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CVE-2026-25564

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) in WeKan Checklist

CVE-2026-25564

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)

CWE:

CWE-639

Impact:

Unauthorized Access and Cross-Board Data Manipulation

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

WeKan versions prior to 8.19 contain an insecure direct object reference (IDOR) in checklist creation and related checklist routes.

By tampering with card and board identifiers, an attacker can associate checklists with cards on other boards without proper authorization checks.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in WeKan's checklist-related endpoints where cards and boards are referenced by client-supplied identifiers.

The implementation does not consistently confirm that a given cardId is actually associated with the provided boardId for the current user, creating a gap between object ownership and access control.

It primarily affects deployments where multiple boards exist and users are expected to have different permission scopes across those boards.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP API and web UI endpoints responsible for checklist creation and manipulation.
  • Required access: Authenticated access to WeKan with permissions to create or manage checklists on at least one board.
  • Trigger point: Sending checklist-related requests (e.g., create/update checklist) with a manipulated cardId and boardId combination.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The server logic trusts the combination of cardId and boardId supplied by the client and fails to verify that the card actually belongs to the specified board or is within the user's authorized scope.

Why this happens

The underlying bug aligns with CWE-639: Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR).

Checklist operations rely on client-provided identifiers (such as cardId and boardId) without enforcing a server-side relationship check between those objects.

Access control is effectively performed on metadata provided by the client rather than on authoritative data from the server, enabling cross-board ID tampering and unauthorized linkage or manipulation of resources.

Potential impact

  • Creation of checklists on cards that reside on boards the attacker should not access.
  • Cross-board data leakage via side effects (e.g., notifications, activity logs) tied to manipulated checklists.
  • Confusion or corruption of board workflows by attaching or modifying checklists on sensitive cards.
  • Potential pivot to further unauthorized actions if other features assume board-level isolation that no longer holds.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally requires strengthening server-side authorization and object relationship checks for all checklist-related operations.

Effective patterns include:

  • Deriving accessible cards and boards from the authenticated user's session and server-side data, rather than trusting client-supplied boardId/cardId pairings.
  • Verifying on the server that any cardId referenced in a request actually belongs to the specified boardId and that the user has permission to that board.
  • Centralizing access control logic so that all routes involving cards, boards, and checklists reuse the same validation routines.
  • Applying least-privilege design, ensuring users can only perform checklist actions on objects they are explicitly allowed to interact with.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically focuses on identifying mismatches between access control decisions and object relationships:

  • Static analysis: Look for checklist routes or handlers that accept cardId and boardId from the client and perform database operations without validating the relationship between these IDs and the current user.
  • Code review: Flag patterns where authorization is checked only at the board level or only via client-supplied identifiers, rather than based on server-derived ownership or membership.
  • Security testing: Use targeted authorization tests, altering cardId and boardId parameters across boards to observe whether the application permits actions on unauthorized cards.
  • Policy enforcement: Adopt secure coding guidelines that require object-level permission checks and prohibiting trust in client-composed resource identifiers for authorization decisions.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/wekan/wekan/commit/08a6f084eba09487743a7c807fb4a9000fcfa9ac
wekan.fiwekan.fi/
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/wekan-checklist-deletion-idor-via-missing-relationship-validation

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. Any authenticated user who can reach the checklist endpoints over the network can attempt to exploit IDOR by manipulating card and board identifiers.

Typically yes. The attacker generally needs an account with permissions to create or manage checklists on at least one board, then abuses that access to target cards on other boards.

Implement strict server-side checks that validate object relationships and permissions for every checklist operation—specifically, confirming that the referenced cardId belongs to the supplied boardId and that the user has access to that board.

Standardize authorization practices so that all routes use centralized, object-level permission checks, avoid trusting client-supplied resource IDs for access control, and include systematic authorization testing in your QA and CI pipelines.

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