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CVE-2026-25512

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

OS Command Injection in Group-Office

CVE-2026-25512

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Group-Office contains an OS command injection vulnerability where the email/message/tnefAttachmentFromTempFile endpoint concatenates a user-controlled tmp_file parameter directly into an exec() call.

An authenticated attacker who can reach this endpoint and control tmp_file may execute arbitrary system commands on the server, leading to full remote code execution under the application's privileges.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in Group-Office deployments that expose the email/message/tnefAttachmentFromTempFile endpoint and accept a tmp_file parameter from authenticated users.

The issue manifests when backend logic passes this parameter directly into a shell command invoked via exec() (or equivalent) without proper validation or escaping.

Environments where the application runs with elevated or broad system privileges are at higher risk, but even least-privilege configurations can see significant compromise of application data and functionality.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) interface of the Group-Office application, specifically the email/message/tnefAttachmentFromTempFile endpoint.
  • Required access: Valid authenticated user account with permission to call this endpoint or trigger email processing that references tmp_file.
  • Trigger point: Submission of a request where tmp_file contains shell metacharacters or injected command fragments.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The tmp_file parameter is concatenated directly into a shell-level exec() call without robust input validation, encoding, or use of safe process invocation APIs, allowing the shell to interpret attacker-supplied content as commands.

Why this happens

This vulnerability stems from constructing shell commands by string concatenation with untrusted input and executing them with a generic exec()-style API.

Instead of treating tmp_file purely as data, the code embeds it into a command line that is interpreted by the operating system shell.

This aligns with CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection'), where lack of input neutralization and reliance on shell parsing allow attackers to inject additional commands or arguments.

The abstract insecure pattern is: exec("somecommand " + user_input) or equivalent, where user_input is neither constrained nor safely passed as a separate argument to a non-shell API.

Potential impact

  • Remote execution of arbitrary system commands under the Group-Office process user.
  • Reading, modifying, or deleting application data and configuration files accessible to the application.
  • Deployment of web shells or backdoors for persistent access.
  • Lateral movement within the server or internal network, depending on available credentials and network reach.
  • Use of the compromised server as a pivot for further attacks or as part of a botnet for spam, DDoS, or cryptomining.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on removing the shell from the execution path and minimizing trust in user-controlled parameters:

  • Prefer high-level language APIs or libraries that perform email/TNEF parsing and file handling without invoking shell commands.
  • When process execution is unavoidable, use parameterized process invocation (e.g., passing arguments as an array) instead of building a shell command string.
  • Treat tmp_file and similar parameters as opaque data: validate against a strict allowlist of known-safe filenames or IDs and avoid allowing arbitrary paths or shell-relevant characters.
  • Apply strong input validation and canonicalization for any value that influences command execution, rejecting input containing metacharacters commonly interpreted by shells.
  • Run the Group-Office service with least-privilege OS accounts and restricted filesystem and network permissions to limit blast radius in case of exploitation.
  • Isolate the application using containers, jails, or similar sandboxing techniques to further constrain potential damage.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection efforts can combine code-centric and runtime monitoring approaches:

  • Static analysis: Configure SAST rules to flag:
  • Uses of exec(), system(), shell_exec(), or equivalent APIs that concatenate variables into command strings.
  • Direct inclusion of HTTP parameters (like tmp_file) in command construction.
  • Code review: During manual review, look for:
  • Any endpoint that builds shell commands from request data.
  • Lack of input validation or allowlists around parameters used in system-level operations.
  • Error handling paths where debug-oriented exec calls may have been left in place.
  • Runtime monitoring and logging:
  • Log command invocations from the application layer and alert on unexpected patterns (e.g., presence of ;, &&, |, backticks, or unusual binaries).
  • Use EDR or OS-level auditing to track child processes spawned by the Group-Office service account, focusing on anomalous commands.
  • Policy enforcement:
  • Introduce secure coding policies that prohibit shell-based command construction with user input.
  • Use CI/CD gates to automatically reject changes that introduce new unsafe exec patterns as identified by linters or SAST tools.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Intermesh/groupoffice/commit/6c612deca97a6cd2a1bd4feea0ce7e8e9d907792
github.comgithub.com/Intermesh/groupoffice/security/advisories/GHSA-579w-jvg7-frr4

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, provided the Group-Office instance is exposed over the network and an attacker has valid credentials with access to the vulnerable endpoint. The attack is carried out via HTTP(S) requests that supply a crafted tmp_file parameter.

The description indicates that an authenticated attacker is needed. Any account that can trigger calls to email/message/tnefAttachmentFromTempFile and control tmp_file could potentially exploit the flaw, even if it is not a highly privileged administrative account.

Replace shell-based exec calls with safe, parameterized process execution APIs or, ideally, pure language-level operations that do not spawn a shell at all. Enforce strict allowlists and type constraints on any parameters that influence file names or command arguments, and ensure no user-controlled data is ever concatenated into a shell command string.

Adopt a defensive design approach: avoid invoking shells from web-exposed code, centralize safe wrappers for any necessary system commands, and mandate code review for all process execution logic. Complement this with automated static analysis rules to detect unsafe command construction and continuous security training to reinforce secure coding guidelines for handling external input.

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