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CVE-2026-24785

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

Cryptographic Weakness / Protocol Misuse in Clatter Noise

CVE-2026-24785

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Cryptographic Weakness / Protocol Misuse

CWE:

CWE-327

Impact:

Loss of Confidentiality and Session Key Security Guarantees

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Clatter's pre‑2.2.0 post‑quantum Noise handshake implementation allowed PSK-based patterns that violated the Noise Protocol Framework's PSK validity rules.

Under certain *_psk0 patterns, PSK-derived keys could be used without proper randomization from ephemeral randomness, weakening confidentiality guarantees and potentially enabling catastrophic key reuse in real-world deployments.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects Rust applications that use Clatter's post-quantum Noise handshakes and rely on pre-shared keys for additional security.

It specifically concerns default and custom handshake patterns that:

  • Use *_psk0 post-quantum patterns (e.g., noise_pqkk_psk0, noise_pqkn_psk0, noise_pqnk_psk0, noise_pqnn_psk0) or similar hybrids
  • Expect Noise PSK processing to strictly follow Section 9.3 of the Noise Protocol Framework
  • Depend on the library to enforce protocol-valid construction of handshake patterns

Environments with long-lived PSKs, high-value data, or long-term secrecy requirements are at particular risk, especially where key reuse and traffic analysis are realistic threats.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Any communication channel using Clatter's affected post-quantum Noise PSK patterns, including embedded, no_std, and constrained devices.
  • Required attacker capability: Ability to observe or manipulate traffic over time, exploit weakened key derivation, or leverage protocol analysis; the attacker does not necessarily need code execution on either endpoint.
  • Trigger point: Use of an offending post-quantum *_psk0 handshake pattern where PSK-derived keys are used for encryption without sufficient randomization from fresh ephemeral values.
  • Why exploitation is possible: Because the protocol implementation allowed PSK processing that violated Noise's PSK validity rule, some session keys could be insufficiently randomized and potentially reused or become linkable, weakening the expected cryptographic security and forward secrecy properties.

Why this happens

The core issue is an incorrect enforcement of protocol-level cryptographic invariants rather than a low-level primitive failure.

Clatter's implementation permitted handshake patterns that were formally disallowed by the Noise Protocol Framework's PSK validity rules (Section 9.3).

Specifically, some post-quantum PSK handshakes allowed PSK-derived material to be used for encryption without proper mixing with strong, self-chosen ephemeral randomness.

This maps to CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm, in the sense of assembling a cryptographic protocol in a way that does not meet its design assumptions.

By not preventing invalid PSK placement in handshake patterns, the library enabled constructions where:

  • Key derivation did not fully align with the Noise threat model
  • Certain sessions could end up with lower entropy or predictable relationships between keys

Such protocol misuse can result in key reuse across sessions or predictable key structure, which in turn undermines confidentiality and some forward secrecy expectations.

Potential impact

  • Session keys may be less random than expected, weakening confidentiality guarantees.
  • Catastrophic key reuse may occur across sessions using the same PSK and pattern.
  • Long-term traffic could become more vulnerable to cryptanalytic attacks or correlation.
  • Handshakes may no longer meet the advertised Noise security properties (e.g., forward secrecy or resistance to active attackers).
  • High-value applications relying on post-quantum handshakes for strong confidentiality may face elevated risk of sensitive data exposure.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on enforcing protocol-compliant handshakes and reducing reliance on fragile PSK constructions:

  • Prefer handshake patterns that are explicitly compliant with the Noise Protocol Framework's PSK rules and avoid custom PSK placements without expert review.
  • Avoid using *_psk0 post-quantum patterns and instead use PSK positions and patterns that are documented as valid and secure.
  • Treat PSKs as highly sensitive long-term credentials: minimize their reuse across contexts and avoid combining them with experimental or non-standard patterns.
  • Introduce runtime validation or configuration-layer checks to reject handshake patterns that violate the Noise PSK validity constraints.
  • Apply defense in depth by limiting the exposure of PSKs (e.g., hardware-backed secrets, strict access controls) and avoiding assumptions that the protocol will "fix" poor key management practices.
  • Where design permits, favor patterns that derive strong session keys from both authenticated static keys and high-quality ephemeral randomness rather than heavily relying on PSKs.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection is centered on configuration and protocol design review rather than simple signature-based scanning:

  • Static analysis / config linting: Check for the use of post-quantum *_psk0 patterns or equivalent custom patterns that place PSKs in disallowed positions.
  • Code review practices: During security review, explicitly verify that all Noise handshake patterns used in the codebase are:
  • Drawn from vetted, documented patterns
  • Compliant with the Noise PSK validity rules
  • Not altered in ways that circumvent protocol guidance
  • Library-level enforcement: Enable or implement runtime checks in the cryptographic library to validate handshake patterns at construction time, rejecting invalid PSK placement.
  • Automated tooling: Integrate cryptographic configuration auditors or protocol linters (where available) into CI/CD pipelines to flag risky or non-standard handshake definitions.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/jmlepisto/clatter/commit/b65ae6e9b8019bed5407771e21f89ddff17c5a71
github.comgithub.com/jmlepisto/clatter/security/advisories/GHSA-253q-9q78-63x4
noiseprotocol.orgnoiseprotocol.org/noise.html#validity-rule

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. Any remote attacker capable of observing or interacting with protocols using affected handshake patterns may benefit from the weakened cryptographic properties, particularly over long-lived or high-volume connections.

The attacker typically needs network-level access to observe or participate in the handshake and subsequent traffic.

They do not need access to the server or client internals, but the impact is most significant when they can correlate or analyze many sessions using the same PSK and pattern.

Stop using invalid or *_psk0 post-quantum patterns and move to handshake patterns that are explicitly compliant with the Noise PSK rules.

Ensure the cryptographic library enforces protocol-valid pattern construction and, where possible, add runtime or configuration checks to reject unsafe patterns.

Base cryptographic protocol usage strictly on well-reviewed specifications and reference patterns, avoid ad-hoc or custom handshake designs without expert review, and institutionalize security review of all cryptographic configurations.

Incorporate automated checks for handshake patterns, and treat PSK usage as a design decision requiring explicit threat modeling rather than a mere configuration choice.

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