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CVE-2026-25041

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

OS Command Injection in Budibase PostgreSQL Integration

CVE-2026-25041

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution in Application Context

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Budibase's PostgreSQL integration constructs shell commands using user-supplied connection parameters (such as database name, host, and password) without adequate sanitization.

An attacker who can control these configuration values may inject arbitrary shell metacharacters, potentially leading to command execution on the server hosting Budibase.

Affected context

This vulnerability exists in Budibase deployments that use the PostgreSQL integration implemented in packages/server/src/integrations/postgres.ts.

It manifests when PostgreSQL connection parameters (database name, host, user, password, or similar fields) are taken from user-controlled or tenant-controlled configuration and interpolated directly into shell commands.

The risk increases in multi-tenant or self-service environments where untrusted users can define or edit database connection settings through the Budibase UI or APIs.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Budibase server process, specifically the PostgreSQL integration path.
  • Required access: Ability to create or modify PostgreSQL connection configurations (e.g., via admin or project configuration interfaces, API calls, or compromised admin accounts).
  • Trigger point: Execution of the PostgreSQL integration logic that builds and runs shell commands using the provided connection parameters.
  • Why exploitation is possible: Connection parameters are directly interpolated into a shell command without proper escaping or use of safer execution primitives, allowing shell metacharacters and injected commands to be interpreted by the operating system.

Why this happens

The root cause is the construction of shell commands using string concatenation or interpolation with untrusted input, rather than treating arguments as data.

In the PostgreSQL integration, configuration values like host, database, and password are inserted into a command line that is then passed to the system shell.

This pattern matches CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, because shell metacharacters included in these fields can alter the command's structure and behavior.

The design implicitly assumes configuration values are safe and does not enforce strict validation, encoding, or separation of command and arguments.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary OS commands with the privileges of the Budibase server process
  • Unauthorized access to local files or environment-managed secrets
  • Lateral movement to other services or databases reachable from the Budibase host
  • Disruption of service, including denial of service or data corruption
  • Potential pivot to broader infrastructure compromise if the process has elevated privileges

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation centers on eliminating direct shell interpolation and narrowing the trust boundary around configuration data.

Pattern-based mitigation strategies include:

  • Avoid building shell commands with string concatenation; use library APIs (e.g., native PostgreSQL client libraries) instead of shelling out where possible.
  • Where shell invocation is unavoidable, use process spawning APIs that accept argument arrays and bypass the shell, ensuring arguments are treated as data, not executable syntax.
  • Apply strict validation and normalization to all connection parameters, rejecting or tightly constraining characters that have no valid place in hostnames, database names, or usernames.
  • Treat configuration values, even from "admin" users, as untrusted input and apply consistent input handling policies.
  • Run the Budibase server with least-privilege OS accounts and minimal filesystem and network permissions to limit blast radius if an injection occurs.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection efforts can focus on both code-level patterns and runtime behavior.

Code-centric approaches:

  • Use static analysis rules to flag any use of shell execution APIs (e.g., exec, spawn with shell: true, or similar) where user-derived configuration values are concatenated into the command string.
  • During code review, look for string-templated commands in integration modules, especially where credentials and connection details are involved.
  • Enforce secure coding guidelines that prohibit shell-based database utilities unless arguments are passed as structured arrays and sanitized.

Runtime and operational approaches:

  • Monitor logs for unusual or malformed PostgreSQL configuration values, particularly those containing shell metacharacters or unexpected whitespace.
  • Use host-based intrusion detection or command auditing to detect anomalous processes spawned by the Budibase server.
  • Integrate automated security scanning tools into CI pipelines to surface command injection patterns before deployment.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Budibase/budibase/blob/f34d545602a7c94427bae63312a5ee9bf2aa6c85/packages/server/src/integrations/postgres.ts#L529-L531
github.comgithub.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/9fdbff32fb9e69650ba899a799e13f80d9b09e93
github.comgithub.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-726g-59wr-cj4c

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, if remote users are able to influence PostgreSQL connection configurations through the Budibase interface or APIs. In self-service or multi-tenant setups, this often becomes remotely exploitable via normal application entry points.

An attacker typically needs access to create or modify PostgreSQL integration settings—this may require administrative or project-owner privileges, or compromise of such an account. In some deployments, misconfigured roles or exposed APIs might inadvertently grant this capability more broadly.

The most robust fix is to avoid invoking shell commands for database interactions and instead use direct database client libraries. If shells must be used, pass all parameters as separate arguments (not through the shell), enforce strict validation, and disallow unsafe characters.

Adopt a development standard that treats all configuration values as untrusted, forbids string-built shell commands with user-derived data, and mandates the use of parameterized APIs or argument arrays. Reinforce these standards with static analysis, code review checklists, and security-focused testing in the CI/CD pipeline.

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