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CVE-2026-25234

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

SQL Injection in PEAR Category Deletion Workflow

CVE-2026-25234

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-89

Impact:

Arbitrary SQL Execution / Database Compromise

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A SQL injection vulnerability in the PEAR category deletion workflow allows crafted category identifiers to be injected directly into database queries.

When an attacker has access to the category manager interface, they can manipulate the category id parameter to execute arbitrary SQL, potentially leading to full database compromise.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in PEAR installations that expose the category manager workflow to authenticated users with category management permissions.

The affected code path is responsible for deleting categories, and it constructs SQL queries using a category id derived from request parameters without proper sanitization or parameterization.

Systems are at greater risk when the category manager is accessible to a broad set of users or integrated into custom administrative panels without additional access controls.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Web-based category management interface (HTTP requests hitting the category deletion endpoint).
  • Required access: Ability to authenticate or otherwise reach the category manager workflow and trigger category deletion actions.
  • Trigger point: Submission of a crafted category id value (e.g., via query string, form input, or route parameter) during a category delete operation.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The category id is incorporated into SQL statements without strict type enforcement, input validation, or use of prepared statements, allowing attacker-controlled fragments to alter the intended query structure.

Why this happens

The core issue is the construction of SQL statements by directly concatenating or interpolating user-derived input (the category id) into query strings.

This maps to CWE-89: SQL Injection, where untrusted data is used to dynamically form a SQL command without sufficient neutralization.

Instead of using parameterized queries or strict integer casting and validation, the code path trusts the category id value, enabling attackers to break out of the expected query context and inject arbitrary SQL clauses.

Potential impact

  • Bypass of authorization checks on category operations.
  • Extraction of sensitive data from other tables (users, credentials, configuration).
  • Modification or deletion of arbitrary database records, including entire tables.
  • Creation of new privileged accounts or alteration of application roles.
  • Potential pivot to remote code execution where SQL functions or stored procedures support command execution.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating direct string-based SQL construction and tightening trust boundaries around request parameters:

  • Use parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database operations, including simple lookups and delete operations.
  • Enforce strict server-side validation and type casting of identifiers; treat category ids as integers and reject any non-conforming input.
  • Centralize data access logic in a database abstraction layer or ORM that defaults to safe query patterns.
  • Apply the principle of least privilege to database accounts so that, even if an injection occurs, the accessible operations and data are minimized.
  • Restrict access to the category manager workflow to the smallest necessary set of trusted roles and use robust authentication/authorization controls.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect similar SQL injection patterns through a combination of code and runtime analysis:

  • Static analysis rules that flag string concatenation or interpolation involving request parameters in SQL query construction.
  • Manual code reviews focusing on administrative workflows and delete/update endpoints, ensuring all queries use bound parameters.
  • Security testing (including fuzzing and web application scanning) targeting input fields associated with identifiers and filtering by SQL error responses or anomalous behavior.
  • Centralized logging and monitoring of database queries to detect unusual patterns, such as unexpected concatenated clauses or tautological WHERE conditions originating from web requests.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/pear/pearweb/security/advisories/GHSA-q28j-3p7r-6722

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if the category manager workflow is reachable over the network (e.g., via a web admin panel), the vulnerability can be exploited remotely by anyone who can interact with that interface.

It requires access to the category manager workflow, which is typically an authenticated and privileged function. However, the risk depends on how broadly those permissions are granted and whether any misconfigurations expose the interface more widely.

The safest pattern is to replace all dynamic SQL string construction with parameterized queries, strictly validate and cast identifiers such as category ids, and ensure that all database operations pass untrusted input as bound parameters rather than string fragments.

Adopt a secure-by-default data access layer (such as an ORM or database abstraction with prepared statements), enforce coding standards that prohibit direct interpolation of user input into SQL, integrate static analysis and security testing into CI/CD pipelines, and regularly review administrative workflows for injection risks.

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