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CVE-2026-24790

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.2)

Missing Authentication in Industrial Device

CVE-2026-24790

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authentication

CWE:

CWE-306

Impact:

Unauthorized Remote Control of PLC Operations

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A missing authentication control in the device's underlying PLC interface allows remote entities to influence PLC behavior without proper safeguards.

When exposed over a network, this weakness can permit unauthorized changes to control logic or process parameters, potentially impacting safety, availability, or product quality.

Affected context

This vulnerability arises in industrial or embedded devices that integrate a programmable logic controller (PLC) and expose control or configuration endpoints over a network.

It is especially relevant when:

  • The PLC interface is reachable from untrusted networks (e.g., corporate LAN, remote access links, or the internet)
  • There is no authentication or session control on the PLC command or configuration channel
  • Network segmentation and access control are weak or inconsistent

In such environments, an attacker may issue PLC commands or change device behavior remotely, assuming basic connectivity is possible.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible PLC communication or management interface (e.g., TCP/IP-based fieldbus, web API, or proprietary protocol).
  • Required access: Ability to reach the device's PLC endpoint over the network (logical connectivity), which may occur via local network presence, VPN, or exposed services.
  • Trigger point: Sending crafted control, configuration, or state-change messages directly to the PLC interface, which are accepted without identity verification.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The PLC interface lacks authentication and proper access control, so the device cannot distinguish between authorized operators and arbitrary network clients.

Why this happens

The core issue maps to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function.

The device's PLC control or configuration functions are exposed in a way that assumes a trusted network environment and does not enforce authentication, authorization, or session management.

This design pattern treats network reachability as equivalent to authorization, allowing any party with connectivity to invoke sensitive PLC operations such as changing setpoints, toggling outputs, or modifying logic.

In industrial contexts, this reflects a broader architectural weakness where safety- or process-critical actions are not gated by identity, role, or policy checks.

Potential impact

  • Remote modification of process control parameters (e.g., speed, temperature, pressure) that may impact safety or equipment health
  • Unauthorized starting, stopping, or altering of device operations, potentially causing downtime or production loss
  • Manipulation of PLC logic or state that can degrade product quality or lead to defective output
  • Use of the PLC as an entry point for broader OT network disruption or coordinated process interference
  • Erosion of operator trust in instrumentation readings or system behavior due to undetected remote interference

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation typically focuses on adding robust access control to PLC interfaces and minimizing exposure of critical functions.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Enforcing strong authentication on all PLC management and control endpoints, including role-based access for configuration versus monitoring
  • Applying the principle of least privilege, ensuring remote interfaces expose only the minimum set of commands necessary for operations
  • Implementing network segmentation to isolate PLCs within protected OT zones, with tightly controlled gateways for remote access
  • Using secure-by-default configurations where remote control is disabled or highly restricted unless explicitly enabled and governed
  • Introducing compensating controls such as physical interlocks, safety layers, or local-only overrides that limit the effect of remote commands
  • Logging and monitoring PLC access attempts so that unexpected remote interactions can be detected and investigated

How teams detect issues like this

Effective detection strategies focus on both design-time and runtime signals:

  • Static analysis & design review:
  • Review PLC communication interfaces and APIs for missing authentication or authorization checks on sensitive operations.
  • Identify any assumptions that the network is "trusted" without cryptographic or identity-based enforcement.
  • Check configuration templates and deployment guides for guidance that leaves PLC control interfaces unauthenticated by default.
  • Configuration & policy audits:
  • Analyze device and gateway configurations to ensure that remote access paths require credentials and are constrained by roles or ACLs.
  • Validate that remote management features are disabled when not needed and that default passwords or open access modes are not in use.
  • Network- and log-based monitoring:
  • Monitor for unexpected PLC control messages from unusual hosts, segments, or at abnormal times.
  • Use security monitoring tools (including IDS/IPS or specialized OT monitoring solutions) to flag unauthenticated or anomalous PLC commands.

Automated code review tools, OT security scanners, and configuration compliance frameworks can help systematically identify missing authentication patterns in PLC-enabled devices.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-050-04.json
cisa.govcisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-050-04
welker.comwelker.com/contact-us/welker-team

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, if the PLC or its controlling device is reachable from external networks (e.g., via VPN, remote access gateways, or misconfigured firewall rules). If exposure is limited to a tightly segmented OT network, the scope is narrower but still serious.

The attacker generally needs only network connectivity to the PLC interface; no valid credentials or prior foothold on the device are required when authentication is absent.

Introduce mandatory authentication and authorization for all PLC control and configuration operations, combined with network segmentation that restricts who can even attempt to connect, and ensure that remote-control features are disabled by default unless needed and governed.

Apply secure-by-design principles in OT and embedded development: treat every network-exposed PLC function as untrusted, require strong identity and role checks for critical commands, define clear trust boundaries, and regularly review device interfaces against authentication and access-control requirements.

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