Summary
An OS command injection vulnerability in Cisco RV130/RV130W and RV110W routers allows arbitrary command execution via the machine_name configuration parameter.
When an authenticated remote attacker controls this parameter, they can inject system commands that run with root privileges on the device.
Affected context
This vulnerability occurs in Cisco RV130/RV130W and RV110W router environments where the web-based or remote management interface allows authenticated users to set or modify the machine_name configuration parameter.
The issue manifests in firmware versions where the rc binary's start_lltd() function constructs shell commands using this parameter without adequate sanitization or validation.
It is most relevant in deployments that expose management interfaces to untrusted networks or share administrative credentials among multiple users.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Router management interface (web UI, API, or equivalent configuration channel).
- Required access: Valid authenticated access capable of setting the machine_name configuration parameter (e.g., administrative or high-privilege user).
- Trigger point: Invocation of the start_lltd() function in the rc binary, typically during service start or configuration application.
- Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled input is directly embedded into OS command strings without escaping, validation, or separation from shell metacharacters, enabling arbitrary command injection.
Why this happens
The root cause aligns with CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection').
Within the start_lltd() function of the rc binary, the machine_name configuration parameter is likely concatenated into a shell or system command line without neutralizing special characters such as ;, &&, |, or backticks.
This insecure pattern treats configuration values as trusted data, allowing them to alter command structure rather than being constrained to simple, inert arguments.
The absence of strict validation, escaping, or the use of safer APIs that avoid the shell altogether results in arbitrary command execution when a malicious machine_name value is processed.
Potential impact
- An attacker may execute arbitrary OS commands with root privileges on the router.
- The device configuration could be modified or reset, impacting network availability.
- Attackers could install persistent malware or backdoors on the router.
- Network traffic could be intercepted, redirected, or inspected for data exfiltration.
- The router may be co-opted into broader attacks, such as DDoS participation or lateral movement within the internal network.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation focuses on removing the ability for user-supplied configuration values to influence shell command structure and reducing the trust placed in management inputs.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Avoid building shell commands via string concatenation; instead use APIs that pass arguments as structured parameters without invoking a shell.
- Strictly validate configuration parameters like machine_name against a whitelist of allowed characters and length limits, rejecting values containing shell metacharacters or control characters.
- Normalize and encode user-provided input before use, ensuring it cannot alter command syntax.
- Reduce the privilege level of processes that interact with user-controlled configuration wherever possible, following least-privilege principles.
- Restrict access to the management interface to only trusted networks and dedicated administrative accounts, limiting who can set potentially sensitive parameters.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection commonly relies on both code-centric and operational monitoring techniques:
- Static analysis rules targeting shell invocation APIs (e.g., system, popen, exec variants) that incorporate configuration-derived strings without sanitization.
- Code review practices emphasizing scrutiny of any command construction logic, ensuring parameterization and validation of router configuration values like machine_name.
- Policy-based checks in CI/CD pipelines that flag direct concatenation of user-controlled data into command lines or the use of high-risk shell utilities in control-plane binaries.
- Runtime monitoring of router logs and process activity for unusual command executions, unexpected child processes spawned from rc or related management binaries, and anomalous system calls.
- Network-based detection through anomaly monitoring for traffic patterns that may indicate compromised routers (e.g., unsolicited outbound connections or DDoS participation).

