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CVE-2026-24856

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

Type Conversion and Input Validation Error in iccDEV ICC

CVE-2026-24856

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Type Conversion and Input Validation Error

CWE:

CWE-20, CWE-681, CWE-704

Impact:

Memory Corruption and Potential Remote Code Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

iccDEV versions prior to 2.3.1.2 contain a type conversion flaw when floating-point NaN values from ICC profile XML data are converted into unsigned short integers, leading to undefined behavior and possible memory corruption.

Under conditions where an attacker can influence ICC profile content, this unsafe conversion can be abused to corrupt internal memory structures and potentially achieve arbitrary code execution during profile parsing.

Affected context

This issue occurs in applications that use the iccDEV library (pre-2.3.1.2) to parse ICC color profiles, especially when profiles are loaded from user-provided or otherwise untrusted sources (e.g., uploaded images, documents, or assets containing embedded ICC profiles).

The vulnerable code path is triggered during ICC profile XML parsing when floating-point values, including NaN, are converted into unsigned short integer fields without robust validation or error handling.

Impact is most relevant in workflows where ICC profile data can be injected or modified by an attacker as part of larger structured files or streams.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Any application or service that links against vulnerable iccDEV versions and parses ICC profiles (including embedded profiles in images, PDFs, or other media).
  • Required access: Ability to supply or modify ICC profile data or files processed by iccDEV (e.g., uploading or opening attacker-crafted content).
  • Trigger point: Parsing of ICC profile XML data that contains specially crafted floating-point values, including NaNs, which are then converted to unsigned short integers.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The conversion of NaN floating-point values to unsigned short types occurs without sufficient input validation or range checking, leading to undefined behavior that can corrupt memory structures and create conditions for arbitrary code execution.

Why this happens

The vulnerability stems from unsafe handling of numeric type conversions during ICC profile XML parsing. Floating-point values sourced from profile data, including NaNs, are converted into unsigned short integer fields without enforcing valid ranges, checking for non-numeric values, or defining a safe fallback behavior.

This pattern maps to:

  • CWE-681: Incorrect Conversion between Numeric Types – the code assumes that a floating-point value can be safely represented as an unsigned short without verifying its validity or representability.
  • CWE-704: Incorrect Type Conversion or Cast – the implementation implicitly trusts that the type cast will produce a meaningful and safe result, but NaN and other out-of-range values cause undefined behavior.

Combined with limited input validation (CWE-20) on ICC profile data, this leads to memory corruption when corrupted or malicious values are written into internal structures that expect well-formed numeric data.

Potential impact

  • Memory corruption within the iccDEV process during ICC profile parsing.
  • Application crashes or denial of service when malformed profiles are processed.
  • Arbitrary code execution in the context of the application using iccDEV, if memory corruption is carefully controlled.
  • Potential compromise of systems that automatically process untrusted media with embedded ICC profiles.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on hardening numeric conversions and strengthening input validation around ICC profile parsing:

  • Treat all ICC profile content as untrusted input, especially when profiles are embedded in user-supplied media or documents.
  • Apply strict validation of floating-point values before conversion:
  • Reject or sanitize NaN, infinite, and out-of-range values.
  • Define explicit bounds and clamp or normalize values before casting to smaller integer types.
  • Centralize numeric conversion routines with consistent checks, rather than performing ad-hoc casts scattered across parsing code.
  • Prefer defensive coding patterns that:
  • Check for conversion errors and propagate failures instead of continuing with partially initialized structures.
  • Use safer intermediate types or representations that avoid undefined behavior on invalid input.
  • Run code that parses ICC profiles with least privilege, sandboxing, or process isolation where possible to limit the blast radius of potential memory corruption.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically involves a mix of static analysis, targeted testing, and defensive review of parsing routines:

  • Static analysis and code scanning:
  • Search for casts from floating-point types (e.g., float, double) to small integer types (unsigned short, uint16_t) in the ICC parsing code.
  • Flag locations where conversions occur without explicit range checks, NaN checks, or error handling.
  • Define rules in SAST tools to highlight unsafe numeric conversions in parsers and file format handlers.
  • Code review focus areas:
  • Review XML and binary parsing logic for assumptions about numeric formats and ranges.
  • Ensure all parsing entry points validate incoming values before storing them in internal structures.
  • Look for handling of special floating-point values (NaN, ±INF) and confirm that behavior is deliberate and safe.
  • Dynamic testing and fuzzing:
  • Use fuzzing frameworks to generate ICC profiles with malformed, extreme, and NaN-containing floating-point fields.
  • Monitor for crashes, memory corruption indicators, or anomalous behavior when processing fuzzed profiles.
  • Policy and process:
  • Establish secure coding guidelines for numeric conversions in libraries that parse complex formats.
  • Integrate automated checks into CI to detect reintroductions of unsafe cast patterns.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/InternationalColorConsortium/iccDEV/commit/5e53a5d25923b7794ba44e390e9b35d391f2b9c1
github.comgithub.com/InternationalColorConsortium/iccDEV/issues/532
github.comgithub.com/InternationalColorConsortium/iccDEV/pull/541
github.comgithub.com/InternationalColorConsortium/iccDEV/security/advisories/GHSA-w585-cv3v-c396

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, depending on how the library is used. If an application processes ICC profiles from remote or user-supplied content (such as uploaded images, documents, or media), an attacker can potentially trigger the vulnerability remotely by providing a crafted file.

The attacker needs the ability to influence or supply ICC profile data that is parsed by iccDEV. This often corresponds to the ability to upload or deliver files with embedded ICC profiles, or to otherwise inject ICC profile information into a pipeline that uses the library.

Introduce robust validation and error handling around all numeric conversions in the ICC parsing code. Specifically, detect and reject NaN, infinite, and out-of-range floating-point values before converting them to smaller integer types, and ensure parsing fails safely rather than proceeding with corrupted or undefined data.

Adopt defensive parsing practices for all complex file formats: treat all external data as untrusted, centralize numeric conversion logic with strict checks, use static analysis to detect unsafe type casts, and include fuzz testing against parsers to uncover edge cases like NaNs and extreme values early in development.

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