Summary
WeKan versions prior to 8.19 contain an insecure direct object reference (IDOR) in checklist creation and related checklist routes.
By tampering with card and board identifiers, an attacker can associate checklists with cards on other boards without proper authorization checks.
Affected context
This vulnerability appears in WeKan's checklist-related endpoints where cards and boards are referenced by client-supplied identifiers.
The implementation does not consistently confirm that a given cardId is actually associated with the provided boardId for the current user, creating a gap between object ownership and access control.
It primarily affects deployments where multiple boards exist and users are expected to have different permission scopes across those boards.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: HTTP API and web UI endpoints responsible for checklist creation and manipulation.
- Required access: Authenticated access to WeKan with permissions to create or manage checklists on at least one board.
- Trigger point: Sending checklist-related requests (e.g., create/update checklist) with a manipulated
cardIdandboardIdcombination. - Why exploitation is possible: The server logic trusts the combination of
cardIdandboardIdsupplied by the client and fails to verify that the card actually belongs to the specified board or is within the user's authorized scope.
Why this happens
The underlying bug aligns with CWE-639: Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR).
Checklist operations rely on client-provided identifiers (such as cardId and boardId) without enforcing a server-side relationship check between those objects.
Access control is effectively performed on metadata provided by the client rather than on authoritative data from the server, enabling cross-board ID tampering and unauthorized linkage or manipulation of resources.
Potential impact
- Creation of checklists on cards that reside on boards the attacker should not access.
- Cross-board data leakage via side effects (e.g., notifications, activity logs) tied to manipulated checklists.
- Confusion or corruption of board workflows by attaching or modifying checklists on sensitive cards.
- Potential pivot to further unauthorized actions if other features assume board-level isolation that no longer holds.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally requires strengthening server-side authorization and object relationship checks for all checklist-related operations.
Effective patterns include:
- Deriving accessible cards and boards from the authenticated user's session and server-side data, rather than trusting client-supplied
boardId/cardIdpairings. - Verifying on the server that any
cardIdreferenced in a request actually belongs to the specifiedboardIdand that the user has permission to that board. - Centralizing access control logic so that all routes involving cards, boards, and checklists reuse the same validation routines.
- Applying least-privilege design, ensuring users can only perform checklist actions on objects they are explicitly allowed to interact with.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection typically focuses on identifying mismatches between access control decisions and object relationships:
- Static analysis: Look for checklist routes or handlers that accept
cardIdandboardIdfrom the client and perform database operations without validating the relationship between these IDs and the current user. - Code review: Flag patterns where authorization is checked only at the board level or only via client-supplied identifiers, rather than based on server-derived ownership or membership.
- Security testing: Use targeted authorization tests, altering
cardIdandboardIdparameters across boards to observe whether the application permits actions on unauthorized cards. - Policy enforcement: Adopt secure coding guidelines that require object-level permission checks and prohibiting trust in client-composed resource identifiers for authorization decisions.

