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CVE-2026-25240

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

SQL Injection in PEAR user::maintains() Role Filtering

CVE-2026-25240

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-89

Impact:

Arbitrary SQL Execution / Database Compromise

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

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Summary

A SQL injection vulnerability in the PEAR framework's user::maintains() method allows attacker-controlled role filters to be directly interpolated into an IN (...) clause when supplied as an array.

Under conditions where user input influences the role filter list, an attacker may inject arbitrary SQL, potentially leading to data exfiltration, modification, or full compromise of the underlying database.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects PHP applications that use the PEAR framework's user::maintains() API and pass role filters that may be derived from external or semi-trusted input.

The issue manifests when role filters are provided as an array and incorporated into an SQL IN (...) clause via string interpolation rather than parameterized bindings.

Risk is elevated in deployments where application logic does not strictly constrain or sanitize the role filter values before calling user::maintains().

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Application code paths that invoke user::maintains() with configurable or user-controllable role filters.
  • Required access: Ability to influence the role filter array (e.g., via HTTP parameters, form fields, or indirectly through configurable roles).
  • Trigger point: Execution of the database query that builds an IN (...) clause using raw elements from the role filter array.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The query construction logic interpolates array elements into SQL without robust parameterization or escaping, allowing crafted values to break out of intended literals and inject additional SQL.

Why this happens

The root cause is improper construction of SQL queries using untrusted input in the user::maintains() method.

Instead of using parameterized queries or safely bound placeholders for each role, the code interpolates array elements directly into an IN (...) clause, treating them as trusted fragments of SQL.

This pattern corresponds to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'), where user-controlled data is incorporated into SQL statements without appropriate neutralization, enabling attackers to modify query structure.

Potential impact

  • Bypass of authorization checks by manipulating role-based logic.
  • Unauthorized reading of sensitive data from the database.
  • Modification or deletion of application data, including integrity-impacting records.
  • Creation of new privileged accounts or escalation of privileges via injected SQL.
  • In some environments, potential execution of database-level functions that can assist in remote code execution.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating dynamic SQL string construction with untrusted values and enforcing strict query parameterization:

  • Use prepared statements with bound parameters for all elements of IN (...) clauses, generating a placeholder per role value.
  • Constrain role filters to a fixed set of allowed identifiers or enums, validating against a whitelist before building queries.
  • Avoid passing raw user input into lower-level data access APIs; instead, map input to internal role constants or IDs.
  • Apply the principle of least privilege to database accounts so that, if injection occurs, the blast radius is limited.
  • Encapsulate query construction in well-reviewed data access layers, reducing the spread of custom SQL string-building logic.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can combine code-centric and behavior-centric approaches:

  • Static analysis: Configure SAST rules to flag SQL string concatenation patterns, especially where arrays or lists are expanded into IN (...) clauses without parameter binding.
  • Code review: During manual reviews, inspect data access layers and PEAR integration points for any direct interpolation of role-related inputs into SQL.
  • Unit and security tests: Add negative tests that feed unexpected role values (including quote characters and SQL keywords) through user::maintains() to detect unsafe handling.
  • Runtime monitoring: Enable database query logging or use an application security monitoring tool to identify anomalous queries containing user-controlled fragments or obvious injection signatures.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/pear/pearweb/security/advisories/GHSA-xw9g-5gr2-c44f

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if external users can influence the role filters passed into user::maintains() (for example, through web forms, query parameters, or API inputs), the vulnerability can be exploited remotely via those interfaces.

The attacker needs the ability to supply or manipulate data that becomes part of the role filter array. This might require only unauthenticated access in some applications, or authenticated access where role-related parameters are user-configurable.

The safest approach is to replace any string interpolation in SQL with parameterized queries, binding each value in the role filter array as a separate placeholder, and enforcing strict validation or whitelisting of acceptable roles.

Standardize on parameterized database access across the codebase, isolate SQL construction in well-tested data access layers, perform regular security code reviews, and use static analysis to flag any direct concatenation of untrusted input into SQL commands.

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