/

CVE-2026-25917

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

Unsafe Deserialization in Apache Airflow Webserver

CVE-2026-25917

Modified

Vulnerability type

Category:

Unsafe Deserialization

CWE:

CWE-502

Impact:

Remote Code Execution within Airflow Webserver Context

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

An unsafe deserialization flaw in Apache Airflow allows crafted XCom payloads to trigger arbitrary code execution within the webserver process.

If a DAG author can control XCom contents, they may escalate from DAG-level logic control to code execution in the webserver context, extending their effective privileges and attack surface.

Affected context

This issue arises in Apache Airflow deployments where:

  • DAG authors are allowed to define, modify, and run DAGs, and
  • XCom payloads originating from DAG tasks are later processed, rendered, or deserialized by the webserver.

The vulnerable condition typically appears when the webserver trusts serialized XCom data from the scheduler/worker side and deserializes it without strict type controls or validation.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Airflow webserver, specifically code paths that deserialize or process XCom payloads.
  • Required access: Ability to author or modify DAGs and influence the contents of XCom payloads (e.g., by controlling task code that pushes XComs).
  • Trigger point: A webserver operation (such as a view, UI element, or API handler) that reads and deserializes the crafted XCom entry.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The webserver treats serialized XCom data as trusted and uses a deserialization mechanism that can materialize attacker-controlled objects or invoke logic during object construction, matching the pattern of CWE-502 unsafe deserialization.

Why this happens

The root cause is the use of a generic, powerful serialization format for XComs that the webserver later deserializes without robust restrictions.

In practical terms, XCom data originating from DAG-executed code is treated as trusted when processed by the webserver, and the deserializer is capable of reconstructing arbitrary object graphs instead of limiting itself to simple, inert data types.

This aligns with CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data, where untrusted or semi-trusted serialized data can influence program control flow, leading to code execution or privilege elevation when reconstituted.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary code in the Airflow webserver process.
  • Elevation of privileges from DAG author capabilities to webserver-level actions.
  • Unauthorized access to data or configuration available to the webserver.
  • Tampering with DAG definitions, metadata, or UI-exposed operational data.
  • Potential lateral movement to other systems reachable from the webserver environment.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on reducing trust in serialized XCom content and limiting what deserialization can do:

  • Prefer simple, inert data formats for cross-component communication (e.g., JSON with strict schemas) instead of general-purpose object serialization.
  • Enforce a whitelist of allowed types when deserializing XComs, rejecting or sanitizing unexpected structures.
  • Separate trust boundaries by treating data coming from DAG execution (workers/scheduler) as untrusted when processed by the webserver, even if produced by known authors.
  • Apply least-privilege to the webserver process, restricting filesystem, network, and credential access so that even successful code execution has limited blast radius.
  • Introduce validation or transformation layers between raw XCom storage and webserver consumption to normalize data into safe representations.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can combine code-based analysis and operational monitoring:

  • Use static analysis to search for unsafe or generic deserialization APIs applied to XCom or other user-influenced serialized data, especially in webserver-related code paths.
  • During code review, flag patterns where worker- or DAG-originated data is deserialized in the webserver without clear type restrictions or schema validation.
  • Establish secure coding guidelines and linting rules that discourage direct use of powerful deserialization mechanisms for web-facing features.
  • Monitor logs and security telemetry for anomalous XCom contents or unexpected webserver behavior (e.g., unusual subprocess invocations or file access) that could indicate exploitation attempts.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/apache/airflow/pull/61641
lists.apache.orglists.apache.org/thread/6whgpkqbh12rvpfmvcg8b0vwlv4hq3po
openwall.comopenwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/04/17/9

Frequently asked

questions

Typically, no. Exploitation generally requires authenticated access as a DAG author or equivalent role capable of influencing XCom payloads. However, if such access is exposed over the network, an attacker who gains DAG author permissions could exploit the flaw remotely.

An attacker must be able to create or modify DAGs and run tasks that push controlled XCom data. This presumes a level of trust in the attacker as a DAG author, but the vulnerability allows that trust boundary to be bypassed to reach webserver code execution.

The safest pattern is to remove or strictly constrain unsafe deserialization. That means treating XCom data as untrusted input, using safe serialization formats, enforcing type whitelists or schemas, and ensuring that deserialization cannot instantiate arbitrary objects or trigger code execution.

Adopt a design principle that all cross-component serialized data is untrusted, even when it originates from internal services. Standardize on safe serialization formats, bake serialization/deserialization rules into shared libraries, and enforce them through code review, static analysis, and security-focused testing.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.