps to CWE-862: Missing Authorization, where the system exposes functionality that should require authorization but either does not perform the check or relies solely on implicit trust such as network location.

The insecure pattern is that state-changing operations affecting operational control (in this case, ICS/SCADA schedules) are not consistently routed through a centralized authorization layer or middleware, leading to a gap between intended access policy and actual enforcement.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may create new schedules that trigger unauthorized operations on connected ICS/SCADA devices.
  • Existing schedules can be modified to change timings, durations, or target actions, possibly disrupting normal industrial processes.
  • Schedulers could be abused to repeatedly start, stop, or reconfigure equipment, leading to process instability or equipment stress.
  • Malicious scheduling may interfere with safety or environmental controls, potentially contributing to unsafe operating conditions.
  • Manipulated schedules could be used as a foothold for broader operational disruption or to conceal other malicious activities.

General mitigation guidance

To reduce risk from missing authorization on sensitive operations, defensive strategies typically include:

  • Centralizing authentication and authorization checks so that all state-changing endpoints (e.g., scheduler CRUD operations) pass through mandatory access control middleware.
  • Adopting a default-deny access model for operational controls, explicitly granting permissions only to authenticated roles that require them.
  • Applying role-based or attribute-based access control to limit who can create, edit, or delete schedulers, and segregating duties between operational and administrative roles.
  • Minimizing exposure of FUXA interfaces by placing them on restricted network segments, using VPNs or jump hosts instead of direct internet access, and enforcing strict firewall rules.
  • Implementing defense-in-depth around ICS/SCADA paths, such as additional command authorization, rate limiting for schedule changes, and out-of-band process safety controls independent of the HMI/SCADA layer.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection and assurance can focus on both code and runtime behaviors:

  • Static and code review: Verify that all routes handling scheduler creation, modification, or deletion invoke common authentication and authorization mechanisms; look for direct route handlers that bypass middleware or omit role checks.
  • Access control testing: Include negative test cases where unauthenticated or low-privilege clients attempt scheduler operations, and ensure these requests are denied.
  • Logging and monitoring: Enable detailed auditing of scheduler-related actions (who changed what and when), and alert on unusual patterns such as anonymous or unexpected clients modifying schedules, or high-frequency schedule updates.
  • Automated tooling: Use application security testing tools or CI-integrated scanners configured to flag endpoints that accept state-changing requests without prior authentication or with missing access control annotations.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/frangoteam/FUXA/commit/5782b35117a9bd14ffcb881f8dfb8c6680157d9b
github.comgithub.com/frangoteam/FUXA/releases/tag/v1.2.11
github.comgithub.com/frangoteam/FUXA/security/advisories/GHSA-c869-jx4c-q5fc

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. If the FUXA web interface or API is reachable from a network segment accessible to an attacker, they can remotely issue scheduler creation or modification requests without authentication.

No. The core issue is missing authorization on the scheduler endpoints, which allows unauthenticated users to perform operations that should require a logged-in, privileged account.

Enforce mandatory authentication and authorization for all scheduler-related operations through a centralized access control layer, using a default-deny policy and clearly defined roles and permissions for operational tasks.

Adopt a consistent access control architecture where every state-changing endpoint is protected by shared middleware, incorporate access control threat modeling into design reviews, and include automatic tests and static rules that fail builds when new routes bypass established authorization patterns.

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