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CVE-2026-25136

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in Rucio WebUI 500 Error Handling

CVE-2026-25136

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

CWE:

CWE-79, CWE-1004

Impact:

Session Hijacking and Account Compromise via Reflected XSS

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A reflected Cross-site Scripting (XSS) issue in the Rucio WebUI error page allows attacker-controlled data to be rendered as HTML/JavaScript inside 500 error responses.

If a user is tricked into visiting a specially crafted URL, an attacker could execute scripts in the victim's browser and potentially steal their login session tokens.

Affected context

This vulnerability arises in the Rucio WebUI when server-side exceptions trigger a 500 error page and the associated ExceptionMessage is rendered back to the browser.

In affected versions, parts of the error content can reflect attacker-controlled input from the request URL without proper output encoding.

The risk is highest in deployments where users regularly follow shared links or support/debug URLs and maintain active authenticated sessions in the WebUI.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Rucio WebUI HTTP interface exposed to users.
  • Required access: Ability to craft and distribute a malicious URL pointing to the Rucio WebUI (no prior authentication is strictly required, though impact is greater against authenticated users).
  • User interaction: A victim must navigate to the attacker-supplied URL while logged in or with an active session.
  • Trigger point: A backend condition that causes a 500 internal server error, where the ExceptionMessage containing unsanitized request data is rendered in the response.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The ExceptionMessage is incorporated into the 500 error page without context-appropriate HTML/JavaScript escaping, allowing injected script to execute in the browser.

Why this happens

The underlying flaw is an output encoding issue in error handling logic, where server-side exception messages that may incorporate user input are rendered directly into an HTML response.

This maps to CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (Cross-site Scripting): untrusted data influences the structure of the returned page without proper escaping.

The session token theft angle also touches CWE-1004: Sensitive Cookie Updated Without 'HttpOnly' Flag, where the lack (or insufficiency) of defense-in-depth cookie protections can allow client-side scripts to read or exfiltrate authentication tokens.

Potential impact

  • Theft of login session tokens from users who visit malicious URLs
  • Impersonation of affected user accounts within the Rucio WebUI
  • Unauthorized access to data management operations available to the compromised user
  • Execution of arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the Rucio WebUI origin (e.g., DOM manipulation, CSRF chaining, or further phishing)
  • Potential pivoting to other internal tools or dashboards if they trust the compromised browser session

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on strict output encoding and robust error handling patterns:

  • Treat all data reflected in HTML responses (including exception messages and debug details) as untrusted and apply context-aware escaping for HTML, attributes, and URLs.
  • Avoid rendering raw exception messages or stack traces directly to users; instead, return generic error pages and log detailed diagnostics server-side.
  • Centralize error page rendering so that all error responses pass through a sanitizing template or view.
  • Apply a default security posture for cookies by setting flags such as HttpOnly and Secure to reduce exposure of session tokens to client-side scripts and transport-level attacks.
  • Enforce a least-privilege design for WebUI sessions and actions so that compromise of a single session yields minimal access where practical.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for similar vulnerabilities using:

  • Static analysis: Rules that flag direct concatenation of exception messages or request parameters into HTML templates or response bodies without encoding.
  • Template review: Manual or automated checks ensuring all variables in templates use safe encoding helpers and that error templates never include raw server-side diagnostic messages.
  • Centralized error handling audits: Verifying that all 4xx/5xx responses are generated by a common, security-reviewed component rather than ad-hoc responses scattered throughout the codebase.
  • Dynamic testing: Automated scanners or manual penetration tests that inject typical XSS payload markers into URLs and verify whether they appear unescaped in error pages.

Sources

SourceLink
cheatsheetseries.owasp.orgcheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross_Site_Scripting_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html
github.comgithub.com/rucio/rucio/releases/tag/35.8.3
github.comgithub.com/rucio/rucio/releases/tag/38.5.4
github.comgithub.com/rucio/rucio/releases/tag/39.3.1
github.comgithub.com/rucio/rucio/security/advisories/GHSA-h79m-5jjm-jm4q

Frequently asked

questions

The vulnerability is broadly exploitable wherever the Rucio WebUI is accessible to users. An attacker only needs the ability to craft a URL that triggers the vulnerable 500 error path and convince victims to click it. The most significant impact occurs against authenticated users with active sessions.

Not necessarily. The attacker can often exploit the reflected XSS path without authentication by constructing a URL that triggers an internal error using publicly reachable endpoints. However, to gain meaningful access (such as stealing valuable session tokens), the victim must be an authenticated user.

The safest pattern is to completely decouple user-facing error pages from raw server-side exception data. Use generic, static error templates and log detailed exception information server-side, while ensuring any dynamic data that must appear in an error page is passed through strict, context-aware encoding functions.

Adopt a secure templating framework with auto-escaping enabled by default, centralize error handling, and enforce coding standards that forbid direct inclusion of exception messages or request parameters in HTML without sanitization. Complement these practices with code review checklists and automated security testing specifically targeting error pages and debugging features.

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