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CVE-2026-24836

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.6)

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in DNN PersonaBar Log Notes

CVE-2026-24836

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

CWE:

CWE-79

Impact:

Stored Cross-Site Scripting leading to privilege abuse in the admin UI

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.6)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

DNN extensions could store rich text, including script content, inside log notes that are later rendered in the PersonaBar without proper output encoding.

When a privileged user views these logs, the embedded scripts can execute in their browser context, enabling stored cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks within the DNN administration interface.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in DNN (DotNetNuke) installations using versions 9.0.0 and later, but prior to 9.13.10 and 10.2.0, where extensions can write richtext content into log notes.

The risk is present when these log notes are rendered inside the PersonaBar administration interface without strict sanitization or context-appropriate output encoding.

It particularly affects administrators and other privileged users who routinely review logs through the PersonaBar.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: DNN log note rendering in the PersonaBar administrative UI.
  • Required access: Ability to influence or create log entries that support richtext content (e.g., via extensions, modules, or operations that write to logs).
  • Trigger point: A privileged user (such as an administrator) opens the PersonaBar and views log entries containing the malicious richtext.
  • Why exploitation is possible: Log note content is treated as rich HTML without sufficient sanitization or context-aware escaping, allowing attacker-controlled script blocks or event handlers to execute in the browser.

Why this happens

The core issue aligns with CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (Cross-Site Scripting).

User- or extension-controlled log note data is stored and later rendered as richtext in the PersonaBar without applying robust HTML sanitization and context-aware output encoding.

Because log notes are considered display content rather than untrusted input, scripts and active content can slip through and execute in the administrator's browser when the logs are viewed.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary JavaScript in the context of an authenticated, privileged DNN user session.
  • Theft of session tokens, anti-CSRF tokens, or other sensitive data accessible via the admin UI.
  • Unauthorized actions performed on behalf of the admin user (e.g., managing users, changing content, or installing/removing extensions).
  • Lateral movement within the DNN environment through abuse of elevated privileges.
  • Defacement or injection of malicious content into the CMS.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on treating all log content as untrusted and enforcing strict output handling:

  • Apply context-appropriate output encoding for any data rendered into the PersonaBar (e.g., HTML-encoding text content, attribute-encoding values, and avoiding direct insertion into script contexts).
  • Use a vetted HTML sanitization library to strip or neutralize script tags, event handlers, and other active content from richtext fields sourced from logs or extensions.
  • Restrict the ability of extensions to emit arbitrary rich HTML into logs; favor plain text or a limited, well-defined markup subset.
  • Enforce least-privilege principles for extensions and modules so that compromised or buggy components have reduced impact on administrative interfaces.
  • Adopt secure UI design patterns where admin consoles never trust stored content, regardless of its origin (core platform, extension, or user action).

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect and monitor for similar issues using a combination of review and tooling:

  • Static analysis: Configure rules to flag direct rendering of dynamic data in views without encoding, especially in admin or logging interfaces.
  • Code review: Examine logging and diagnostic features to ensure log data is treated as untrusted and encoded before display; pay special attention to richtext rendering helpers.
  • Security testing: Perform manual and automated XSS testing against areas displaying stored data such as logs, audit trails, and administrative dashboards.
  • Policy enforcement: Establish coding standards that mandate output encoding and HTML sanitization for all user- or extension-controlled content, reinforced by CI checks or automated code review tools.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/dnnsoftware/Dnn.Platform/security/advisories/GHSA-2g5g-hcgh-q3rp

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, remote exploitation is possible if an attacker can trigger or control log entries that support richtext. Once the malicious content is stored, it executes when an administrator views the affected logs in the PersonaBar.

The attacker needs a path to influence the content of log notes—typically through an extension, module, or action that writes to logs. Direct admin access is not required for the attack to succeed, but an admin must eventually view the tainted logs to trigger execution.

The most robust fix is to treat all log note content as untrusted and always apply context-aware output encoding and/or HTML sanitization before rendering it. Additionally, limit or eliminate the use of arbitrary richtext in logs and prefer plain text wherever feasible.

Adopt a default stance that all stored data is untrusted, enforce strict encoding and sanitization at every output boundary, and bake these rules into shared UI helpers and frameworks. Combine this with secure coding guidelines, automated checks for unencoded outputs, and regular security testing focused on administrative and diagnostic interfaces.

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