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CVE-2026-25109

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.0)

OS Command Injection in XWEB Pro get setup Route

CVE-2026-25109

Modified

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.0)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

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Summary

An OS command injection vulnerability in XWEB Pro up to version 1.12.1 allows an authenticated attacker to inject malicious commands through the devices field when accessing the get setup route.

When exploited, this flaw can lead to remote code execution with the privileges of the XWEB Pro service on the underlying system.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in XWEB Pro deployments that expose the get setup route to authenticated users and pass the devices field into underlying OS-level commands or scripts.

It is relevant when user-controlled input is used to construct shell commands, command-line arguments, or script invocations without strict validation or proper escaping.

The risk is higher in environments where authenticated users are untrusted or where multiple tenants share the same device or management interface.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP interface exposing the get setup route in XWEB Pro.
  • Required access: Authenticated access to the XWEB Pro management interface with permission to interact with the get setup endpoint.
  • Trigger point: Submission of crafted data in the devices field when invoking the get setup route.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The server-side logic incorporates the devices field directly or indirectly into an OS command without safe parameterization, escaping, or strict input constraints, allowing attackers to break out of expected input format and inject arbitrary shell commands.

Why this happens

The underlying issue is improper neutralization of special elements used in OS commands, aligning with CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection').

Application code appears to treat the devices field as trusted and directly embeds it into command lines or shell-invoking APIs, rather than using parameterized process execution or validated, whitelisted input.

This pattern allows user-controlled input to alter the structure of the command rather than serving solely as data, enabling execution of attacker-chosen OS commands.

Potential impact

  • Remote execution of arbitrary commands with the privileges of the XWEB Pro service.
  • Reading, modifying, or deleting local files accessible to the service account.
  • Pivoting deeper into the network from the compromised host.
  • Installing backdoors or malware to maintain persistent access.
  • Disrupting normal device operation, potentially leading to denial of service.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation generally focuses on removing direct coupling between user input and OS command construction and reducing the privileges of any command execution components:

  • Prefer high-level APIs or libraries over shell commands for device and system management, so user input is handled as data, not command text.
  • Where command execution is unavoidable, use parameterized process execution (e.g., direct argv arrays) instead of invoking a shell, and avoid concatenating input into command strings.
  • Apply strict allowlists for the devices field, limiting it to known-valid identifiers, formats, and character sets.
  • Enforce robust input validation and reject or sanitize characters with special meaning in shells (such as separators, redirection operators, and metacharacters).
  • Run the XWEB Pro process and any helper utilities with least-privilege accounts and restricted filesystem and network access to limit blast radius if exploitation occurs.
  • Segment management interfaces onto dedicated, access-controlled networks to reduce exposure from untrusted authenticated users.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can combine code-focused and runtime-oriented approaches:

  • Static analysis: Search for code paths where request parameters (especially the devices field) are passed into shell-invoking APIs (e.g., generic command execution helpers, system calls, or script wrappers) using string concatenation.
  • Code review: Flag patterns where shell commands are built using string interpolation, concatenation, or unvalidated user input, and confirm whether shells are invoked unnecessarily instead of direct API calls.
  • Policy enforcement: Establish secure coding guidelines prohibiting direct shell invocation with user-controlled data, and enforce them via pre-commit hooks, CI checks, or SAST tools.
  • Runtime monitoring: Use logging and command auditing to detect anomalous command patterns, unexpected arguments, or command sequences originating from web request handlers tied to the get setup route.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-057-10.json
webapps.copeland.comwebapps.copeland.com/Dixell/Pages/SystemSoftwareUpdate
cisa.govcisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-057-10

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, it is remotely exploitable through the XWEB Pro HTTP interface, but it requires authenticated access to the get setup route.

An attacker must have valid credentials or otherwise gain authenticated access to the XWEB Pro interface and be able to submit requests that control the devices field on the get setup endpoint.

The safest approach is to avoid shell command construction entirely for handling user input by using high-level APIs or direct system calls; where commands are necessary, enforce strict allowlists, treat all user input as data (not command text), and invoke processes without a shell.

Adopt secure coding standards that forbid using raw shell commands with user input, mandate input validation and allowlists for all externally supplied data, integrate static analysis into CI pipelines to catch injection patterns, and conduct regular security-focused code reviews on request-handling and command-execution components.

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