Summary
A flaw in LavinMQ's authorization logic allows authenticated users with the "Policymaker" management tag to create shovels that bypass normal access controls.
Under certain configurations, this can let those users read from or publish to virtual hosts (vhosts) they are not otherwise authorized to access, undermining isolation between tenants or applications.
Affected context
The vulnerability appears in LavinMQ deployments that:
- Use management roles/tags, specifically the "Policymaker" tag
- Rely on vhosts for tenant or application-level isolation
- Allow authenticated users with the Policymaker tag to manage policies and shovels
In these environments, the authorization checks for shovel creation and configuration may not fully enforce per-vhost permissions, allowing shovels to be set up across vhosts the user cannot normally access.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: LavinMQ management interface or API endpoints that handle shovel and policy management.
- Required access: Valid, authenticated LavinMQ account with the "Policymaker" management tag.
- Configuration requirements: Multiple vhosts configured, with some vhosts the attacker is not authorized to read from or write to, and shovels enabled/usable in the deployment.
- Trigger point: Creation or configuration of a shovel that specifies a source and/or destination vhost outside the user's authorized set.
- Why exploitation is possible: The authorization layer enforces vhost permissions for normal client operations, but does not consistently apply these checks when a Policymaker user defines shovel endpoints, allowing indirect access via the shovel mechanism.
Why this happens
This issue stems from improper authorization (CWE-863), where a privileged management capability is not fully constrained by the normal access control model.
While direct client operations are checked against vhost-specific permissions, the shovel creation logic treats the Policymaker role as sufficiently trusted and fails to re-validate whether the user is allowed to read from or write to the specified vhosts.
Conceptually, this reflects a broken access control pattern where an indirect operation (configuring infrastructure objects like shovels) can be used to bypass the stricter checks applied to direct messaging operations.
Potential impact
- Unauthorized reading of messages from vhosts the attacker is not permitted to access.
- Unauthorized publishing of messages into restricted vhosts, potentially injecting malicious or misleading data.
- Breach of tenant isolation in multi-tenant deployments, leading to cross-tenant data exposure.
- Integrity impact on message-driven workflows, such as triggering unintended actions or corrupting message streams.
- Expansion of an attacker's effective privilege within the messaging infrastructure via indirect routing paths.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation typically focuses on tightening authorization rules around management capabilities and removing implicit trust in privileged tags.
Recommended defensive patterns include:
- Ensuring that any configuration of shovels, policies, or routing objects is subject to the same vhost-level permission checks as direct client operations.
- Restricting assignment of the "Policymaker" or similar high-impact management roles to a minimal set of administrative accounts, following least-privilege principles.
- Separating duties so that operational accounts managing shovels do not also represent end-user or application identities.
- Applying role and permission models that explicitly bind management actions to scoped resources (e.g., per-vhost administrative roles) rather than broadly trusted global roles.
- Periodically reviewing access control policies and management tags to verify they align with isolation and tenancy requirements.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches can focus on both configuration review and behavioral monitoring:
- Configuration and policy review: Periodically audit management roles/tags and verify that only appropriate accounts hold the Policymaker tag or equivalent high-privilege capabilities.
- Access control validation: Use security or QA checks that attempt to configure shovels targeting unauthorized vhosts to confirm that permission boundaries are enforced.
- Log and telemetry analysis: Monitor management API logs for shovel creation or modification events where the source or destination vhost differs from the user's typical authorized scope or usage pattern.
- Static and policy analysis: Apply configuration-as-code checks or policy-as-code tools to ensure that management permissions are tightly scoped and that indirect routing mechanisms cannot bridge restricted vhosts without explicit approval.

