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CVE-2026-25803

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Hard-Coded Credentials / Default Passwords in 3DP-MANAGER

CVE-2026-25803

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Hard-Coded Credentials / Default Passwords

CWE:

CWE-798

Impact:

Full Administrative Compromise over Network

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

3DP-MANAGER versions 2.0.1 and earlier automatically create an administrative account with predictable default credentials (admin/admin) on first initialization.

Any attacker who can reach the login interface over the network may be able to log in as an administrator, control VPN tunnels, and alter system settings if the default password is not changed.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects deployments of 3DP-MANAGER (version 2.0.1 and prior) that:

  • Expose the 3DP-MANAGER web login interface over a network, and
  • Use the first-run initialization flow that auto-creates the admin account, and
  • Do not immediately change or disable the default admin/admin credentials.

It is particularly risky in environments where the interface is reachable from untrusted networks or where multiple users may know or guess the default credentials.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible 3DP-MANAGER web login interface (e.g., LAN, VPN, or internet-exposed HTTP/HTTPS endpoint).
  • Required access: No prior authentication is needed; only the ability to reach the login page.
  • Trigger point: Logging in using the default username and password combination (admin/admin) created during initialization.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application ships with a known, hard-coded default administrative credential and does not enforce a mandatory password change or disablement before use, making it trivially guessable.

Why this happens

The root cause aligns with CWE-798: Use of Hard-Coded Credentials.

The application automatically provisions an administrative account with a fixed, publicly-known username and password (admin/admin) at first initialization.

Because these credentials are the same across all installations and there is no enforced rotation or setup-time change, the authentication boundary is effectively weakened to a well-known secret.

This design pattern treats a constant credential as a security control, which fails as soon as the product is deployed in any environment where an attacker can reach the login endpoint.

Potential impact

  • Attackers can log in as the administrator and gain full control of the 3DP-MANAGER instance.
  • Management and modification of VPN tunnels, routes, and related configuration can be taken over.
  • System and security settings may be altered, disabled, or misconfigured.
  • Sensitive configuration data, logs, or connection details could be viewed or exfiltrated.
  • The system could be used as a pivot point for further attacks within the network.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating reliance on shared default credentials and reducing exposure of the management interface:

  • Replace hard-coded or default administrative passwords with a first-run mandatory credential setup flow that forces the operator to define a unique strong password (and ideally a unique admin username).
  • Require users to change any bootstrap credential on first login and block all operations until this step completes.
  • Provide configuration options to disable or restrict network exposure of the administrative interface, limiting access to trusted management networks or via dedicated VPNs.
  • Encourage deployment patterns that place the admin interface behind additional controls such as reverse proxies, IP allow-lists, or SSO/identity-aware proxies.
  • Design for least privilege, separating high-impact administrative actions from routine operations and allowing use of non-admin accounts for day-to-day tasks.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection approaches can focus on both configuration state and behavioral signals:

  • Periodically scan deployments for instances where the admin account is still using default or weak credentials, if technically feasible without exposing secrets (e.g., via health checks or management APIs that indicate password rotation status).
  • Implement server-side logging and alerting for successful logins from unusual IP ranges, first-time access patterns, or repeated use of the admin account.
  • Use configuration management or compliance checks to identify systems where the administrative interface is exposed to broad networks (e.g., open internet) without compensating controls.
  • During code review or static analysis, flag patterns where user accounts are provisioned with fixed credentials, or where default secrets are embedded in initialization logic.
  • Integrate automated security review tools that look for hard-coded credentials and default-password initialization flows in source code and deployment manifests.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/denpiligrim/3dp-manager/commit/f568de41de97dd1b70a963708a1ee18e52b9d248
github.comgithub.com/denpiligrim/3dp-manager/security/advisories/GHSA-5x57-h7cw-9jmw

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if the 3DP-MANAGER login interface is accessible over a network that an attacker can reach. The attacker only needs network access to the interface and knowledge of the default credentials.

No prior authentication is required. The vulnerability can be exploited using the built-in default admin/admin credentials as long as they have not been changed and the interface is reachable.

The safest general pattern is to remove hard-coded default admin credentials entirely and replace them with a first-run setup process that forces the operator to create unique, strong admin credentials before the system becomes usable. Additionally, restrict network exposure of the admin interface by default.

Avoid shipping products with shared default passwords, require secure initial provisioning of credentials, and enforce password change-on-first-use semantics for any bootstrap accounts. Support secure configuration guidance, apply least privilege, and incorporate security design reviews to catch hard-coded credentials and insecure initialization flows early in development.

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